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ABSTRACT
This study examines the way in which certain foreign policy decisions 
were made in the latter stages of the Republican-Royalist war of the 
1960s. It seeks to explain hew decisions were made, under what 
circumstances, who the decision-makers were, and what the influences 
were, internal as well as external, which bore on the foreign policy 
making of the Yemeni Republic.
In addressing these questions four major decisions are analysed. 
These are:
1. The rejection of the Khartoum Agreement on Yemen concluded by the 
Egyptian President Djamal Abd al-Nasir and King Faysal of Saudi 
Arabia on 31 August, 1967;
2. The recognition of the independence of the People's Republic of 
South Yemen on 30 November, 1967;
3. The resumption of diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic 
of Germany on 15 July, 1969;
4. The acceptance of the proposed reconciliation agreement with Saudi 
Arabia and the Yemeni Royalists on 31 March, 1970.
These decisions were all made in the second half of the war, beginning 
at a time when Egyptian influence in Yemen had receded and a more 
autonomous YAR policy was emerging. These decisions were made by 
different elites, in response to various stimuli, and under divergent 
settings and could thus be taken as representative of YAR decision­
making in this period.
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This investigation confirms that in Yemen, as with other third world 
countries, the decision-making process was dominated by personalities, 
and in particular by the two heads of state, Marshal Abdallah al- 
Sallal and Kadi Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani. However, contrary to the 
assumption of the primacy in the decision-making process of the 
personal predispositions of the principal decision-makers, especially 
in stress situations, the personal predisposition of the two heads of 
the Yemeni Republic were largely subordinated to the supreme objective 
of the regime defined in terms of the survival of the Republican 
system.
External factors helped to shape the decision-making process. The 
YAR, as a poor-resource developing state, had insufficient capacity to 
either defend itself against the Royalist military threat or achieve 
other less vital objectives such as economic development. For these, 
it had to rely on external assistance and as a result, other states, 
especially the UAR and USSR in the pre-1968 era, became important in 
the decision-making calculus. In another aspect, the Royalist threat 
dictated the need for solidarity within the YAR governing elite and 
facilitated the adoption of decisions on the crucial issue of security 
by consensus. Similarity of views and the existence of shared values 
among the post-November 5, 1967 government, ensured the perpetuation 
of this pattern of decision-making with respect to almost all issues.
One of the objectives of the study is to contribute to analysing 
comparative foreign policy decision-making, and sane conclusions are 
related to propositions pertaining to decision-making in third world 
countries. However, other conclusions shew that, in the Yemeni 
situation, the existing theories have only limited applicability.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
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This study is the first to investigate how certain Yemen Arab Republic 
(YAR) policies were formulated and implemented. It is intended to be 
both a contribution to Yemeni studies and an addition to the 
cumulative knowledge of comparative foreign policy-making. Its 
significance in these areas is demonstrated in two ways. Firstly, YAR 
policy-making during the period under consideration took place in 
conditions of a protracted conflict between the Republican government 
and the externally-backed Royalist insurgents. This situation may be 
presumed to have affected the decisional process in many ways and thus 
to have given such a case study a particular significance. Secondly, 
the policy-making process took place within newly established
Republican institutions. Indeed, the 1960s represented a formative 
period for YAR foreign policy-making in both conceptual and 
institutional respects. In this context, the study could provide 
students of Yemeni politics with seme insight into a crucial stage in 
the evolution of YAR foreign policy-making. To students of
comparative foreign policy-making, it represents another instance of 
third world policy-making under conditions of political and social 
transformation.
Despite the fact that Yemen has recently been assuming an increasingly 
important role in regional politics, it remains probably the least
studied country in the Arab world. This fact is no more evident than
in the almost total absence of works pertaining to its foreign policy. 
Until very recently, there was an apparent lack of interest on the 
part of the Arab and Western institutions in Yemen’s foreign policy. 
Due to the country's continued reliance on external aid, its foreign 
policy was generally presumed to be more of a product of external 
pressures than an outccme of internal needs. Perhaps for that reason, 
YAR foreign policy was not studied except in general works on regional
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politics. Only during the 1980s is one able to locate literature that 
deals with the external relations of the YAR. These works are 
academic studies prepared in Arab universities by Yemeni students. 
Although such studies contribute greatly to promoting the study of the 
country's external behaviour, they essentially belong to the tradition 
of diplomatic history and deal with the YAR relations with individual 
countries.1 Only one study has been devoted to a systematic analysis 
of the country's foreign policy. This study entitled Al-Siyasah al- 
Kharidjiyyah al-Yamaniyyah fil Ahd al-Djumhuri was prepared by Dr. 
Muhammad al-Hilweh exclusively for academic use. It deals with the 
internal and external determinants of the country's foreign policy. 
It is, however, brief and, like the other works an the subject, was 
unable to consult the available primary sources, written or oral, 
necessary for such undertakings. Hew the YAR foreign policy was 
formulated remained completely unexplored territory. It is the main 
objective of this study partially to fill this gap by providing, as 
far as is possible, a systematic analysis of Yemen's foreign policy­
making based mainly on primary sources, and in particular on interview 
material.
The lack of sufficient literature highlights the contribution of this 
study, but at the same time constituted a severe constraint on the 
conduct of the project. Much of the required primary information was 
unrecorded. Minutes of the cabinets meetings were not recorded during 
the 1960s. Large parts of the state's documents are still scattered 
and many of those pertaining to the 1960s are lost. What is available 
is out of the public reach. Even the archives of Radio Sana'a are 
only partially organised and require special permission before use. 
The newspapers of the 1960s, on the other hand, were focused mainly on 
the development of the war.
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Unable to rely on analysis of the few available documents, the writer 
interviewed a number of officials who contributed to the formulation 
of the country’s foreign policies at that time, including the foreign 
ministers Muhsin al-Ayni, Hasan Makki, Yahya Djaghman, Muhammad 
Sallam, Mustafa Yakub and Ahmad Barakat. These interviews yielded 
only limited results, either because sane of the interviewees were 
reluctant to answer questions or because they knew only part of the 
story. Until very recently, decision making in Yemen was conducted by 
individuals who did not tend to keep records of what really happened.
Due to the time span, many events were understandably beyond the 
recall of these individuals. This posed a difficult problem for the 
researcher. Except for Abd al-Rabman al-Baydani and General Abdallah 
Djuzyalan, none of the principal political figures have published 
memoirs - a useful reference for such a study. The writer was not 
able to meet with the two heads of state, President al-Sallal and 
Chairman al-Iryani, in order to ascertain their involvement in the 
decision-making process relevant to the decisions under consideration. 
It is in fact doubtful whether they would have responded positively to 
such an enquiry. Both sent written replies to the writer's enquiry 
but responded only to selected questions.
The value of these interviews were reduced by the fact that sane of 
those who responded tended to present the facts so as to shew their 
role in the best possible light. Nevertheless, the writer benefited 
fron the information provided and interpretation given. In the case 
of contrasting information, the writer used only those on which there 
was general agreement and in most cases the various interpretations 
were included.
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The problem encountered with this research could be summarised by the 
fact that the decision making approach taken, which usually requires 
abundant information of the internal politics of government, was 
applied to a case lacking the most basic literature. At one point, 
the writer contemplated abandoning the project altogether. Failure to 
secure sufficient information to the complex questions entailed in the 
study threatened the continued viability of the research. However, 
the sense of being able to contribute in seme degree to the 
understanding of the foreign policy-making of largely obscure polity 
prevailed and led to the presentation of this study.
Methodology
This study analyses YAR foreign policy-making during the Republican- 
Royalist war of 1962-1970. It seeks to explain how certain foreign- 
policy decisions were made, under what circumstances, who the decision 
makers were and what were the influences, internal as well as 
external, which bore on the policy-making process.
As the study will attempt to explain the interaction of the internal__
and external factors within the the
research will use the foreign policY-system approach. Advocates of
this approach hold that foreign policy is, in essence, a series of 
decisions made by a group of people who operate within a system 
consisting of three components: inputs, processes and outputs. Like 
any other system, the foreign policy system comprises stimuli at one 
end, a process which responds to such inputs by transferring them or 
reacting to them, and an end product of seme description which 
constitutes the performance of the system.2 As applied in this
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particular case, the inputs are the operational and psychological 
environment; the process comprises the formulation and implementation 
of policies; and the decisions represent the output of the system.
YAR policy-making will be illustrated by the examination of four major 
decisions. These decisions were taken towards the latter part of the 
war, between 1967 and 1970. Coming as they did at the point where 
Egyptian influence was diminishing, they reflect the emergence of 
autonomous YAR decision-making institutions. In the preceding period 
(October 1962 to June 1967) YAR foreign policy was, for a variety of 
reasons, influenced by that of the United Arab Republics (UAR), so 
much so it was hard to disengage the former's policies from those of 
the latter.
The study is divided into nine chapters. Chapters 2 to 4 examine the 
general setting of the decision-making system of the entire period. 
These are: The Antecedents of the Security Situation, the Decision 
Makers, and the Foreign Policy Objectives. In the second chapter, the 
main developments during the first three years of the YAR (September 
1962 - December 1965) will be reviewed under three headings, namely: 
Saudi-Egyptian intervention; the implications of the Arab and 
superpower rivalry; and internal differences. These influenced the 
decisional situation in the four cases examined as they formed 
antecedents of many of the post-1965 events. The decisional context 
identifies the decision makers and examines their role and 
significance within the legal and political framework as well as the 
general socio-political setting. The focus of the examination is on 
the way war pressures and political imperatives gave the two heads of 
state, al-Sallal and al-Iryani (1962-1967, 1967-1970 respectively), an 
added authority over the decision-making process.
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Concerning foreign policy objectives, the focus is on the evolution of 
policies in response to the changing patterns of the Royalist military 
and political challenge. The persistent challenge to the Republic 
throughout the war period resulted in the primacy of security over 
other objectives. As a result, YAR foreign policy has developed 
through three distinct phases: the Policy of Confrontation (1962-
1967); the Prelude to Reconciliation (1967-1968); and the Policy of 
Reconciliation (1968-1970).
Chapters 5 to 8 examine the four major decisions adopted in the later 
half of the war period in sane detail. With the exception of the 
initial decision to request UAR assistance in September 1962, these 
were the most important foreign policy decisions of the entire war 
era. It must be noted that in the initial period of the war (1962- 
1965), most of the YAR foreign policy activities focused on the 
developments of the war and the UAR-Saudi attempts to obtain a 
peaceful settlement. In addition, UAR intervention in sane of the 
YAR's foreign policy decisions make it less meaningful to talk about 
completely independent Yemeni actions. The decisions analysed are 
those relating to:
The rejection of the Khartoum Agreement on Yemen concluded by 
Egyptian President Nasir and King Faysal of Saudi Arabia on 31 
August, 1967.
The recognition of the independence of the People's Republic of 
South Yemen (PRSY) on 30 November, 1967.
The resumption of ruptured diplomatic relations with the Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG) on 15 July, 1969.
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The acceptance of the reconciliation deal with Saudi Arabia on 31 
March, 1970.
In analysing these decisions, the research will be guided by the 
various frameworks devised for the study of policy-making using the 
system approach, but will not attempt to apply any particular model. 
The peculiar characteristics of the Yemeni decis ion-making and the war 
conditions under which these decisions were made called for a much
simpler framework. Therefore, the analysis siirply proceeds along the
\
basic sequence of systemic action as used by foreign policy system 
theorists. These are: the operational and psychological environment 
(the input); the formulation and implementation of decisions (the 
process); the decisional outcane (the output); and the decisional 
consequences (feedback).3 It should be noted that due to the limited 
scope of this study, the decisions, which represent the main output of 
the system will, by necessity, be included but not treated separately. 
With this in mind, the analysis will proceed along the following 
lines.
First: the Operational Environment will be investigated in terms of
the various acts and/or situations which had a bearing on the 
decisional outcomes. The emphasis here will be on the degree of 
relevance to the decision under consideration. In this context, these 
components fall into two categories; the influences and the stimuli:
a) Influences: Throughout the war, political action was motivated
primarily by defence and security imperatives. As such, the 
development of the fighting formed a permanent component of the 
operational environment. On the one hand, there were events which 
only influenced the setting of the respective decisions and
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obviously varied fran one situation to another. Economic 
conditions and the restricted nature of YAR foreign relations, for 
instance, had a profound effect on the government's decision in 
1969 to seek resumption of severed diplomatic relations with West 
Germany. On the other hand, the inability of the Republican 
forces to fill the military vacuum left by the withdrawing of 
Egyptian forces was behind al-Sallal1s fierce opposition to the 
Khartoum Agreement of August 1967.
b) Stimuli: the second step is to identify the situation or act
which constituted the stimulus for the decision under 
consideration. These by definition vary from one case to another 
but have the same effect in the sense that they provide the raison 
d'etre of the subsequent political action. While, for example, 
the Saudi-Egyptian accord in August 1967 triggered the YAR 
response, the dialogue between the Republican and the Royalist 
side during the Djedda Islamic foreign ministers' conference 
(March 1970) constituted the stimulus for the subsequent decision 
on YAR-Saudi reconciliation.
Second, The Perception of the Decision Makers: The emphasis is on
the perceptions of these individuals and how these perceptions were 
related to the relevant political behaviour. In the Yemeni case, 
foreign policy decision-makers were located at the top of the 
governing elite's hierarchy. Theoretically, the prime minister, the 
foreign minister and members of the Republican Council (after November 
1967) constituted the decision-making forum during the various stages 
of policy-making relating to the issues under investigation. 
Practically, however, the two presidents were the real and sometimes 
sole decision makers. As a result, their individual perceptions are
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particularly relevant. The decision to recognise the PRSY is 
attributed, partially at least, to the personal predisposition of 
Chairman al-Iryani.
Third, The Decisional Process: The investigation focuses on the final
political choice of members who formed the ultimate decision-making 
unit responding to the stimulus. The process is traced through three 
stages: the predecisional activities, the choice selection and the 
implementation. The emphasis is on the role of the principal decision 
maker: the way he controlled the flew of information about the event, 
his style in promoting responses in line with his preferences, and the 
procedures followed to ensure consensus on the choice made. For
example, in the case of the reconciliation decision, al-Iryani 
withheld information from cabinet members about the controversial 
aspects of the deal being arrived at in Djedda in March 24-26 and 
chose to reveal full details only during the joint Republican Council- 
Cabinet meeting in which the proposed deal was considered and 
accepted, i.e. on 31 March, 1970.
Fourth, the Feedback: Here the investigation examines the
implications of the decision for the decision-making structure and 
processes, as well as for the internal and external environments. 
Furthermore, each decision was assessed by its effect on the 
achievement of the sought objective. If it furthered that objective, 
the decision makers tended to pursue a similar course of action in the 
same issue area. Conversely, if the decision did not further the 
projected result, the decision makers would most probably adopt a 
different course of action. For instance, the positive economic and 
political results achieved by the resumption of relations with the FRG
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in 1969 enhanced the YAR leadership's convictions of the validity of 
their approaches to the West.
The Theoretical Context
The foreign policy-making of the YAR posed interesting theoretical 
questions. First, why did the country's external behaviour throughout 
the active war period (1962-1968) remain consistent although the 
decision-making elite in the post-1967 era held views which diverged 
frcm and contrasted with those of the pre-1967 elite? Similarly, hew 
can we explain the fact that decisions were made by consensus within 
the government despite the fact that the decision-making elite was 
comprised of individuals with different backgrounds and experiences? 
The answer, in the writer's view, lies in the nature of the 
environment and the decision-makers' perception of it, including their 
objectives. It is generally agreed that environmental factors are 
relevant to foreign policy choices only as far as the decision-maker 
perceived then as being so. More specifically, a situation becomes an 
"occasion for decision" only when the decision-maker perceives it as 
relevant to his foreign policy objectives. This makes the 
identification of decisional situations a subjective phenomenon.
However, efforts have been made to establish criteria for comparing 
decisional situations. Charles Hermann has suggested certain 
characteristics of crisis situations, and has used them as criteria to 
compare various decisional situations. A crisis is said to exist when 
a situation possesses the following three characteristics:
1. Threatens the high-priority goals of the decision-making unit.
-20-
2. Restricts the amount of time available for response before the 
situation is transformed.
3. Surprises the members of the decision-making elite when it 
occurs.4
The existence of these three attributes in a situation produce certain 
effects on the decision-making process and thus distinguish this 
decisional situation fran others. Charles Hermann used these criteria 
for carparing various decisional situations and formulated hypotheses 
on the decision-making pattern produced in each of these situations. 
A set of seven situations were identified, ranging fran the typical 
crisis situation to routinely made decisional situations. In addition 
to the crisis situation, he identified seven situations.
1. Innovative situations, perceived to contain high threat and 
surprise but allowing an extended amount of time for response.
2. Inertia situations which involve lew threat, extended time, 
and surprise.
3. Circumstantial situations which involve lew threat, short time 
and anticipation.
4. Reflexive situations, characterised by high threat, short time 
and anticipation.
5. Deliberative situations, containing high threat, extended 
time, and anticipation.
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6. Routinely made situations, involving lew threat, extended 
time, and anticipation.
7. Administrative situations, said to exist when there is lew 
threat, short time and anticipation.5
Throughout the entire war period (1962-1970), the Royalist military 
and political challenge continued to pose a threat to the existence of 
the Republic. Due to the predominance of Saudi Arabia and the 
Egyptian role in the war, most of the YAR foreign policy actions, in 
the pre-1966 era, were a mere reflection of actions taken by the two 
intervening powers.6 Most of the contacts and negotiations between 
these Arab states on a possible settlement of the war were made 
without prior knowledge of, or consultation with, the YAR leadership. 
As such, the YAR foreign policy actions in this respect were mostly of 
a reflexive nature. A combination of a deliberate policy by the post- 
November 1967 government aimed at reducing the influence of external 
factors in the Republic's policies7 and a change in the regional 
politics, made it possible for the post-November 1967 leadership to 
initiate pre-planned policies. Thus, most of the decisions of that 
period were deliberative.
More specifically, the theoretical specifications provided by the 
Hermann model are applicable only to two of the four decisions under 
consideration. The three characteristics of the prescribed crisis 
situation are relevant to the Khartoum agreement while the decision on 
the FRSY is typical of the Reflexive Situation. In the other two 
cases, the FRG and the Reconciliation, these propositions are less 
relevant. In neither case was there a threat to the high value; 
instead the situation was perceived by the YAR decision-makers as
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providing opportunities for achieving the primary policy objectives 
defined in terms of ensuring the survival of the Republican regime and 
the promotion of economic development.
Making decisions is, according to Snyder et al., the selection by the 
decision makers from a socially defined, limited number of 
problematical alternative projects, of one project intended to bring 
about the particular future state of affairs.8 Much of the efforts 
being made in the field of comparative foreign policy are directed 
towards investigating "the influence or influences which affected the 
decision makers choice." In this respect two models have been 
developed: the analytical model and the cognitive model. Proponents 
of the former portray a decision maker as a rational person who 
obtains and processes information constantly and flexibly, attempting 
to discover the optimal alternatives. In this respect, the decision 
maker considers possible courses of action and evaluates the likely 
consequences of each in terms of costs and benefits. He then selects 
the course of action most likely to achieve the desired goal.9 
Advocates of the cognitive model, on the other hand, suggest that the 
explanation lies in the cognitive process of the decision-makers. Any 
investigation into the decision-making should be directed towards 
understanding the way the cognitive mechanism is formed, modified, and 
operated so as to structure perceptions and hence determine behaviour. 
Most problems in the decision-making process, they suggest, arise when 
decision-makers misperceive the situation which constitutes a 
constraint on his rationality. Janis and Mann examine the 
ramifications for decision-making in cases of effective reactions 
associated with psychological stress. Their conflict model of 
decision-making is based on the assumption that the decision-maker’s 
main drive is how to resolve decisional conflict or the simultaneous
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opposing tendencies within the individual to accept or reject a given 
course of action. In this respect, the decision-maker asks himself 
about the costs, risks, and possibilities arising fron responding to 
the problem. If no serious risks to the current policy are perceived 
at the outset, the response will be to do nothing (Unconflicted 
Inertia). If there is a potential risk, an alternative policy is 
adopted (Unconflicted Change). If no such policy is available, then 
stress enters the decision-making process directly. This leads to a 
pattern of "defensive avoidance" which can take any of three forms: 
procrastination, shifting the burden of responsibility to someone 
else, or "bolstering".10
The dcminant role of personalities in the formulation of foreign 
policies in third world countries has beccme a truism in current 
political theories. It was suggested that to understand foreign- 
policy-making in the Middle East, it is more useful to analyse the 
leaders' personalities, perceptions, values and needs than to examine 
organisational procedures or bureaucratic competition.11 But this was 
not specific to the Middle East: there are conditions in both
developing and developed countries alike which allow decision makers 
to reflect their idiosyncratic predispositions on the decisional 
outcomes. Among these are crisis situations, where time constraints 
allow only a few individuals to participate in the decision-making. 
The idiosyncratic input of those who are concerned with making a 
decision is likely to be highly significant. Furthermore, it is 
generally agreed that the influence of personal factors on the 
decision-making process has a negative effect on the political 
outcome, for they inhibit rationality. But the predominance of 
personalities in the policy-making, even in crisis situations, at 
times seems rational. In an influential study, Sidney Verba
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identified circumstances which affect the degree to which personality 
factors affect the behaviour of the decision maker. Among these are 
conditions in which the values involved are both vital and clear. He 
concludes that:
"Insofar as one has such a goal or set of goals in mind, the 
situation itself will be more compelling. Attention will be 
focused on the choice situation and the effect of unrecognised 
influences upon the individual will be reduced."12
The post-revolutionary elite in Yemen comprised individuals holding 
divergent value systems, but with one salient canmon objective defined 
in terms of the maintenance of the Republican regime. As a reaction 
to the persisting Royalist challenge, the moderate post-1967 
government, like the pre-1967 radical government, put security at the 
top of their objectives. The first post-November government also 
followed the same line in its foreign relations to that of al-Sallal's 
government. It was only when the Royalist threat began to recede in 
mid-1968 that conflict within the "goal system" of the post-November 
regime surfaced. Goal inconsistency within the government was 
eliminated by the ejection of the left in the aftermath of the 1968 
intra-Republican clashes. From September 1968 onwards, members of the 
decision-making elite possessed not only a similar value system but 
also agreed on the structure of that goal system.
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CHAPTER II
TEE ANTECEDENTS OF TEE SECURITY SITUATION:
TEE FIRST THREE YEARS OF TEE REPUBLICAN-ROYALIST WAR
1962 - 1965
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On 26 September, 1962, a military coup in Yemen overthrew Imam 
Muhammad al-Badr and established the YAR. The coup put an end to the 
Imamate after a rule little short of a millennium and many, both 
inside and out of the country, welcomed the revolt as a step towards a 
better future. The Hamid al-Din Imams, in their determination to hold 
on to power, had resisted modem ideas and thus kept the country 
largely isolated from the rest of the world. They kept their foreign 
relations to the minimum and only entered into diplomatic relations 
when the necessity arose.1 An American specialist defined the 
Imamate's foreign policy as being governed by the desire "to be left 
alone".2 Internally, the country was so backward that at the time of 
the revolution Yemen was said to be "dashing towards the fifteenth 
century."3 Although this was an exaggeration, the country was among 
the most backward in the world. In the political field there were no 
modem political institutions or government bureaucracies with 
delegated authority. As an autocrat, the Imam was personally the 
focus of all executive, administrative and judicial power, and all 
matters regardless of size were determined by his sole discretion. In 
the socio-economic field, a complete absence of modem services and 
unexploited resources coincided with an almost complete stagnation of 
the economic and social systems.4
During the three years that preceded the revolution, Imam Ahmad faced 
the most sustained challenge to his rule. The anti-imam factions, 
whose long-tem aim had been to eliminate despotic and conservative 
monarchs, replacing them with reform-minded ones, had by the end of 
the 1950s begun to work towards the establishment of a republic.5 
Simultaneously, the Imamate lost the loyalty of the army and the two 
main tribal Federations, the Hashid and the Bakil, on whan the Imamate 
depended for its existence. The revolt in 1959 of the Hashid and the
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Bakil, traditionally known as the 'Wings of the Imamate', was followed 
by further unrest within the army.6 The army had played the main part 
in the revolts of 1948 and 1955 and continued to plot the 
assassination of Imam Ahmad. In March 1961, three officers made the 
most serious attempt on his life in which the Imam was wounded 
seriously. Ahmad tried to contain the uprising by a combination of 
premises of reform and cruel suppression of the opposition. On 19 
September 1962, he died while the country was still in turmoil
following a series of violent student demonstrations.
Many Yemenis were hopeful that Muhammad al-Badr, who succeeded his 
father on 20 September, 1962, would introduce the much needed changes. 
As a Crown Prince, al-Badr had given every indication of having
liberal inclinations, but after assuming the throne he publicly stated 
that he intended to pursue the policies established by his father.
This confirmed the suspicions of the officers who were already
planning a coup, ever since they founded the Free Officers 
Organisation in December 1961. Upon learning that al-Badr had indeed 
resolved to suppress the opposition, the Free Officers decided to act. 
At 2300 hours on 26 September, 1962, a small column of tanks and 
armoured vehicles surrounded the al-Bashai' er Palace where al-Badr was 
attending a cabinet meeting. After failing to persuade al-Badr to 
surrender, the tanks shelled the palace. The next morning it was 
announced that the new Imam had been killed in the palace bcmbardment 
and a Republican regime had taken over.7
It immediately became clear that the revolutionaries, who by then 
comprised not only the officers but also several civilian groups, were 
not aiming at a simple change of government but at a radical 
restructuring of the country's socio-economic and political system.
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In the first policy statement broadcast on 27 September, it was 
announced that the principal aims of the Revolution were: to put an
end to the absolute rule of the individual and to do away with foreign 
influence in Yemen and to replace the monarchy with a democratic, 
Islamic Republican regime based on social justice in a unified state, 
representing the people's will and realising their demands.8 Mainly 
because of the lack of sufficient resources and due to the 
preoccupation with the ensuing war, many of the stated objectives were 
not realised. Nevertheless, measures were taken in the following 
weeks which resulted in radical changes. Briefly suirmarised they 
were: the establishment of the Republic, the removal of the old
ruling oligarchy, the end of large-scale landlordism, and the creation 
of a public sector in the national economy.9
From the first moment of its inception, the Yemeni Republic was faced 
with difficulties emanating from both its complicated internal 
conditions and a largely hostile external reaction. As the first 
republic in the Arabian Peninsula, it was viewed with apprehension by 
the traditional theocratic and shaykhly-dcminated regimes which still 
ruled the rest of Arabia.10 It also met with suspicion by both 
Britain and the USA, who were fearful of the effects the Yemeni 
revolution might have on their vital economic and strategic interests 
in the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf. Because of its increasing 
dependence on Middle East oil and its reliance on Aden as a military 
base and bunkering station, Britain had the greater cause for 
concern.11 In short, the YAR was widely perceived to be a threat to 
the status quo in the area, especially as it had the military aid of 
President Nasir. Saudi Arabia and Jordan were the first of its 
neighbours to react. On 1 October Saudi troops were deployed along
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the borders with the YAR and both monarchies played a vital role in 
encouraging the counter-revolution within Yemen.
Naturally, the Hamid al-Dins were eager to restore the monarchy in 
Yemen but it is generally acknowledged that without Saudi support the 
Yemeni Royalists would never have been able to initiate substantial 
resistance to the Republican government, let alone sustain it for more 
than seven years.12 Hcwever, upon hearing the news from Sana'a, 
Prince al-Hasan (al-Badr1 s uncle and the then Yemen's representative 
at the United Nations) was confident enough to claim the Imamate. On 
28 September he left for Saudi Arabia claiming that the revolt had 
been carried out by a small army group with no popular support and 
vowing to crush it.13 Hcwever, before he left New York, Jordan had 
instructed its representative at the United Nations to convey its 
recognition of al-Hasan. On 30 September, al-Hasan arrived in Saudi 
Arabia and on 5 October, after obtaining the support of King Saud, he 
declared a Royalist Government-in-Exile. Without delay, he began 
sending the Hamid al-Din princes to the northern Yemeni tribes to 
offer gold and arms in exchange for their loyalty. At the beginning 
of October, Jordan sent a mission to Djedda to lend him military 
support.14
The existence of the Royalist government and the military deployment 
within Yemen were portrayed as internal opposition to the regime in 
Sana'a and an indication of support for the Imam. This was not 
exactly the case. Except for seme tribes in the north and east of the 
country, the Yemeni people had responded enthusiastically to the 
proclamation of the Republic, a fact reported even by Western media 
who were unsympathetic to the new regime in Sana'a.15 Among the 
tribes which later rallied to the Imam, only seme Zaydi tribes in the
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north-west region had followed him in his capacity as their religious 
leader. The loyalty of the rest of the tribes making up the main body 
of the Royalist army was neither based on firm commitment nor on 
political opposition to the Republic. This fact became clear to al- 
Badr himself who in fact had managed to escape from his besieged 
palace on the night of the coup and had taken refuge in the north. 
There he tried to rally the Zaydi tribes to march on Sana'a as his 
father had done in 1948; but none of these tribes was prepared to 
offer him protection, let alone fight for him. Hcwever, when he 
received cash from Saudi Arabia with which to pay than and after they 
had suffered mistreatment by the Republicans and their Egyptian allies 
which had created wide resentment, seme of them agreed to join him.16
Despite all the challenges, internal and external, which the Yemeni 
revolution faced, its chances of success were greater than those of 
previous revolts. During the revolt of 1948 and the coup of 1955, the 
revolutionaries could not attract any support from the Arab states 
which were nearly all either still governed by monarchical regimes or 
had become conservative republics. Hcwever, in 1962 when the 
September revolution broke out, the idea of revolutionary Arabism was 
being officially promoted by the United Arab Republics (UAR) and there 
were already revolutionary governments in Iraq, Syria and Algeria. In 
anticipation of external intervention against the projected 
revolution, the Free Officers had, prior to the September coup, sought 
and received a promise from the Egyptian President Djamal Abd al-Nasir 
to cone to their aid in case of foreign intervention.17 On 29 
September, Colonel al-Sallal, Chairman of the Revolution Command 
Council (RCC), sent a telegram to Nasir in which he emphasised the 
revolutionary character of the coup and requested Egypt's help. In an 
immediate reply, Nasir expressed official UAR recognition of the YAR
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and pledged Egyptian support.18 Three days later a small contingent 
of Egyptian troops arrived in Yemen to underline the UAR carmitment to 
the survival of the new regime in Sana'a. Almost all YAR leaders 
agreed that the subsequent UAR aid saved the Yemeni Republic fran 
immediate collapse and gave it time to develop into a viable state.19 
Nevertheless, the immediate outcome of the Egyptian help was a mixed 
blessing. Instead of serving as a deterrent, Egypt's "symbolic" 
military aid was subsequently used by Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Britain 
as a pretext for further intervention.
Implications Of The Response Of The Arab World 
And Ihe Wider International Response
At the time when the Yemeni Republic came into existence, the Arab 
world was sharply divided between a revolutionary bloc led by the UAR 
and a conservative camp led by Saudi Arabia. As early as the first 
day of its inception the new regime in Sana'a stated that it 
identified itself with the Arab revolutionary movement and requested 
Egypt's aid. This obviously alarmed not only the governments which 
opposed the YAR for one reason or another, but also the principal 
Western governments which were 'at odds' with President Djamal Abd al- 
Nasir. The position of these states was partly reflected in their 
stance regarding recognition of the YAR.
Intra-Arab response to the Yemeni revolution was varied, as were the 
Arab states in their ideological and political identification. The 
radical Arab regimes of Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Algeria 
enthusiastically welcomed the Yemeni Republic and recognised it within 
the first two weeks.20 On the other hand, the Arab monarchies of
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Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco and Libya opposed the YAR. The moderate 
Arab republics of Sudan, Lebanon and Tunisia recognised the new regime 
in Sana'a, although their subsequent relations with Sana'a remained 
restricted.
These initial responses were not to prove lasting. Within a year the 
monarchies of Morocco, Libya and Kuwait joined in recognising the 
YAR.21 Jordan, in the conciliatory atmosphere which followed the 
First Arab Summit Conference, announced its recognition of the Yemeni 
Republic on 22 July, 1964, leaving Saudi Arabia the only Arab state 
continuing to support the deposed Imam. On the other side, relations 
between Nasir and the governments of Iraq and Syria affected the 
latter's relations with the YAR.2 2 The Ba'athist government in Syria, 
which had persistent ideological differences with Nasir, resented his 
treatment of the Ba'ath followers in Yemen. Its relations with the 
President al-Sallal regime were, consequently, strained.23
In the wider context of the cold war, the Soviet Union declared its 
support of the Yemeni Republic, recognising that it had inaugurated 
the first anti-imperialist struggle in the Arabian Peninsula. On 28 
September, 1962 Premier Khrushchev sent a cable to al-Sallal conveying 
Soviet recognition of the YAR and at the same time warning that it 
would "regard as inadmissible any foreign interferences in the 
domestic affairs of Yemen".24 This early friendly Soviet gesture 
served to consolidate a relationship between the two countries which 
dated back to 1928. In March, 1964, a five-year Friendship Agreement 
was signed between the two countries. This resulted in more economic 
Soviet aid to the Yemen, although military aid continued to be 
channelled through the UAR.25
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By mid-October 1962, twenty-four countries had recognised the YAR; 
all except one were either third world countries or socialist states. 
The hesitation of the Western democracies, especially Britain and the 
USA, caused concern to the Yemeni revolutionaries because they felt 
the attitude of the rest of the members of the UN depended on the 
position of these two great powers. In addition, the reluctance of 
the West to grant recognition might give credence to the allegations 
that the Yemeni revolution had communist connections.26 The YAR 
Foreign Minister was sent to New York in the first week of October in 
an attempt to secure the recognition of the USA and admission to the 
UN at the same time. Earlier, on 2 October, he had stated that
international recognition of the YAR was needed "not to consolidate 
the government in Yemen but to cut the routes to external 
intervention".2 7
As suggested earlier, the West was generally unreceptive to the 
revolutionary regime in Sana'a because of the latter's association 
with President Nasir and because of potential implications for their 
own interests in the area. Britain and France invoked traditional 
criteria of international law in denying recognition. Their argument 
rested on the facts that ex-Imam al-Badr was still alive, and that he 
allegedly had a large amount of support in Yemen. This position was 
one of political expediency rather than adherence to legal criteria. 
In October, 1962, West Germany became the first Western state to 
recognise the YAR, reportedly with the encouragement of other Western 
states which sought to balance the increasing Soviet influence in 
Sana'a.28
For almost two months, the USA was in a dilemma as to whether to 
withhold recognition of the new government in Sana'a, as the British
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had been urging, or to give its support to the YAR in order to balance 
and curtail the growth of Egyptian and Soviet influence over it. On 21 
November the US Charge d'Affairs in Sana'a declared that the 
Republican government was in full control of the country, except for 
seme remote areas.29 The Kennedy administration was increasingly 
aware of the need for YAR co-operation in its plans to prevent a 
further escalation of the conflict which could damage American 
interests in the area. On 19 December, 1962, the US Government 
announced its recognition of the YAR, citing the YAR's affirmation of 
its goodwill towards its neighbours as the reason for this decision.30
This move on the part of the USA revealed the extent of its influence 
in the UN, for on the day that followed its recognition of the YAR 
the Credentials Committee of the UN General Assembly voted in favour 
of accepting the delegation of the YAR as the official delegation of 
Yemen in place of the Royalist representatives. The General Assembly 
accepted the Committee's recommendation with seventy-four in favour 
and four against, thus confirming the international legitimacy of the 
YAR.31
This left Great Britain, Saudi Arabia and Jordan the only states in 
the world which still recognised the Imam's government. The two Arab 
monarchies made strenuous efforts to prevent the UN from accepting the 
YAR. During the UN General Assembly's debate on 20 December regarding 
Yemen's contested seat, they claimed that there were two authorities 
in Yemen, one the "legitimate government of the Imam" and the other 
"self-proclaimed" regime of the Republicans which would have no chance 
of survival without the presence of foreign troops.32
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The Arab League was slow to respond to the situation in Yemen. In 
October 1962 it received simultaneous requests from both the Royalist 
government in exile and the YAR, for a meeting of the Arab League 
Council to consider the situation in Yemen. Due to the fact that the 
members were at that time divided over the issue, the request was not 
put forward for consideration. When the League Council held its 38th 
Ordinary Session in March, 1963, the situation had changed in so far 
as the YAR had been recognised by most member states in the interim. 
The Council decided therefore, on 23 March, despite Saudi Arabian 
opposition, to admit the YAR to membership of the League.33
The British posture towards the Yemeni Republic was based on the 
assumption that the new Nasir-supported regime in Yemen might pursue 
Yemeni claims to the colony of Aden and the protectorates in Southern 
Arabia with renewed vigour. In the event of this being the case, the 
British feared that the Yemeni Republic would find wide support among 
the inhabitants of the colony, many of whom were of North Yemeni 
origin. Despite repeated assurances by the YAR leaders of their 
peaceful intentions, the British Government retained its deep 
suspicion of the new government in Sana'a. On 23 October, the British 
cabinet decided in principle to recognise the Yemeni Republic hut 
subsequently retracted this decision under pressure frcm the powerful 
Royalists' lobby.34 In the first week of February 1963, Britain still 
insisted that the situation in Yemen "was not sufficiently clear to 
justify recognition", on the basis that a government is only 
recognised when it is in effective control of a country.35 On 10 
February, 1963, the government in Sana'a gave Britain a week to 
recognise the new regime and when no favourable response was 
forthcoming, the British legation in Ta'iz was closed on 17 
February.36
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Predaninanae Of The UAR and Saudi Arabia
The most significant feature of the pre-1967 era was the extent of the 
influence which the UAR and Saudi Arabia exerted on the conflict in 
Yemen. Basically, the two Arab states viewed their support of the 
Yemeni warring factions as an extension of their ongoing rivalry. 
Until the Egyptian withdrawal fron Yemen in 1967, each carmitted its 
prestige and resources to ensure the victory of its respective Yemeni 
allies. In short, these two powers played a primary role in deciding 
the way the war was to be settled.
This was because, of all the states involved, Egypt and Saudi Arabia 
perceived the Yemeni revolution as closest to their own interests and 
they moved accordingly. President Nasir decided to support the Yemeni 
Republic mainly in order to reaffirm Egypt's role in promoting a pan- 
Arab revolution. Thereby he hoped to secure a foothold in the western 
comer of the Arabian Peninsula from where he could spread his 
revolutionary ideas and Egyptian influence throughout the rest of 
Arabia. Soon this support developed into a significant military 
involvement. A small contingent of Egyptian troops, about 100 strong, 
arrived in the Yemeni port of Hudaydah on 5 October, 1962 in what was 
believed to be a token demonstration of the UAR ccxmiitment to the 
survival of the YAR.36 Hcwever, steady reinforcement in reply to the 
escalating number of Royalist attacks on the Yemeni Republic meant 
that by August 1965 the force was 70,000 strong.
Saudi Arabia, already considerably alarmed by the success of the 
Republican coup in Sana'a, became even more concerned by the Egyptian 
military intervention. The Egyptian propaganda which accompanied the 
dispatch of the troops, combined with the ideological-political
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rivalry which then existed between Cairo and Riyad, led the Saudis to 
believe the ultimate objective of the Egyptian intervention in Yemen 
was the destabilisation of their own monarchy.37 As a result, the 
Saudis redefined their objectives in Yemen with the ejection of the 
Egyptian forces becoming the top priority.38 They believed the 
withdrawal of the UAR from Yemen would not only remove the Egyptian 
military threat from the Saudi borders but would in effect 
substantially improve the chances of the Royalist takeover. While the 
Republicans would be left without the Egyptian support, the argument 
went, the Royalists would continue to receive clandestine aid across 
the borders.39
During the initial phase of the ensuing war between the Republicans, 
backed by the UAR, and the Royalists, supported by Saudi Arabia, which 
extended from October, 1962 to mid-1963, each side sought a military 
victory. Basically Nasir decided to intervene militarily in Yemen on 
the false belief that the Royalists were weak and that the Republican 
government would need only limited Egyptian assistance to overcome the 
opposition speedily and decisively.40 The truth of the matter was 
that the Royalists had early on captured several strategic positions 
in the north and east and established supply routes up to Nadj ran in 
Saudi Arabia and through Harib to Bayhan inside the South Arabian 
Federation. As a result, the strength of their position, combined 
with the guerrilla type of warfare they followed over notoriously 
difficult terrain, made it almost impossible for the Republican side 
to achieve a victory over them, speedily or otherwise.
By the first week of December 1962, Royalist attacks had escalated to 
the point that the Egyptians had not only substantially increased 
their troops from the original 100 to around 15,000, but had also
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decided to take over the responsibility for the military confrontation 
with the Royalists fran the Republican army.41 The legal basis for 
joint military operations between the Egyptians and the Republican 
forces had already been established on 10 November, 1962 when the YAR 
and the UAR had signed a five-year military pact which obliged each to 
come to the aid of the other in case of external aggression.42
Because of their military weakness and political vulnerability at the 
time, the Saudis adopted a defensive strategy, avoiding in the process 
any direct involvement in the fighting in Yemen. Instead they 
provided the Yemeni Royalists with large-scale financial and military 
aid, enabling them to engage the Republicans and the Egyptian troops 
themselves. King Faysal believed that by intervening in Yemen, Nasir 
had involved himself in a quagmire and that the continued financial 
and military drain would sooner or later force the Egyptians out of 
Yemen.43 This threat to UAR involvement became more real as the 
Royalists began to receive help fran a variety of sources including 
Britain, France, and Iran.44
In November 1963, President Nasir, having becane aware of the 
potential consequences for Egypt of a prolonged military involvement 
in Yemen, prepared to launch two major military offensives aimed at 
the decisive defeat of the Royalists. The first was made in February 
1963 and the other followed in June 1964. Both these operations did 
indeed cause major setbacks to the Royalists, dislodging them fran the 
strategic positions they controlled and cutting their supply routes, 
especially through Harib and Marib. But these defeats did not finish 
than off. Due to the difficult terrain of the northern and eastern 
parts of the country and the unfailing supply of foreign aid, the 
Royalists were not only able to survive but to reply with counter­
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attacks. In a major counter-offensive beginning in December 1964 and 
continuing sporadically until July 1965, they were able to regain 
control of areas they had been evicted frcm in the 1963 Republican 
offensive and by August 1965 the military situation had returned 
almost to what it was at the beginning of 1963.45
Attempts at Settlement
Failure to settle the conflict militarily stimulated efforts to find a 
peaceful resolution to the conflict. The fact that these efforts were 
either made by, or addressed to, Saudi Arabia and the UAR indicates 
the degree to which the importance of these two powers was paramount.
The first peace initiative was taken by the US administration; it was 
not aimed at securing a peaceful resolution to the war but was an 
attempt to contain it within Yemen itself. Following aerial attacks 
by the Egyptians on Royalist targets inside Saudi Arabia in November 
1962 and January 1963, the Kennedy administration feared that an 
escalation of tension might lead to direct confrontation between Saudi 
Arabia and Egypt, and that this would threaten both the stability of 
the Saudi monarchy and the US strategic and oil interests in the 
Arabian Peninsula.46 On 1 March the UN, under pressure from the US, 
sent the Under-Secretary, General Ralph Bunche, to visit Yemen on a 
fact-finding mission. About the same time the US special envoy, 
Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, made several visits to the UAR and Saudi 
Arabia. The underlying purpose was the same as that of the Bunche 
mission, but the American diplomat met with greater success and later 
negotiated an agreement for a simultaneous disengagement by the two 
states frcm Yemen.
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Inevitably, Nasir showed more interest in negotiating an agreement 
that would consolidate the military successes achieved by the 
Republican side during the military offensive of February 1963. The 
then Saudi Premier Faysal was less enthusiastic to conclude a deal 
under these circumstances but was in no position to stand up to the 
UAR military challenge.47 Consequently, both leaders signed a 
disengagement agreement the details of which were disclosed by the UN 
Secretary General on 29 April, 1963. Under the terms of the 
agreement, Saudi Arabia undertook to terminate all aid to the 
Royalists and prohibit the use of its territory by them, while the UAR 
premised to begin a phased withdrawal of its troops frcm Yemen without 
taking any punitive actions against the Royalists.48
In accordance with the agreement, a UN observation team (UNYCM) 
arrived in Yemen on 13 June, although it was not until 4 July that 
they began their task. They were deployed in Sana'a, Hudaydah, Sada, 
Nadj ran and Djizan, where they were presumably intended to monitor the 
implementation of the agreement. Both the inadequacy of the 
facilities put at the disposal of the mission and a shortage of 
supplies limited the effectiveness of its operations right fran the 
start. Moreover, the Royalists, who were not recognised as a party to 
the conflict, were determined to undermine the efforts of the UN, and, 
with the help of Britain across the borders, they continued the 
fighting. This ultimately led to the Egyptians ceasing their 
withdrawal.49
Notwithstanding the lack of progress, Saudi Arabia and the UAR 
continued the extension and financing of the UNYCM on a two-monthly 
basis while the Secretary-General continued to submit pessimistic 
reports to the Security Council. In the spring of 1964 the fighting
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increased and as a result the mission was finally terminated on 
September 4 of that year.50
The first attempt to end the war was in Yemen was made in the calmer 
atmosphere of the intra-Arab detente which followed the First Arab 
Summit Conference held in Cairo in January 1964. Amid the spirit of 
reconciliation which was reflected in the resumption of relations 
between Cairo and Riyad, Faysal and Nasir responded positively to the 
mediation efforts initiated by the Algerian and the Iraqi presidents 
to settle their differences over Yemen. Positive ideas for a 
settlement were worked out by the officials of the two countries 
during the first half of 1964 and a final formula was reached in 
September. At the conclusion of the Second Arab Summit in Alexandria 
(September 1964) President Nasir and King Faysal held talks on the 
Yemeni problem. After these talks which lasted fran September 11 to 
14, the two leaders issued a joint communique which became kncwn as 
the "Alexandria Agreement". By this accord, Saudi Arabia and the UAR 
undertook to "make the necessary contacts with the parties involved 
for a peaceful settlement".51
Peace talks were subsequently held between Republican and Royalist 
delegations at Erkuwit in southern Sudan on 1-3 November, 1964, with 
Muhammad al-Zubayri leading the Republican side and Ahmad al-Shami 
heading the Royalists. An agreement was soon reached, and it was 
announced that a cease-fire would became effective on 8 November, 
1964. It was also agreed that a National Congress, consisting of 63 
tribal leaders and an 18-member preparatory canmittee, was to meet in 
a Yemeni town on the 23 November to formulate terms for settling 
existing differences. Also Saudi Arabia and the UAR were to be asked 
to implement the Congress decisions.52
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The planned congress was never held. First it was announced on 20 
November that it was to be postponed indefinitely. Despite the 
initial goodwill shewn by President Nasir and King Faysal, it became 
evident that neither was ready to force concessions on his Yemeni 
ally. The only outcome of this attempt was the fact that it helped to 
crystallise the differences between the two Yemeni sides. It was 
announced that the proposed congress was postponed because of 
disagreements over where it should take place and the numerical 
allocation of delegates.53 However, the fact was that the two sides 
disagreed on the more substantive aspects. The Republicans would not 
agree on any alterations to the Republican regime while the Royalists 
insisted that it was up to the proposed Congress to decide on the 
nature of the future regime. On another point, the Republicans would 
not countenance the imnediate withdrawal of the Egyptian forces while 
the Royalists demanded a guarantee that the Egyptian forces would 
leave the country before any plebiscite on the future government.54
Contrary to the Alexandria Agreement, the second attempt at a peaceful 
settlement was fraught with considerable tension between the UAR and 
Saudi Arabia. In the summer of 1965, Nasir, concerned at the mounting 
cost of the war and inpatient with the Republican bickering, took the 
initiative in another attenpt at finding a peaceful resolution to the 
conflict. As the Royalist forces were on the offensive at that time, 
King Faysal was not as anxious as Nasir to cane to an agreement, and 
responded only after Nasir threatened to put a decisive end to the 
conflict one way or another.55 In July 1965 communications between 
the two leaders were resumed. These resulted in a meeting between 
than which took place in Djedda on 23-24 August. After the meeting a 
new agreement to settle the conflict in Yemen was announced. The main 
conditions of the accord, which came to be kncwn as the Djedda
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Agreement, were an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of the Egyptian 
forces fran Yemen by September, 1966, the ending of Saudi military aid 
to the Royalists, the setting up of a provisional Yemeni government, 
the holding of a plebiscite in November 1966 and the formation of an 
interim conference consisting of all Yemeni factions. The conference 
was to meet in the northern city of Haradh on 23 November to form a 
provisional government, make arrangements for the transitional period 
and organise the plebiscite.
In order to rebut any criticism from his Yemeni allies for his part in 
the agreement, Nasir arranged a meeting in Alexandria with the leaders 
of the two Republican factions, the moderates and the radicals. At 
the meeting, which took place on 19 August, Nasir explained his ideas 
in general terms to the Republicans. The Republicans were ambivalent 
towards Nasir's efforts and when the terms of the Djedda Agreement 
were announced they were far from satisfied, believing that Nasir's 
eagerness to withdraw from Yemen had made him offer too many 
concessions to the Royalists' side. On 21 September, 1965, the YAR 
Presidential Council and the Cabinet issued a joint statement in which 
they welcomed the reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and the UAR but 
made a point of affirming their commitment to the Republican system.56 
The Republicans, especially the hard-liners, had no wish to take part 
in the proposed conference and agreed only when they received Nasir's 
assurances that the Republican system would not be jeopardised.57
The conference commenced in Haradh on 23 November as scheduled with 
equal representation on each side. The meeting was scarcely underway 
before sharp differences began to emerge as each side tried to 
interpret the Djedda Agreement to its own advantage. The main bone of 
contention was the nature of the provisional government: the
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Republicans insisted on the continuation of the Republic 
administration while the Royalists insisted on a neutral "Islamic 
state". A recess was called and, because of failure to resolve the 
disputed issues, the conference was never resumed.58
Although sane suggested that the Yemenis were responsible for the 
failure of the conference, it was clear that King Faysal and President 
Nasir were also not keen on its success. By December, the king had 
received new military equipment which increased his confidence and 
made him feel less vulnerable to a possible Egyptian attack. Nasir, 
for his part, became suspicious of the Saudi moves, especially King 
Faysal1 s attempt to promote an Islamic alliance, and began to prepare 
for a new round of confrontation.
Intra-Republican Differences
A crucial element in the political situation in the YAR was the intra- 
Republican discord which created instability within the system and at 
the same time contributed to the lack of coherent policies. Most of 
the differences whether on a personal level or in the wider political 
arena, sprang from the divergent backgrounds and political views of 
the post-revolutionary elites. Many of the differences that began to 
emerge in the weeks following the revolution were of a personal 
nature. For instance, Abd al-Rahman al-Baydani, who became Deputy 
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs in the 31 October 1962 
cabinet, was opposed by many covetous of the leadership. There were 
similar rivalries among senior officers in the army.59 These did not 
inflict any lasting damage on the stability of the regime and were 
kept largely under control by the occasional intervention of the
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UAR.60 More fundamental differences also began to develop in the 
early days after the revolution. In the first stages of the war, the 
three veteran leaders, Ahmad Muhammad Nu'man, Kadi Abd al-Rahman al- 
Iryani and Kadi Muhainnad al-Zubayri, were reported to have expressed 
doubts about the inflexible policy against the pro-Royalist tribes 
pursued by the Egyptians and supported by al-Sallal. These moderates 
advocated conciliation and benevolence towards the disaffected tribes 
- Ahmad Nu'man recommended conclusion of a series of agreements with 
local shaykhs to win them one by one from the Imam's side, and so 
gradually extend the influence to the Republican government.61 These 
views, hcwever, were kept within the government and were not expressed 
publicly, partly because the moderate leaders wanted to avoid anything 
that would alienate the Egyptians at a time when no other alternative 
to the military confrontation was available.
The first time intra-Republican differences surfaced was at a popular 
conference held in September 1963. The conference was convened in 
Amran, to the north of Sana'a, with the stated purpose of finding ways 
and means of consolidating the regime. At the end of its 
deliberations it adopted resolutions which concentrated on internal 
affairs and were, in general, supportive of the government's policies 
vis-a-vis the Royalists. These resolutions involved measures designed 
to eliminate corruption, rationalise internal policies and introduce 
reforms, specifically a constitution and a freely elected 
parliament.62 Hcwever, during the deliberations it became clear that 
the most fundamental differences within the Republican ranks revolved 
around the best way to deal with the ongoing conflict with the 
Royalists. In effect, there were two factions advocating opposing 
policies. The radicals, represented by the majority of the 
intellectuals, the senior officers and the followers of various
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political organisations, called for firmness and determination as the 
best way to defend the Republic and secure the regime. The moderates, 
represented by what was left of the old Free Yemeni Movement, the 
tribal Shaykhs and most of the junior officers, advocated, on the 
other hand, reconciliation with the Royalists (with the exception of 
members of the Hamid al-Din family) and called for a policy that would 
win over the rebellious tribes. These differences were of no 
Immediate political relevance because of the priority given to the war 
with the Royalists and because the regime of al-Sallal would not 
permit the moderates to dictate policies.63
The failure of the Erkuwit Peace Conference (November 1964) brought, 
inter alia, the differences among members of the governing elite into 
the open. On 2 December, 1964, the two vice-Premiers, al-Zubayri and 
al-Iryani, together with Nu'man, Chairman of the Consultative Council, 
resigned fran their respective posts in protest against al-Sallal1 s 
policies. In their letters of resignation they accused al-Sallal1 s 
regime of alienating popular support through its corruption and 
incompetence,and proposed that the president's pcwers should be 
transferred to a five-man Council of Sovereignty for an interim period 
of five years.64
A political crisis ensued when all cabinet members except one also 
resigned in solidarity with the three leaders. Within one month a new 
government was formed by General Hassan al-Amri. In the new cabinet 
announced on 5 January, 1965, only half the members of the previous 
government were included. Furthermore, a state of emergency was 
declared in Sana'a, and a tribunal was established to try several 
former ministers and dissident Republican leaders.65
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During 1964 the Egyptian presence had beccrne increasingly the focus of 
criticism, especially by those who blamed the Egyptians for both the 
prolongation of the war and the impotence of the government. In the 
aftermath of the December 1964 crisis, a group of Yemenis who became 
kncwn as the "Third Force" went to Beirut and Saudi Arabia in protest 
against the situation in Yemen. Their demands, which became the basis 
of the political manifesto of the "Union of Popular Forces", were 
briefly: the end of foreign intervention in Yemen, meaning the
withdrawal of Egyptian forces fran Yemen and the simultaneous 
termination of Saudi aid to the Royalists; the convening of an intra- 
Yemeni popular congress in order to form a provisional government; the 
holding of free elections with a view to choosing a Constituent 
Assembly to decide the country's form of government.66
No longer held in check, as hitherto in 1963, the intra-Republican 
differences developed into a struggle for power between the two 
factions, namely the moderates and al-Sallal1 s government, and 
ultimately affected YAR policies. Following the December 1964 rift, 
Kadi al-Zubayri moved to Barat where, on 16 February,he founded an 
opposition party called Hizb Allah (Party of God). It had the 
objective of establishing an "Islamic Republican Consultative Rule" 
for Yemen and called for a peaceful settlement and the withdrawal of 
the Egyptian forces.67 Al-Zubayri's posture reflected the growing 
schism within the Republican leadership. There was not only friction 
over the issue of the settlement of the war but also over the nature 
of relations with the UAR. Most of the radicals, including al-Sallal, 
lent their unreserved support to the Egyptian presence in Yemen and 
were happy to rely entirely on it.68 On the other hand, the 
moderates, including the three leaders, Nu'man, al-Zubayri and al- 
Iryani, adopted an altogether more guarded approach. While they
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wholeheartedly welcomed the UAR military role in defence of the 
Republic, they sought to limit the degree of Egyptian involvement in 
the formulation of YAR policies and particularly advocated self- 
reliance in finding a solution to the conflict.69 On 1 April, 1965 
al-Zubayri was killed in obscure circumstances, but his death led to 
popular indignation and brought about the moderates rise to pcwer. 
Under pressure, al-Sallal was forced to ask Ahmad Nu'man, al-Zubayri*s 
colleague, to form a new government with the freedom to initiate 
reforms. The cabinet he assembled on 20 April accordingly represented 
the Republican moderates in both its composition and policies.70
Nu1 man's cabinet set as a priority the convening of a peace conference 
that would include all Yemeni factions, Republican and Royalist. 
Although the Royalists refused to take part, the conference was held 
in Khamir, to the north of Sana'a, from 2-5 May 1965. Most of its 
resolutions were dedicated to the peaceful settlement of the conflict. 
They included one to send delegations to Arab countries to seek 
cooperation in ending the war, and another to appoint a carmittee to 
make contact with the Royalists for the same purpose. It was also 
decided that a Yemeni "people's army", about 11,000 strong, should be 
formed which would gradually relieve the Egyptian forces. The 
conference also called on the government to amend the constitution.71
The Khamir conference gave a popular mandate to the moderates who had 
clearly won that round in the political struggle with their radical 
rivals. On 8 May, al-Sallal was obliged to approve an interim 
constitution and two days later Nu'man sent a telegram to King Faysal 
requesting his cooperation in resolving the war. In the second half 
of June a delegation visited several Arab capitals to implement the 
Khamir resolutions.
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Neither al-Sallal nor the UAR were pleased by Nufman's policies. The 
first resented the measures taken to limit his powers while the
Egyptians did not like Nu1 man's independent stance. On 28 May, 1965 
al-Sallal precipitated a political crisis by forming a Supreme Council 
of the Armed Forces without consulting the Prime Minister. Nu'man 
considered the action' unconstitutional and on 1 July resigned his post 
in protest. This action brought the power struggle between the
moderates and radicals to a head. On 14 July, General al-Amri, who 
was in favour of a hard-line approach, formed a nineteen-member 
cabinet which included only three ministers from the previous 
government. Al-Amri's cabinet lost no time in reversing the policies 
of his predecessor. The policy statement of the new cabinet 
emphasised the need to uphold the Republican system, to debar the
Hamid al-Din family from any part in government and to eliminate
rebellion, dissension and reaction.72
The moderate leaders had been widely supported by the tribes and the 
expulsion of the al-Nu'man government meant more dissension fran 
within the Republican ranks. On 20 July 1965, nearly 250 Republican 
shaykhs arrived in South Yemen fran where they sent telegrams to the 
Arab League and the UN demanding the reinstatement of the Nu'man 
government and the Implementation of the Khamir resolutions.73 
Afterwards they left for Saudi Arabia where they met King Faysal and 
under his auspices held talks with the Royalists and the popular 
forces on ways in which the war could be settled. Fran this two-week 
conference, which was held at Ta'if, Saudi Arabia from 1-31 August, a 
four-step settlement plan emerged. The sine qua non of the plan was 
the establishment of an Islamic state in Yemen with a provisional 
government to arrange for a plebiscite on the future form of 
government.74
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As an attempt at settlement the Ta'if Agreement had no real chance of 
success for it reflected the Saudi views too closely. It pin-pointed 
the basic difference between the Republicans, radicals and moderates 
who on one hand insisted on the Republic and on the other the popular 
forces who sought to abandon the Republic in favour of an Islamic 
state.75 The Ta'if Agreement was irrmediately rejected by both the YAR 
government and the moderate Republicans. In a statement on 18 August, 
General al-Amri1 s cabinet rejected the Ta'if Agreement and denounced 
the conference as "merely a continuation of Saudi acts of aggression 
and sabotage" against the YAR.76 For his part, al-Iryani 
categorically rejected the Ta'if Agreement, insisting that any accord 
must include two basic terms: the maintenance of the Republic and the 
permanent removal of the Imam and his family.77
Conclusion
The war which broke out after the overthrew of the Imamate on 26 
September, 1962 increased the polarisation of forces in the Arab world 
and involved great power rivalry as well. The intervention by the UAR 
and Saudi Arabia in Yemen was perceived mainly within their ongoing 
rivalry hut also invited indirect involvement of the other powers 
which had a vested interest in the Arabian Peninsula, notably Britain, 
USA, and USSR. This engulfed the YAR in wider regional conflict and 
confronted the Yemeni Republic with many challenges. The 
revolutionary character of the Yemeni revolution and its association 
with President Nasir's Egypt were at the root of the problems the YAR 
faced in the pre-1976 era. Many states denied recognition to it 
partly because of its association with the UAR and revolutionary 
policies. Increasing involvement by the UAR and Saudi Arabia led to
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loss of control by the YAR of the conflict which became linked with 
relations between the two Arab states. In its danestic politics too, 
the increasing involvement of the UAR in the war led to increasing 
influence over the Republic's own policies. No less a threat were the 
sharp differences which developed among the two Republican factions, 
the radicals and the moderates, over the extent of the Egyptian 
influence and the strategies of settling the war.
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CHAPTER III
THE DECISION MAKERS
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Meed Dawisha, in his influential study of Middle East foreign policy­
making, has suggested that examination of the decision-making elite 
should involve three categories, corresponding to the scale of their 
descending importance and influence in the decision-making process.
The first category refers to the hegemony over the decision-making 
structure of one person, usually the head of state. The second is the 
ruling elite, which comprises a small group of people who are 
regularly consulted by the principal decision-maker in either their 
individual capacity or as representatives of institutions. The third 
category, the political elite, consists of \ individuals and \ \ \
1 1 ihstitutibns who 1 participate in tile ' decisioh-making1 process' without' 1 1 1 1  
necessarily being allocated any decision-making powers.1 This 
proposition is particularly relevant in the case being studied because 
it provides a useful basis for examining the different levels of 
participation in the Yemeni decision-making process. For reasons 
explained in the first chapter, the emphasis in the Yemeni case is on 
the role of individuals rather than that of institutions. With this 
in mind, the following section will briefly describe the Yemeni 
decision-making elite on the basis suggested by Dawisha. In this 
case, the decision-maker refers to the head of state and the second 
deals with members of the Republican Council (after 1967), the prime 
minister as well as the foreign minister. The third category includes 
representatives of the various political forces, namely tribal shaykhs 
and military officers, as well as representatives of the various 
political groups.
-65-
Hie Principal Decision Makers
The situation in the YAR is not very different fran that of other Arab 
countries where the decision-making system is dominated by a principal 
decision-maker, namely the head of state. Except for the Second 
Interim Constitution (1965), all Yemeni constitutions so far have 
given the president a central role in the policy-making mechanism of 
the state. Although the government system was a canbination of both 
parliamentary and presidential systems, the head of state was accorded 
v N N substantial authority. The first Permanent Constitution issued on 27 \ \ \ \ 
' 1 1 April, 1964 had, for 1 instance, madd the president responsible for a I 1 I I 
wide range of functions. In addition to being the head of state, the 
President was also the head of both the Political Bureau and National 
Security Council as well as the Ccmmander-in-Chief of the armed 
forces. He shared with the cabinet the formulation of the state's 
policies, nanination of the Prime Minister and members of cabinet, and 
had the right to dismiss them. With the concurrence of the
Consultative Assembly, he could declare war, approve treaties, and 
also accept the accreditation of foreign diplomatic representations in 
Yemen.2 During the pre-1967 period however, the role of President al- 
Sallal in the policy-making of the YAR was in reality severely 
limited. His long and recurrent visits abroad, the pressures from the 
opposition and the interference of the UAR made his role mostly 
irrelevant. Only after the elimination of the opposition in September
1966 and the waning of the UAR's interest in Yemen following the June
1967 war did President al-Sallal exercise effective control of YAR 
policies.
The changes which took place in 1967 meant that the government came to 
be based on a parliamentary system where the executive authority was
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divided between the Republican Council (al-Madjlis al-Djumhuri) and 
the Council of Ministers (Madjlis al-WUzara). According to the Third 
Provisional Constitution (November 1967) the office of the presidency 
was transferred to a three-man presidential council whose chairmanship 
was to be rotated among its members every eight months. The authority 
of the council’s chairman was, according to this constitution, reduced 
to mostly ceremonial duties. The Consultative Assembly (Madjlis al- 
Shura) was given pcwers formerly under the president's jurisdiction.3 
Hcwever, the Assembly did not actually cane into existence until after 
the national reconciliation of May 1970. The National Council which 
was established in March 1969 as a temporary replacement for the 
Consultative Assembly was given only limited authority and the real 
authority continued as before to rest with the executive, dominated by 
the chairman of the Republican Council Kadi al-Iryani.
These legal provisions only partly explain the dominant role played by 
the two heads of state and are less relevant in explaining their long 
occupancy of the office. The explanation lies in two inter-related 
factors: the personal qualities of the two leaders and the pressures
of war.
Colonel al-Sallal was chosen to be the leader of the Revolution by the 
Free Officers on the night of the September 1962 coup because, as 
Chief of Staff of the Imam's guards, his support was vital and also 
because a high-ranking officer was needed to lead the Revolution. 
There were sane who considered him unsuitable because of his humble 
social background while the moderate Republicans to a man objected to 
his confrontational policies. Hcwever, his popularity was lasting 
among many Yemenis who identified with his views, especially the 
leftist elements who still remained part of his cabinet in October
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1967. Like most of the Yemeni officers, he was an enthusiastic 
supporter of Djamal Abd al-Nasir's revolutionary Arabism but was less 
diplanatic in expressing his views. A Yemeni writer described him as 
a "revolutionary who put on the costume of a politician." 4 His open 
and candid support of UAR policies in Yemen led many inside and 
outside Yemen to accuse him of being an Egyptian puppet. Undoubtedly, 
al-Sallal owed his five-year tenure of the presidency (fran October 
1962 to November 1967) mainly to Egyptian support. The latter 
supported him partly because of their desire to maintain stability in 
the higher echelons of the YAR power structure.5
Unlike al-Sallal, Kadi al-Iryani who became Chairman of the Republican 
Council on November 5 1967, did not provoke wide opposition within the 
governing elite. He seldom took sides in disputes and was known as 
"the man who holds the middle of the stick". Throughout the first 
five years of the Republic, in spite of his moderate views, he was 
never considered to be one of al-Sallal's enemies and he enjoyed the 
respect both of the Egyptians and those who were opposed to the 
Egyptian presence.6 His background as Kadi (religious judge) and his 
revolutionary credentials as a veteran leader of the anti-imam 
movement accorded him influential social and political status. He 
became chairman of the Republican Council in 1967 and was re-elected 
several times, having demonstrated his ability to strike a balance 
between the opposing Republican factions, especially following the 
August 1968 clashes, as well as having exhibited the moderate views 
deemed necessary for eventual reconciliation with the Royalist side.7
President al-Sallal's domination of the decision-making system was 
absolute by mid-1967. Members of the cabinets formed in September 
1966 and October 1967 were either individuals loyal to him personally
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or persons supportive of his policies. There is virtually no way of 
telling hew al-Sallal arrived at his final decisions. In sane cases 
the Cabinet was only informed afterwards. He relied on a small group 
of aides which included his chief of cabinet, to collect information 
on foreign policy issues and provide him with advice on foreign policy 
matters, but he retained the last say in making the final political 
choice.8
Al-Iryani on the other hand, showed no desire to control the decision­
making although he remained throughout his tenure the centre of the 
process. Because of his status and political skills, al-Iryani 
invariably had the last word politically, despite the fact that many 
of his colleagues were individuals of considerable experience, like 
Muhammad Ali Uthman (a permanent member of the Republican Council) and 
Ahmad Nu'man - the other influential moderate leader. He tended to 
leave matters to be thoroughly debated and only intervened if it 
became necessary over controversial issues, although he always had the 
decisive say. In all cases, he never took a decision unless he was 
absolutely sure it was the right one.9 He was heard to say on many 
occasions that he was "an arbiter, not a ruler".10
The Ruling Rlite
In addition to the two members of the Republican Council, the ruling 
elite also included the prime minister and usually the foreign 
minister. Notwithstanding the legal prescriptions, the role of the 
cabinet in foreign policy formation amounted to no more than rubber 
stamping decisions handed down to it from above. Hcwever, due to 
their position as heads of the government, the three Premiers who
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presided over the six cabinets formed after November 1967 were 
actively involved in the policy-making process and in turn constituted 
part of the ultimate decision-making elite. Abdallah al-Kurshmi was 
largely preoccupied with the financial crises which confronted his 
short-lived cabinet (September 1969 - February 1970) but the other two 
premiers, General al-Amri and Muhsin al-Ayni, were able to play a more 
active role in foreign policy. Al-Amri had almost no training or 
special interest in foreign affairs. He was primarily a military 
leader who ccmbined the post of premier with that of ccrrmanding the 
army. As a result he devoted most of his energies to military affairs 
and while heading the cabinet delegated real pcwer in the field of 
foreign affairs to the foreign minister.11 The views of both al-Amri 
and al-Ayni carried special weight, not only by virtue of their formal 
positions in the government but also because of their cwn political 
influence. Al-Amri's record of opposition to the Imamate and his role 
in the defence of the revolution, especially during the critical siege 
of Sana'a in 1967/78, accorded him prominent political status. In 
general, his views were taken to reflect those of the military. Al- 
Ayni cwed his influence to his active role in opposition to the 
Imamate and also to the fact that he was widely respected among his 
fellcw intellectuals and closely associated with the Ba' athists, 
inside and outside Yemen, in addition to having family links with 
influential shaykhs.12 Of all the prime ministers of the war period, 
Muhsin al-Ayni was the most involved in foreign affairs. His 
education at Cairo University and at the Sorbonne during the 1950s and 
his travels before and after the revolution, in addition to his early 
experience of foreign affairs as the YAR's first foreign minister, 
added to his skill and interest. In the two governments he formed in 
November 1967 and February 1970, he personally took charge of the 
foreign affairs portfolio.13
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The foreign affairs portfolio was customarily given to an important 
member of the cabinet because of its crucial nature. Sometimes, as in 
the case of al-Sallal's cabinet of October 1967 and al-Ayni !s two 
cabinets, the portfolio was retained by the premier himself. Dr. 
Hasan Makki, who as a well-known politician and prominent intellectual 
played an active role in the formulation of both foreign and domestic 
policy, was the only minister to assume the foreign affairs portfolio 
three times, in 1964, 1966 and 1967. Because of the complexity of 
foreign relations, the position was invariably given to those who had 
seme expertise in this area. Except for Shaykh Abdulkawi Hamim, 
President al-Sallal and Mustafa Yakub, all foreign ministers were 
graduates of Arab and foreign universities.14
The Political Elite
One particular feature of decision-making in Yemen was that 
individuals from outside the decision-making structure indirectly 
participated in the formulation of the state' s policies. These 
included individuals who either sought to influence decisions or who 
were "co-opted" into the process by the Government itself. The first 
category included a number of tribal shaykhs who, because of the 
indispensable role of their tribes in support of the army during the 
war, came to exercise direct influence on the decision-making centre. 
Tribal shaykhs like Abdallah ibn Husayn al-Ahmar and Sinan abu Luhum, 
began to hold important positions within the central government, 
compared with the situation before the September 1962 Revolution when 
they could only exert influence on the Government policies fran 
outside.15 Their influence was greatly enhanced in the post-November 
regime as a result of their interference during the 1968 intra-
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Republican struggle in support of the Government and its conservative 
policies. Among these shaykhs Abdallah bin Husayn was the most 
influential, because of his position as the paramount shaykh of the 
powerful Hashid tribal federation. These had provided most of the 
tribal support to the regime and made his opinion indispensable in the 
country's political decisions. The fact that he had sane influence 
among sane elements and tribal factions on the Royalist side added to 
the significance of his role during the search for reconciliation in 
the last three years of the war. Following his election to the 
Chairmanship of the National Assembly (al-Madjlis al-Watani) in April 
1969, he began to play a more active role in foreign policy matters, 
and participated in official delegations sent abroad.
Like the tribal shaykhs, the army insisted on playing a role in 
deciding the country's policies. The differences within the army, and 
the opposition by seme officers to General al-Amri after 1968, led 
seme officers to bypass their high command and express their opinion 
directly to the Presidential Council. These inclinations were 
encouraged by the leadership which showed particular interest in 
ascertaining the various views within the army.16
Among members of the political elite were prominent social figures 
including Ulama (Islamic clergy), and intellectuals who were "co­
opted" to the decision-making process on the Government's own 
initiative. In important foreign policy issues, consultations were 
usually widened to include not only members of the decision-making 
elite but also selected public opinion leaders.17 While such a process 
was not clearly defined in the pre-1967 era, al-Iryani's government 
promoted this type of "public participation" in policy-making. Al-
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Iryani viewed these consultations as a means of providing him with new 
perspectives as well as mobilising support for his policies.
Public Pressure
In Yemen, as in many other third world countries, the influence of 
public opinion on foreign policy is minimal. Usually decisions are 
reached in the light of discussions and debates which take place at 
the top of the government's structure and are only later communicated 
to the public. Lack of political participation by the public during 
the 1960s was partly due to the unsophisticated nature of the public 
resulting from the high level of illiteracy. In 1955, literacy among 
Yemenis was estimated to be as low as 2.5 per cent and by 1972 this 
figure had risen to no more than 15 per cent. In addition, the public 
mass media was in its infancy and contributed little to the 
understanding of foreign policy issues. During the war there were 
three radio stations, situated in Sana'a, Ta'iz and Hudaydah, but 
their transmissions reached only half of the main urban centres. The 
circulation of daily newspapers was limited to 5,000 copies, of which 
more than two thirds were local rather than national. While the local 
radio stations paid due attention to foreign news, the press generally 
gave no coverage to foreign policy issues.18
The virtual absence of public pressure was, in short, a reflection of 
the backward nature of the socio-political organisation of Yemeni 
society. No political parties or permanent interest groups existed 
which could aggregate and articulate the interest of the various 
segments of society. At the beginning of the 1960s branches of pan- 
Arab parties like the Ba'ath, the Movement of Arab Nationalists
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{Harakat Al-Kawmiyyin Al-Arab) and the Ccnmunists, sprang up in Yemen, 
but because of limitations emanating fran the socio-political setting 
their following was restricted, a fact which made them more of 
political groups than political parties. At the time of the September 
Revolution their core membership did not exceed 40, and at the end of 
the 1960s the number was still no more than a few hundred.19
Despite repeated official emphasis on the need to establish a mass 
political organisation to ensure public participation in the 
formulation of YAR policies, only one serious attempt was made tcwards 
that end. Mainly due to the demands made by the war on the Republican 
governments, the issue of political organisation was not among its 
priorities. Indeed, the government adopted the Egyptian method of 
mobilising the masses only whenever a demonstration of public support 
was needed.20 Under the influence of Egypt's example, al-Sallal's 
government even passed a law on 23 May, 1963 banning the establishment 
of political parties. The only political organisation, al-Ittihad al- 
Thawri al-Sha 'abi (the People's Revolutionary Union) was established 
in January 1967. Being an official creation hcwever, it could not 
claim to represent the mass of the people and it was abandoned after 
the overthrew of al-Sallal's government in the November 1967 coup. 
Its main achievement was the organisation of demonstrations in October 
1967 against the Khartoum Agreement. The ban on political parties was 
upheld after the November 1967 coup. The August 1968 clashes between 
the followers of Ba'ath and followers of the Movement of Arab 
Nationalists (MAN) mobilised public opinion against party politics and 
gave the government the pretext to oppose such political activities. 
Throughout the post-November 1967 era al-Iryani continued to oppose 
such activities on the grounds that they would involve incessant 
friction between parties and open the door to foreign intervention.21
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Until 1966, only limited activities by the then pro-Egyptian MAN had 
been tolerated, and even after the November coup it was only the 
Ba'athists who were able to exert anything like an influence on 
government policies, and only then indirectly through selected 
individuals in the government.22
Legislative constraints on government policies were almost non­
existent. Despite several attempts in the pre-1967 era aimed at 
establishing a representative body, the Consultative Assembly {Madjlis 
al-Shura) was never established. On 15 March, 1969, after more than 
eight years, the National Council was established to function as a 
temporary representative body. Hcwever, since its entire membership 
(45) was nominated by the Republican Council and because of its 
limited legislative powers, the Madjlis could have no real influence 
on policies.23
This does not entail that public opinion did not have any influence at 
all on the policy-making process. Precisely because of the need for 
national consensus and cohesion in face of Royalist challenge, and due 
to continued intra-Republican friction, the decision-makers were even 
more sensitive to public attitudes, especially the views of the 
military and the tribes. Al-Sallal and his successor al-Iryani were, 
to varying degrees, aware of the prevailing socio-political climate, 
formulating their decisions to suit it on several occasions. For 
instance, in May 1965, because of popular support for the Khamir 
Conference, al-Sallal was obliged to approve the resolutions of the 
conference which included reconsideration of seme of his long 
established policies.24 In addition, al-Iryani admitted that it was 
due to pressure fran the military and intellectuals that in November
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1967 he rejected the Arab Tripartite Carmission, against his cwn 
inclination.25
The two effectively organised socio-political institutions, the army 
and the tribes, were the only pressure groups capable of affecting the 
policy-making process. The priority given to defence during the 
Republican-Royalist war effectively put the military in charge of the 
country's affairs. Army officers held important portfolios in most of 
the cabinets during that period. In addition al-Sallal and his 
successor al-Iryani always ensured the support of the military before 
making any choices relating to major issues. The military did not, 
however, possess the exclusive power enjoyed by their counterparts in 
other countries of the Middle East, mainly because it did not have the 
monopoly on coercion in Yemeni society. As all Yemeni tribes were 
armed collectively they were much more powerful than the army.26 In 
the final analysis, the military could not by itself ensure the 
defence of the revolution which it had initiated and had to rely on 
Egyptian military support, as well as that of the tribal forces. Its 
preoccupation with defence, and the inclination of the post-November 
moderate leadership to curb its role in politics, had made the army's 
participation in the government rather inconsistent. This was 
reflected in the fact that whereas the officers occupied 30 per cent 
of the seats in the pre-November 1967 cabinets, the proportion 
subsequently fell to 20 percent.27 The army only intervened directly 
in the decision-making process where the decisions under 
considerations had a direct bearing on defence.
The other powerful element in Yemen were the tribes who collectively 
had always played an important role in the political life of the 
country. During the war, the pcwer of the tribes was further enhanced
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by the competition for their support between the Republicans and the 
Royalists and the money and weapons their shaykhs had received as 
inducements. The shaykhs1 influence traditionally lay in their role 
as a pressure group influencing policies frcm outside the government 
and it was not until after the November 5 coup that they were 
incorporated into the ruling establishment.28 Hcwever, even after
they were given important positions in the al-Iryani government, lack 
of political experience limited their direct participation in the 
formulation of the state's policies. In general, the shaykhs had 
little interest in matters outside their cwn tribal donains and had 
little experience in technical matters. Their participation in the 
formulation of the country's foreign policies was therefore both 
minimal and indirect.
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CHARTER IV
FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES
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The foreign policy pursued by any state is the end result of 
interaction between values, images and capabilities. Whereas a 
state's values will determine what is desirable, the capabilities, as 
perceived by decision-makers, will determine what is feasible.1 In 
the case of the revolutionaries who overthrew the Imamate in Yemen, 
their first policy statement declared their main objective to be the 
establishment of a Republican regime. Other objectives were defined 
in the Declaration of the Aims and Principles of the Revolution, but 
it was implicitly assumed that only under a Republican regime could 
these other objectives be realised.2
The Royalist counter-revolution, which sprang up in the first two 
weeks of the revolution, continued for more than seven years; it 
threatened the very existence of the Republic and made security a 
priority over all other objectives. The YAR's foreign policy 
objectives during the period under consideration were determined by 
the interaction of three elements all clearly related to the security 
situation. These were: the perceived intentions and strengths of the 
anti-Republican forces including Saudi Arabia; the opportunities and 
constraints inherent in the shifts and changes of regional and 
international relations; and the Republic's cwn estimated 
capabilities. YAR foreign policy during the period under examination 
could be divided into three distinctive periods. The first period was 
characterised by the confrontational policies adopted as a response to 
the aggressive postures of the Royalist forces, both militarily and 
politically. This period began on 10 November, 1962 with the signing 
of the Mutual Defence Pact and lasted until November 1967, which 
represented a turning point in the YAR foreign policy.3 Hcwever, only 
the part of this phase that began in August 1966 will be reviewed. 
The second period extended fran November 1967 to September 1968 and
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was dominated by the Royalist siege of Sana'a which for .a while 
imposed a confrontational stance on the moderate leadership and 
frustrated its reconciliatory aims. In the third period, which lasted 
until March 1970, the Royalist military threat had largely subsided 
giving the YAR decision-makers an opportunity to shift attention to 
objectives other than the security of the regime.
However, before dealing with the evolution of YAR foreign policy, it 
is important to examine in more detail the differences between the 
rival Republican factions, the radicals and the moderates already 
touched on in Chapter II. Throughout the period 1963-1965 controversy 
raged over the basic issue of how best to ensure the survival of the 
Republic, especially the extent to which it should depend on the help 
of the UAR.
Revolutionary Vs. Moderate
Despite their divergent backgrounds and political experience, the 
post-revolutionary elite was agreed upon the threat of external 
intervention against the revolution, especially from Saudi Arabia and 
Britain. Sane, including the Free Officers, based their assumption on 
memories of the previous revolts of 1948 and 1955, but Kadi al-Iryani, 
who was one of the Free Yemenis, was actually told of the Saudi 
opposition to a Republican revolution in Yemen personally by Prince 
Faysal one year before the September 1962 revolution.4 Anticipating 
an intervention from Saudi Arabia and Britain, almost all nationalist 
factions, and notably the Free Officers who initiated the coup, had 
been in contact with the UAR prior to September 1962 in the belief 
that the latter, because of its ccrrmitment to the Arab revolutionary
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cause and its capabilities, would be the only Arab state willing and 
able to support the revolution. Consequently al-Sallal's telegram to 
President Nasir on 29 September, 1962, in which he requested Egypt's 
aid, was agreed to by almost all members of the post-revolutionary 
elite.5
In the initial stage of the war, that is until the end of 1963, no one 
in the YAR publicly expressed any dissenting views regarding the way 
the war with the Royalists was being conducted. As the Royalists 
stepped up their military activities, so the Republicans became 
increasingly preoccupied with the fighting. At that stage the 
Republican leaders of all political persuasions were fully aware of 
the necessity of ensuring sufficient and long-term Egyptian assistance 
and put pressure on Nasir to commit ever more troops to the defence of 
the YAR.6 However, there were early signs of differences of opinion 
within the Republican leadership as to the strategy best fitted to 
deal with the Royalist opposition. Ever since the first waves of the 
Royalist offensive in the first two weeks of October 1962, the main 
tactical objective, both militarily and politically, was to cut off 
all external aid to the Royalists, especially that fran Saudi Arabia. 
But while President al-Sallal and his deputy Dr. al-Baydani opted for 
an aggressive posture and in early October began to make threats 
against Saudi Arabia, supposedly aiming at deterring it fran 
continuing to supply aid to the Royalists, Kadi al-Iryani and his two 
moderate colleagues Ahmad Nu'man and Muhammad al-Zubayri were already 
urging President Nasir to send a Republican delegation to Riyad to 
allay Saudi fears.7
The subsequent controversy on the role of the intervening Arab states, 
the UAR and Saudi Arabia, which dominated the Republic's politics, was
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clearly linked to the YAR leader's perceptions of the vulnerability of 
their position and the need for external assistance. Hcwever, the 
revolutionaries had been aware of the dangers of external aid since 
the foreign support received by Imam Ahmad during the two previous 
revolts of 1948 and 1955 had proved so detrimental.8 Following the 
1948 attempt there were doubts in sane minds as to the usefulness of 
external aid to future revolutions. In 1953, while still in jail for 
his part in the 1948 revolt, al-Sallal expressed his conviction that 
due to unfavourable internal conditions the revolutionaries could not 
depend on their cwn resources for the protection of a future revolt. 
The realistic course of action, according to him, was to ensure the 
aid of sympathetic Arab regimes.9 Hcwever, the leaders of the Free 
Yemeni Movement attributed the failure of the 1948 revolt partly to 
the reliance of the revolutionaries an help fran Arab regimes which 
never materialised. As a result these leaders concluded that the 
Yemenis should fran new on determine their cwn destiny, relying on 
their cwn abilities and resources.10
In mid-1963, the first notes of dissension were heard among Republican 
leaders on the subject of Egyptian aid. Sane, including al-Sallal, 
supported the Egyptian military presence and called for unlimited 
reliance on the UAR; others, including the Free Yemenis, among them 
al-Iryani, al-Zubayri and Nu'man, felt the time had cane for self- 
reliance1 1. This concept was used by the Third Force to effect the 
withdrawal of the Egyptian forces fran Yemen, but was conceived 
differently by the moderate Republicans who insisted on a continued 
but limited Egyptian military presence. The concept of self-reliance 
was interpreted differently by the moderate Republicans who were 
ccmmitted to the survival of the Republic. In the resolutions of the 
Amran and Khamir Conferences, which were dominated by the moderates,
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self-reliance was expressed in two interconnected measures: a
peaceful settlement of the war on the basis of negotiation among the 
Yemenis themselves and simultaneously the establishment of a popular 
army to shoulder the main responsibility for the defence of the 
Republic.12 By pursuing these dual aims the moderates hoped to 
achieve two basic objectives at the same time, namely the maintenance 
of the Republic and the restoration of national unity.13
The idea of forming a tribal army to decrease dependence on Egyptian 
^  \ aid was opposed by al-Sallal who claimed that it was unrealistic and ^   ^\ \ 
even dangerous to rely on undisciplined and untrained tribesmen for 
the defence of the Republic. In his opinion, the existing Yemeni army 
and the Republican tribes combined could not hope to overcome the 
externally-backed Royalists and Egyptian aid was indispensable.
Later, in September 1966, he said that "whoever claimed that we could 
depend on ourselves in these circumstances, when all these reactionary 
and international imperialist forces were surrounding us with all 
their pcwer, was wrong and sought to deceive us and to liquidate our 
glorious revolution."14 Al-Sallal viewed the UAR military aid to the 
Yemeni Republic as a manifestation of the "revolutionary" ties which 
bound not only the two regimes in Egypt and Yemen tut all Arab 
revolutionary governments. Within a few days of the overthrew of 
General Kasim's regime in Iraq on February 1963, al-Sallal had taken 
the initiative in calling for a revolutionary alliance consisting of 
the UAR, Iraq, the YAR and Algeria. A month later he sent a cable to 
the delegations of the UAR, Syria, and Iraq, who were engaged in talks 
about possible unity, endorsing a priori their resolutions.15 The 
rationale behind such a policy was the need to form an effective 
revolutionary alliance that could cancel out the reactionary alliance 
and enhance the security of the Republic at the same time.16
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The moderate leaders, who in 1963 began to express doubts as to the 
wisdan of al-Sallal's policy vis-a-vis the UAR, had never been against 
the Egyptians or their military presence in the Republic. In 
principle, their perception of the UAR was based on practical rather 
than ideological considerations. They accepted that the Egyptian
military presence was a deterrent to Saudi and British intervention.
Indeed, during the peace negotiations at the Erkuwit and Haradh 
Conferences (November 1964; November-Decanber 1965) the two moderate 
leaders Nu'man and al-Iryani, much like their colleagues, insisted 
N \  ^ that the UAR forces should not withdraw fran Yemen until external aid \ \ \ \ \ 
to the Royalists was terminated.17 In May 1965, Premier Ahmad Nu'man 
stated that these forces would not withdraw from Yemen until external 
aid to the Royalists was terminated.18 Hcwever, Western sources 
suggested that attempts on the part of the Nu'man Government to obtain 
alternative Arab aid were motivated by the moderates' desire to reduce 
the YAR's reliance on the Egyptian forces and curb the UAR influence 
in Yemeni politics.19 Kadi al-Iryani, who was a member of almost all 
the delegations sent for that purpose, including the delegation which 
toured several Arab countries in June 1965, made a point of saying 
that although aid was indeed sought to strengthen the YAR's position 
it was not the intention to replace the Egyptian troops with other 
Arab forces. The moderates, he later asserted, opposed the
replacement of one external influence by another and, more
importantly, were convinced that among the Arab states only the UAR 
under President Nasir was capable of helping the Yemeni Republic.20
Another underlying factor which influenced YAR policies was divergent 
opinion as to the motives of the ruling elite of Saudi Arabia in 
taking a role in the war. As early as the beginning of October, 1962, 
al-Baydani and the Republican radicals believed the Saudi monarchy was
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bent on the destruction of the Yemeni Republic and that there could be 
no canpranise between the two ideologically opposed regimes.21 The 
religiously-oriented moderates, including Nu’man and al-Iryani, on the 
other hand, did not perceive Saudi Arabia as an ideological foe tut 
rather as an aggressive neighbour with whcm the Yemeni Republic could 
co-exist given the right atmosphere. Despite the Saudis' hostility 
tcwards the Yemeni Republic, they maintained it was still possible to 
assure the Saudis of the Republic’s good intentions and thus ensure 
the termination of the aid the Saudi monarchs were supplying to the 
 ^ x Yemeni Royalists.22  ^Seizing the favourable conditions following the \ \ \ \  ^
Khamir Conference, Premier Nu'man in May and June 1965 made determined 
efforts to talk directly to King Faysal but was forced to resign 
before actually achieving this objective.
The Policy of Ccnfrcntaticn (September 1966 - November 1967)
The confrontation between Saudi Arabia and the UAR came to a head 
between the end of 1966 and the middle of 1967. President Nasir's 
decision in the spring of 1966 to keep the Egyptian forces in Yemen 
and the implementation of the "long breath" strategy contributed to 
keeping Royalist attacks during that period to a minimum.23 At the 
same time, Saudi Arabia and Britain stepped up their talks on 
arrangements for South Yemen after the British withdrawal scheduled 
for 1968.
Many observers, including Yemeni officials, believed that YAR 
responses to these and other external moves were influenced by the UAR 
which had already had a major hand in the formulation of the Yemeni 
Republic's policies.24 This Egyptian influence notwithstanding,
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President al-Sallal was never optimistic about the chances of a 
peaceful settlement to the war in Yemen and immediately upon the 
establishment of a new cabinet resumed his hard-line policies.
Basically, al-Sallal and his colleagues were convinced that although 
the Royalist military pressure had diminished, this recent phase of 
Arab confrontation had constituted a new type of threat to their core 
value of security. In two key speeches, on the fourth anniversary of 
the revolution (25 September, 1966) and on the inauguration of the PRU 
on 17 January, 1967, al-Sallal stated that the Republic was facing an 
\ \ \ alliance between, reactionary and imperialist forces headed by Saudi \ \ \ \ \ 
Arabia and Britain respectively. These hostile forces, he said, were 
devising new plots against the YAR. In the past, the YAR had been 
able to defeat these forces and achieve political stability and 
economic prosperity, but only with the help of the UAR.25 In view of 
the new challenges and lack of sufficient national capabilities, it 
was still imperative to continue to rely on UAR aid. Therefore, the 
basis of YAR foreign policy in the coming period was "we march side by 
side". Other objectives outlined in these speeches were as follows:
1. to counter the Royalist-Saudi alliance by encouraging Saudi 
opposition groups;
2. the promotion of an Arab revolutionary bloc against the Arab 
conservative alliance;
3. to force an unconditional British withdrawal from South Yemen, and 
foil any plans designed to replace the British by a Saudi or any 
other external power there;
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4. to consolidate relations with the socialist bloc countries, 
especially with the USSR, so as to ensure continued military 
supplies and political support fran these states.
In the context of this broad strategy the YAR joined the UAR and the 
other revolutionary states in working against the Saudi-proposed 
Islamic Conference. This was described by al-Sallal as "a regrouping 
of the forces of reaction which were collaborating with the forces of 
imperialism in the last-ditch defence against the progressive 
x N revolutionary march of the liberated Arab countries and plotting \ \ \ \ 
against the Arab peoples so as to include than in the sphere of 
Western influence11.26 In January 1967, like the UAR, the YAR had 
announced its rejection of Jordan's proposal for the reconvening of 
the Arab summit "after it became evident that this invitation was a 
new reactionary ploy and that the Arab summits which were originally 
designed to bring the Arab forces together in the face of Israel are 
instead being used by the reactionary forces and thus in favour of 
Israel.112 7
The YAR leaders perceived the deterioration of their relations with 
several countries in the context of the prevailing polarisation of 
forces in the area and their identification as revolutionaries. The 
withdrawal by Jordan and Tunisia of their recognition of the YAR in 
February 1967, the closure by the British of South Yemen's borders 
with the YAR in August 1966, the crisis in YAR-USA relations in April 
1967, and the execution by Saudi Arabia of seventeen Yemeni emigrants 
in March 1967, were all interpreted as part of a "reactionary- 
imperialist conspiracy" against the revolutionary Yemeni Republic.28
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Egypt’s defeat by Israel in the June War of 1967 aggravated al- 
Sallal's sense of insecurity. The withdrawal by the UAR of sane of 
its forces fran Yemen in the first days of the war was followed 
shortly by an increase in the number of Royalist attacks. Al-Sallal 
objected to the canplete withdrawal of the Egyptian forces scheduled 
for implementation under the Khartoum Agreement (August 1967), 
claiming that the Yemeni army was still incapable of defending the 
Republic on its own.29 Almost all of the YAR leaders believed that 
the anti-Republican forces would seize on the UAR withdrawal and
launch an all-out offensive against^  the, Republic, an eventuality which 
would fatally jeopardise the Republican regime.30
The Prelude to Recaiciliatigi (November 1967 - September 1968)
In this period, YAR foreign policy was characterised by a dichotomy 
between the reconciliatory policies announced by the government and 
the confrontational posture it was forced to follow. The moderate 
leadership which took over as a result of the 5 November, 1967 coup, 
sought to bring about a peaceful end to the war through reconciliation 
with the Royalists, something it had been working on since the Khamir 
Conference of 1965. In its first policy statement, it emphasised 
reconciliation as the core of its policies, both domestic and 
external. More specifically, it aimed at achieving reconciliation 
with the Royalist tribes, within the Republican framework, and at 
arriving at an accomodation with Saudi Arabia.31 The underlying 
assumption was that with the conclusion of the Khartoum Agreement and 
the withdrawal of the Egyptian forces, Saudi Arabia might be ready to 
come to terms with the moderate Republican government. Hcwever, the
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Royalist siege of Sana'a frustrated these policies and forced the YAR 
to concentrate instead on defence.
The Royalist attempt to capture the capital city was perceived by the 
YAR leaders as posing an unprecedented threat to the survival of the 
Republican regime. Clearly, the balance of forces had shifted in 
favour of the Royalists who brought up 5,000 trained troops to lay 
siege to the city and still had 50,000 tribesmen in reserve.32 Just 
as the Republican leaders had predicted, the Royalist offensive was 
launched when the Republicans were having difficulty filling the 
military vacuum left by the departing Egyptian forces and were at 
their most vulnerable. The Republican sense of vulnerability was 
enhanced by an awareness of the strong external backing available to 
the Royalists while even the Arab revolutionary regimes hesitated to 
ccranit themselves to the support of the YAR.33 In December 1967 and 
January 1968, YAR forces captured weapons, maps and documents which 
pointed to the implication in the Royalist campaign of a number of 
foreign governments, including the USA, Iran and Saudi Arabia.34 
Consequently the YAR leadership was convinced that the Royalist attack 
was part of a conspiracy aimed at the very existence of the Republican 
regime. In mid-January 1968, Muhsin al-Ayni expressed the feeling of 
the Republican leaders when he said that:
"what happens now in Yemen is, in my view, the second phase of 
the imperialist-Zionist aggression which was initiated on the
fifth of June  There are now two battles the Arabs have
to wage in their struggle against imperialism and its agent 
Zionism. These are the battles for Palestine and the battle 
for oil. The aggression against Yemen is directly linked to 
the oil and the Arabian Peninsula as a whole  The
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aggressors who wage their war against the Republic in the 
north will move their aggression against the revolution in 
South Yemen. Ultimately, they aim at controlling the entire 
Arabian Peninsula."35
In the struggle for survival, the YAR sought assistance fran
governments willing to provide it with military, economic and
political support. As a result, relations became closer with Syria, 
Algeria, Iraq, China and, most importantly, the USSR which became the 
main source of vital military supplies.36 Hcwever, relations with the 
USA deteriorated further as the YAR believed the former was actively 
involved in backing the Royalists.37 The security imperatives had 
seemingly superseded the need to maintain a balanced non-aligned 
approach in the country's foreign relations. Even the more basic goal 
of Yemen's reunification was temporarily set aside for the sake of 
survival. On 30 November, 1967, the YAR recognised the newly
established PRSY in spite of its previous insistence on a canplete
merger between the two parts of Yemen immediately after the
independence of the south. This change of position was partly due to 
the YAR's immediate need for intra-Yemeni co-operation against the 
Saudis and the Royalists.38
Despite their preoccupation with defence, al-Iryani and the other 
members of the post-November governing elite continued their long 
established policy of trying to dissuade Saudi Arabia fran maintaining 
its aid to the Royalists. As it became clear that King Eaysal was 
supporting the Royalist bid for an outright military victory, the 
Republicans had no alternative but to follcw a strategy that combined 
military steadfastness and political pressure. Most of the YAR's 
diplomatic activities, including the visits made by Premier al-Amri to
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several Arab capitals in January and July 1968, were aimed at either 
obtaining military and economic aid or mobilising Arab support against 
the Saudis' continued intervention on the side of the Royalists.39
The Policy of Reconciliation (September 1968 - March 1970)
With the collapse of the Royalists in late 1968 and their subsequent 
political disintegration in early 1969, the immediate threat to the
Republic receded. The defeat of the left, in August 1968, removed the
/ / / / / . / /  y / / , / / / / / /  / A/ ////,//.///-/./.// /J.l Lj / / / / / /  main internal opposition to the post-November policies. Both these
developments created favourable conditions for the government to
resume its reconciliatory policies, temporarily suspended during the
Royalist offensive, and to rearrange its political priorities.
By November 1968, the YAR leaders were convinced that the threat to 
the survival of the Republican regime had finally subsided. This 
perception rested mainly on the fact that the Royalists were 
retreating to remote areas while Republican military capabilities 
continued to improve. The Republican army had, during the siege of 
Sana'a and the subsequent battles in 1968, increased to about 10,000 
men and was better equipped and trained than before.40 At the same 
time, a large number of pro-Royalist tribes deserted the Imam during 
the last quarter of 1968 and the first three months of 1969 and 
declared their allegiance to the Republic. Kadi al-Iryani, in a 
speech in December 1968, referred to these developments as decisive 
landmarks in the struggle to consolidate the Republic and announced 
the beginning of a new era in which concern for security would be 
replaced by concern for the well-being of the Yemeni people, defined 
in terms of economic prosperity and social justice.41 The peaceful
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settlement of the war, and an intensive programme of economic 
development, were perceived as twin objectives fundamental to the 
future of the Republican regime. Indeed, each depended on the other 
in the sense that peace would create the necessary conditions for 
economic prosperity which in turn would enhance the legitimacy of the 
regime. Yemeni sources believed that emphasising economic development 
at that stage, when the war had not officially ended, was partly a 
result of the need to replace the political tension that resulted from 
the intra-Republican clashes of August 1968 with more agreeable 
concerns, and at the same time diverting the attention of the anti-
the hostilities.42
Hcwever, the three YAR leaders knew it would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to achieve their objectives without outside help. By May 
1969 it was clear to al-Iryani that the Royalists were no longer 
capable of mounting a military challenge to the Republican 
government, but at the same time he was fully aware that the end of 
the war would only cane when external aid to the Royalists was 
terminated. Meanwhile, it was evident that the country lacked both 
the resources and expertise to engineer its cwn economic development. 
By late December 1968, al-Iryani concluded that the accumulated effect 
of the war had further weakened what was basically a very weak economy 
and admitted that the country was becoming increasingly dependent on 
foreign aid.43 These and other concerns determined both the content 
and orientation of YAR foreign policy during the rest of the war 
period. As declared in official statements and implied in diplomatic 
moves, the foreign policy objectives were new as follows:
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1. to achieve reconciliation with Saudi Arabia as the state with the 
greatest influence over the outcane of the war;
2. to search for ' strings-free' foreign economic aid;
3. to establish relations with the principal Western states while 
maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union and the other 
socialist countries;
4. to encourage foreign investment to make up for insufficient local
5. to generate support for the government's policies and at the same 
time neutralise any opposition to them from other states.
The YAR1 s pursuit of a modus vivendl with Saudi Arabia turned out to 
be somewhat one-sided. The negative Saudi response to the repeated 
conciliatory gestures of the YAR leadership was disconcerting for 
them, especially in the light of their perception that the defeat of 
the Royalists left King Faysal with no other alternative but to accept 
the de facto situation and come to terms with the Yemeni Republic. 
Even in late 1969 when the Saudis openly sponsored yet another 
Royalist offensive, the Republican leaders tried to keep the situation 
under control. They avoided any escalation of the fighting and at the 
same time maintained contact with King Faysal.44 These and other 
attempts to placate Saudi Arabia clearly reflected an awareness on the 
part of the post-November Yemeni leadership of the fact that the war 
would only end if King Faysal terminated his aid to the Royalists.45
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An equally cool response fran the main Western states did not 
discourage the YAR leaders fran pursuing their efforts to establish 
relations with these states. Not only al-Iryani but also the three 
other premiers of the time, al-Amri, al-Ayni and al-Kurshmi, made 
repeated calls for the opening of diplomatic relations with the West46 
but generated no positive response from the USA, France or Britain. 
Hcwever, the resumption of relations with West Germany in July 1969 
generated optimism and contributed to a certain rapprochement between 
the YAR on one hand and the West and Saudi Arabia on the other.47 It 
also encouraged further contacts with the principal Western states. 
TheSe d^ t^ rilndriecl efforts I^tfieYAR leadersiiip were motivated by the 
need for the West's economic aid and their desire to achieve more 
balanced relations with the Western and Eastern blocs in general and 
with the USSR and the USA in particular.
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y / ^  /J  ^  / 4  / / - / / / / - / / / / , / / /  / /. / y / / 4-Hayat, November 12, 1967); al-Amri also urged re-establishment of 
these relations (see ME/2644/A/11); Al-Kurshmi announced the YAR's 
readiness to re-establish relations with the U.S.A. (see Mansur 
al-Zandani Ilakat al-Djumhuriyyah ... , op. cit., p. 192).
47. Abd al-Karim al-Iryani, Tatawwur al-Awdha al-Iktisadiyyah wa al- 
Idjtimaiyyah fi Shat rain al-Yaman wa Mustakbal al-Wahdah al- 
Yamaniyyah, a paper presented at the 12th seminar on Diplomacy at 
Abu Dhabi, UAE, 1984, published by the UAE Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, p.103.
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CHAPTER V
H E  DECISION TO REJECT THE KHARTOUM AGREEMENT
/ / / / /,/ / / / / / / / (31 AUGUST, 1967)
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Following the Arab-Israeli war in the spring of 1967, the 
accarrnodative approach adopted by the UAR during the Arab gatherings 
in Khartoum during that sunnier was opposed by the YAR leadership, as 
it entailed concessions to the conservative Arab regimes which were 
perceived as harmful to the very existence of the Yemeni Republic. On 
the last day of the Arab Foreign Minister's Conference held in 
Khartoum fran 1-5 August, 1967, the YAR foreign minister expressed 
reservations about the UAR's initiative to reactivate the Djedda 
Agreement of 1965 on Yemen. Later, on 31 August, when President Nasir
and King Faysal concluded the Khartoum Agreement on Yemen, the YAR
/ / / ./■ / / / /  I /,J / / / /  / /,/ / /. /'J. / / L /‘J / Z / / / / /president announced his government's rejection of that Agreement.
This went down in history as the first and only time President al-
Sallal's government had not only publicly taken a stand in Arab fora
independently of its ally, the UAR, but had also adopted a position in
opposition to Cairo's wishes. The consequences of this contributed
significantly to the failure of the Saudi-Egyptian plan for the
settlement of the war in Yemen. It also led to the estrangement
between al-Sallal's government and the UAR which contributed to the
downfall of the former on 5 November, 1967.1
The decision-making activities covered three months, from the first 
week of August 1967 until 5 November, 1967 when al-Sallal's government 
was overthrown. As the decision was taken within a very short time, 
most of these activities fall into the pre-decisional and the 
implementational stages.
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The Operational Environment
One single element in the external environment had an immediate effect 
on several of the ccmponents which governed the range of political 
choice. The Arab defeat in the Six-Day War against Israel in June 
1967 led, among other things, to the withdrawal of UAR forces from 
Yemen, a move which in turn had important repercussions for two of 
those components, the security situation in Yemen and the YAR's 
political structure. The latter in turn had implications on the 
decision-making structure. Hcwever, the Egyptian-Saudi accord on 
Yemen concluded during the Arai> surrmit conf erence held /in Khartoum in 
late August and the beginning of September 1967 constituted the 
stimulus for the decision under consideration.
Implications of the Arab-Israeli War, June 1967
In 1967, the Arab defeat in the war with Israel represented a turning 
point in the politics of the region as well as for intra-Arab 
relations as well. The Arab solidarity which prevailed during and 
after the war ended the sharp polarisation of the Arab states between 
radical and conservative regimes, a situation which had persisted 
since the mid-1950s. For the next decade or so, intra-Arab relations 
were dominated by efforts aimed at forging a cannon diplomatic and 
military strategy to cope with the disastrous consequences of the 1967 
war. Notwithstanding the demise of the sharp polarisation, the June 
defeat discredited the Arab revolutionary regimes, especially in Cairo 
and Damascus, while strengthening the hand of the conservative 
regimes.
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In so far as the war changed the pattern of intra-Arab relations, it 
also changed the balance of forces between the leaders of the two 
hitherto opposing camps, namely Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The UAR, the 
leader of the revolutionary camp, was the worst affected by the war, 
not only in prestige but also in capability. Its armed forces were 
shattered, and its econany, as a result of the closure of the Suez 
Canal and the loss of the Sinai oil wells, was on the verge of 
collapse. At the same time Saudi Arabia, the leader of the 
conservative camp, was new in a more advantageous position than ever
before. Its special relationship with the USA became of particular
/ / / / / /  j  //. / /,/ /V L-/ /J,/ / J  \ L /  /x / 4/ 7 7 7 7 7 /T/ 7 i 7 7 Jkvalue in the light of the latter s influence over Israel; and
increasing oil wealth gave the Saudis a special weight in the Arab
world. The disparate position of the UAR was soon reflected in its
Arab policy. In a bid to achieve a united Arab front against Israel
and to obtain badly needed financial aid during the Arab meetings in
the surrmer of 1967, the UAR adopted a conciliatory policy, and its
initiative during the Khartoum Arab foreign minister's meeting to
reactivate the 1965 Djedda Agreement with Saudi Arabia on Yemen was
the most dramatic illustration of that policy. By this move, the UAR
not only gave King Eaysal a free hand in the Gulf tut also forfeited
its guardianship of the Arab revolution in Yemen and elsewhere.2 This
change in the pattern of Arab politics was viewed by the YAR with the
utmost concern. In the throes of Arab preoccupation with the
confrontation with Israel, the war in Yemen was sliding into the
background. The YAR themselves feared that the enhanced influence of
the conservative regimes and the diminishing pcwer of the
revolutionary governments, including that of the UAR, might encourage
the former to seize on the situation and intensify their aggression
against the Yemeni Republic. For that reason, during the surrmer of
1967, the YAR leaders were adamant in their calls for the
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strengthening of solidarity between the Arab revolutionary regimes and 
emphasised the commitment of these regimes to the survival of the 
Yemeni Republic. In a press interview during a visit to Cairo in the 
first week of August 1967, Major General Abdallah Djuzaylan suggested 
that the protection of the Yemeni revolution was no less a national 
duty to Arab revolutionaries than the war against Israel.3
The Security Situation
/.//// y < ' / / / / / / / / / /  z / / 7 / 7 / / 7 7 7 4/ 7The impact of the June war on the situation in Yemen was reflected in 
the withdrawal by Egypt, during the month of June, of almost half its
30,000 troops for deployment along the Suez Canal. This sudden 
withdrawal left a military vacuum, for the Yemeni forces were unable 
to replace the departing Egyptian forces. The degree to which the 
Republicans had depended on UAR military aid became immediately clear 
when in the second part of June the Royalists took advantage of the 
partial Egyptian withdrawal and mounted a successful offensive which 
left them in control of important towns along the west coast, as well 
as Harib and Marib in the east.4 Although most of these Royalist 
gains were lost when the Republican forces, once more with the help of 
Egyptian reinforcements, mounted an effective counter-offensive in 
July, the inability of the Republican forces to stop the Royalists on 
their own had awakened Republican fears of the consequences of an 
eventual Egyptian withdrawal.
Ever since the UAR took over the main responsibility for the war in 
early 1963, Republican military strategy was based on this massive 
Egyptian support. Partly because of this reliance not much was done 
to increase the capabilities of the Republican army which at that
stage had a total strength of less than 7,000 poorly-equipped and ill- 
trained troops.5 When in June the UAR first started triirming its 
forces in Yemen, President Abdallah al-Sallal, who at that time could 
not contemplate the possibility of an Egyptian withdrawal, objected 
personally to the Egyptian Ambassador in Sana'a.6 But when during the 
Arab foreign ministers meeting in Khartoum (August 1-5) the UAR made 
very clear its intention of withdrawing fran Yemen, the YAR leaders 
began seriously to contemplate what it would mean to carry an the war 
with no or only limited Egyptian support. The prevailing feeling 
among the YAR leaders was that because of the popular support for the
v  ./ /y/ /*/./ / / a/ / / ^  /. / /./ /.//./ / i j y. i / / 7 /yRepublic, the regime could defend itself with just limited external 
aid. As a result of a Yemeni initiative, a Soviet military team paid 
a visit to Sana'a in August and a plan for rearming the Republican 
army was agreed.7 At the same time, the YAR leaders pleaded for a 
continuation of a limited amount of Egyptian aid. During a visit to 
Cairo in the first week of August 1967, Major-General Djuzaylan tried 
to convince President Nasir of the ability of the Republican forces to 
defend the Republic if support was reduced to just a few squadrons of 
the Egyptian air force. The same argument was put by al-Sallal to 
Nasir during the former's stopover in Cairo on his way to the Khartoum 
surrmit. Although President Nasir had made it clear the UAR initiative 
on the reactivation of the Djedda Agreement was forced on him by the 
imperatives of the post-June conditions, the YAR leaders insisted that 
seme degree of UAR aid was vital to the survival of the Republic.8 
The YAR statement on August 13 made it clear that part of the reason 
for rejecting the UAR initiative was its insistence on a continuation 
of Egyptian aid.
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Political Structure
Regardless of the complexity of relations between the al-Sallal regime 
and that of Nasir, the fact was the latter had given the former its 
unreserved support. This was illustrated when on 12 August, 1966, the 
UAR Ambassador in Sana'a intervened to force the return of President 
al-Sallal despite strong opposition from Vice-President al-Amri and 
his supporters. Later, in mid-September, when al-Amri and most of 
the YAR leadership went to Egypt in order to protest to President
Nasir, they were arrested by the Egyptian authorities; sane were put
/.//. / . y / z / / / / / / / / / / /  / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /  
in 3ail and others were put under house arrest. The detention of
these opposition leaders enabled President al-Sallal to form a new
cabinet and resume his hard-line policies, and this served the
interests of the UAR at that stage of intra-Arab relations. The
majority of members of the new cabinet were either individuals loyal
to al-Sallal personally or supportive of his pro-Egyptian policies.9
This situation was related to the decision under discussion in two 
ways. Firstly, pro-Egyptian ministers advocated acceptance of the 
Khartoum Agreement during the cabinet debate on the issue on September 
2 upon the return to Sana'a of President al-Sallal. It was reported 
that these were arrested in early October for helping the entry into 
Yemen of the Arab Tripartite Commission, contrary to the government's 
formal position.10 Secondly, the stability of al-Sallal's government 
was contingent upon the continued detention in Cairo of the moderate 
leaders, including Nu'man, al-Iryani and al-Amri. All reportedly had 
prestige and popular following sufficient to overthrow al-Sallal if 
allowed to do so, without Egyptian interference.11 The withdrawal of 
Nasir's support to al-Sallal would have exposed the latter to the 
pressure of a very strong opposition. Sane believed that the release
in late October 1967 of the moderate Republicans fron detention in 
Cairo was due, partly at least, to Nasir's frustration over al- 
Sallal's refusal to cooperate with the Tripartite Arab Commission.12
The Khartoum Agreement
Fran 1-5 August, 1967, the Arab Foreign Minister's Conference was 
convened in Khartoum to discuss means of co-ordinating Arab action to 
cope with the consequences of the June war. The UAR president was
7 -k /J  * / I / / / 4 /  4 4 /  /  /  /  /  . 4 / 4  /  /  /  /  /  i /. /already trying to reconcile his differences with the conservative Arab 
governments, not only with a view to obtaining much-needed financial 
aid but also for the sake of forming a cannon Arab front against 
Israel. Efforts to convene an earlier Arab summit in 1966 had been 
hampered by the prevailing Saudi-Egyptian conflict mainly over Yemen, 
but Nasir and all the other Arab leaders were aware that unless 
reconciliation between Cairo and Riyad was new achieved, Arab 
solidarity would remain an impossible endeavour. He used the 
opportunity of the Arab Foreign Minister's Conference to mend his 
differences with King Faysal. On 3 August, the second day of the 
conference, the UAR Foreign Minister, Mahmud Riyad, forwarded a UAR 
proposal providing for the settlement of the Egyptian-Saudi conflict 
over Yemen. Item 6 of the plan proposed an immediate reactivation and 
full implementation of the Djedda Agreement on Yemen, signed by 
President Nasir and King Faysal on 24 August, 1965. That Agreement 
envisaged, in addition to withdrawal of Egyptian forces fron Yemen and 
a termination of Saudi aid to the Royalists, the formation of a 
national caretaker government and the holding of a plebiscite for the 
Yemenis to decide on the future regime.13 The one difference between 
the Djedda Agreement and the new plan lay in the proposal that
-113-
implementation of the Agreement should new be assigned to three Arab 
states rather than to the two contestants themselves, i.e. the UAR and 
Saudi Arabia.14
King Faysal was undoubtedly pleased with President Nasir's initiative.
The proposal was in line with the declared Saudi objective of securing 
the withdrawal of the UAR forces fran Yemen, but the Saudi leader 
adopted a cautious view and preferred to wait for more specific 
details. Therefore, no action on the Egyptian proposal was taken at
the Khartoum ministerial conference. The task of hairmering out the
/ / / / / /  / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / • / / / V / / / / / / / /  
details of the eventual agreement between King Faysal and President
Nasir fell to the Sudanese Premier Muhammad Mahjub and, during visits
to Djedda and Cairo on 20 and 23 August respectively, he managed to
secure the approval of the two Arab leaders on the draft of a new
accord. Details of the proposed agreement were discussed later when
the Egyptian president and the Saudi King came to Khartoum to take
part in the Arab summit (29 August - 1 September, 1967). The summit
itself was made possible by the rapprochement between the UAR and
Saudi Arabia brought about by the Egyptian initiative during the
Khartoum ministerial meeting. During a private two-hour meeting held
in the house of the Sudanese Premier during the early hours of 31
August, between the Egyptian president and the Saudi King, and with
the Sudanese Premier's participation, the details of the proposed
agreement were hammered out. The accord, which became knewn as the
Khartoum Agreement, provided for the formation of a carmittee
consisting of three Arab states with the purpose of:
1. Ensuring the withdrawal of Egyptian forces from Yemen and the 
simultaneous termination of Saudi military assistance to the 
Royalists.
2. Helping the Yemenis to achieve unity and stability in accordance 
with their cwn wishes.
3. Consulting with Saudi Arabia and the UAR in the implementation of 
its mandate.15
In accordance with the accord, the UAR chose Iraq for membership of 
the canmission and Saudi Arabia chose Morocco, while the Sudan was 
added to serve as the third member. This selective membership became 
in itself another reason, albeit a less problematic one, for the
/ / / / / /*/ L 7 /V ' J J j L  / 7 z.7  ^7 /-/ < 7 / V  7 7 7 7difficulties which confronted the canmission in the implementation of 
its task. The Iraqi foreign minister, Adnan Khairallah, promoted 
Republican interests while Dr. Laraki, the Moroccan Foreign Minister, 
became the champion of the Royalists' cause.16
The war in Yemen was not on the agenda of the Arab summit, but all the 
participants welcomed the Saudi-Egyptian accord as a basis for the 
regeneration of Arab solidarity. Syria and Algeria, who advocated a 
"steadfast" policy against Israel after the June 5 war,were critical 
of the predominantly conciliatory tone of the conference and received 
the accord with a certain coolness. As with previous attempts at 
settlement of the war in Yemen, the Yemeni leaders were not involved. 
President al-Sallal was not invited to take part in the talks and was 
not even consulted on the agreement which clearly was of immediate 
concern to him and his delegation. President Nasir and King Faysal 
were, nevertheless, fully aware of the YAR's opposition to the 
reactivation of the Djedda Agreement, a position not made secret by 
the Yemeni leaders during the Khartoum ministerial meeting or 
afterwards. To get around the YAR's opposition, the new accord, based 
as it was on the 1965 Djedda Agreement, neither explicitly referred to
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the issue of the referendum nor did it fix a date for the Egyptian 
withdrawal. When announcing the details of the Agreement, the 
Sudanese Premier explained that al-Sallal had not been consulted 
because the Agreement dealt with the Egyptian-Saudi involvement in 
Yemen and thus did not concern him.17
Perceptions of the Decision-Makers
Following the imprisonment in Cairo (September 1966) of the "moderate"
/ T/ Z / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /  / / Z / /  / 
leaders, al-Sallals leadership had continued unchallenged. He
enhanced his position by forming, on 18 September, a new cabinet
comprised mostly of elements either loyal to him or supportive of his
pro-Egyptian policies. Except for Major-General Abdallah Djuzaylan
who became Deputy Premier and Deputy Gxmander-in-Chief of the armed
forces, and Brigadier Abd al-Latif Daifallah, who assumed the Public
Works Ministry, none of the cabinet members enjoyed an independent
power base other than seme loyalties in the army. Like Dayfallah,
Djuzaylan owed his position to his own revolutionary credentials and
personal influence within the army rather than to any loyalty to al-
Sallal. As one of a group of officers who received their military
training in Egypt in the middle 1950s, Djuzaylan played an important
role in preparation and implementation of the September 26 Revolution
and was favoured by the junior officers to replace al-Sallal once the
regime was firmly established.18 Perhaps this was at the root of the
personal differences which developed later between the two men and
which led to Djuzaylan's brief exile in Cairo in early 1963. His
return to the top of the government' s structure was urged by al-Sallal
who, driven by necessity, rediscovered the cannon radical orientation
which bound him with Djuzaylan against the overwhelming moderate
opposition. As a vice-premier and deputy commander-in-chief of the 
armed forces, Djuzaylan played an important part in formulating the 
decision to reject the Khartoum Agreement, although the crucial role 
was that of al-Sallal.
Lite al-Sallal, Major-General Djuzaylan was a radical nationalist who 
believed in the necessity of ensuring continued UAR military aid and 
saw Egyptian support as being within the context of a revolutionary 
alliance. Even after Egypt's defeat in the June 1967 war, both men
believed that the UAR, because of its revolutionary duties towards the
' / / / / /  / / / / / / / / / /  / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /  
Yemeni Republic, was still capable of helping the YAR. According to
the "progressive" Yemeni view, the victory of the Yemeni revolution
was an achievement for the Arab revolutionary movement as a whole, to
which President Nasir*s Egypt had already contributed substantially.
The fact that the Arabs had lost a battle in the war with Israel made
it even more important to preserve the revolutionary gains in Yemen,
and this left President Nasir with no alternative but to continue
backing the Yemeni Republic.19
Following the announcement in early August 1967 of the UAR1 s 
initiative on Yemen, the YAR leadership was still hopeful that, 
despite the severe setback suffered in the Six-Day War, Nasir would 
still appreciate the importance of continuing aid to the Yemeni 
Republic. This view was partly a result of a mis concept ion on the 
part of the leadership in Sana'a. They interpreted Nasir's overtures 
to the conservative Arab regimes, including the initiative on Yemen, 
as a temporary manoeuvre dictated by the difficulties faced by Egypt; 
once this situation was alleviated Nasir would return to his 
revolutionary policies and reassert his commitment towards the Yemeni 
Republic. This view was expressed by Djuzaylan during his visit to
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Cairo in the first week of August 1967 when he said: "Those who
spread doubts about the continuation of the UAR backing to the Yemeni 
Revolution are labouring under an illusion. Similar doubts were 
voiced after the Djedda Agreement was concluded only to be confounded 
by subsequent events. Current talks about the Agreement might 
reawaken doubts but facts will once again prove they are mistaken."20
President al-Sallal's reaction to the announcement of the Saudi- 
Egyptian accord was coloured by the way the news of the accord was
conveyed to him. All accounts confirm the fact that the Yemeni
///./, / / / / / / / / I / / / / / / / / / / / / / . / /  / / / / / / /
president first heard of the accord on the morning of 31 August
through the local media while still in his hotel suite in the
Khartoum. He was obviously shocked and felt bewildered by the news.
According to him it came as a complete surprise, especially since in
his meeting with the Egyptian president in Cairo cxily a few days
earlier, the latter had not given any indication whatsoever of such a
possibility.21 Foreign Minister Muhammad Sallam told the writer that
the fact that the Agreement was negotiated in secrecy was sufficient
to raise Yemeni suspicions about the intentions of their Egyptian
ally.22
President al-Sallal's response to the news was spontaneous but well 
measured. He did not rush to denounce the Agreement but did not go to 
the morning session of the summit conference, making it known that he 
protested strongly to an Agreement concluded about Yemen by others and 
in total disregard for him as "President of that country".23 He 
certainly projected a feeling of injured pride. The YAR was 
considered by many as a client of the UAR whose affairs could be 
manipulated to suit Cairo's objectives. Al-Sallal entirely rejected 
such an attitude and sought to make it clear that he was totally
opposed to an act taken by external powers to decide the destiny of 
Yemen while its representatives, who were only a few metres away, were 
canpletely ignored.24 President Nasir was quick to appreciate al- 
Sallal's rage and the same morning sent his secretary to arrange an 
appointment so that he could explain things. In his memoirs, the 
Sudanese Premier mentioned that Nasir urged him to see al-Sallal and 
explain to him that the Agreement constituted no interference in the 
internal affairs of Yemen but was rather a solution to the differences 
between the UAR and Saudi Arabia. President al-Sallal refused to 
accept this argument.25 He also remained unconvinced by the
/ / / / / / / , / / . / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /  z / / / ' /  / /./. /explanation given by Nasir at their meeting the same day. In his 
replies to the writer's inquiries, al-Sallal blamed King Faysal and 
the Sudanese Premier who, in his view, had plotted the deal and talked 
Nasir into it.26
President al-Sallal was known for his courage but also for his 
disregard for diplomatic niceties. He distrusted King Faysal and 
believed the king had taken advantage of Nasir's difficulties to 
dictate the terms of the Khartoum Agreement in a blatant act of 
blackmail. Thus when the Yemeni president appeared at the afternoon 
session of the summit, he reportedly could not control his emotions. 
He suddenly interrupted the debate and referred to King Faysal who was 
also taking part in the meeting in rather unflattering terms.27 While 
al-Sallal's reaction revealed seme of his personal predispositions, 
his perception of Saudi intentions was influenced by past experience. 
As one of the participants in the 1948 and 1955 anti-imam revolts, he 
had become convinced that the Saudi monarchy, which had played a major 
part in the failure of the two revolts, would do all it could to 
destroy the September 1962 revolution so as to ensure that Yemen 
remained under its exclusive influence. He believed the Saudi monarch
would not stop interfering in Yemen and the Agreement was only another 
ploy on the king's part to get the Egyptians out of Yemen so that he 
could impose its own will on the YAR.28 When Nasir sent his envoy on 
the morning of 31 August to arrange the meeting between the two 
presidents, the envoy asked al-Sallal why he felt bitter about the 
accord. Al-Sallal replied, "You do not understand the Saudis. We 
knew them very well. Our life with them as neighbours has been an 
uninterrupted chain of bitter experiences. We, therefore, understand 
the implications of what was agreed upon. As we knew the aims of the
Saudi regime very well, we knew that they will not for a moment desist
/ / A / .  / / , / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /  / / / / / / / / / / / / /  
fron doing their best to affect a change in Yemen in order that Yemen
ccmes under their exclusive influence. As long as this is achieved,
they do not mind whether the rulers in Yemen are Republicans or
Royalists. "2 9
Hie YAR Reaction To The Egyptian Initiative
As we have seen, the Egyptian initiative came as an unpleasant 
surprise to the YAR leaders. President al-Sallal had had no prior 
knowledge of the Egyptian intention to put forward such a proposed, 
and on 4 August he had sent his deputy, Major-General Djuzaylan, to 
Cairo to seek, among other things, further clarification from 
President Nasir.30 Muhammad Sallam, the YAR foreign minister, had 
been completely taken by surprise when the Egyptian proposal was 
originally announced during the Arab Foreign Minister's Conference. 
He sought instruction from Sana'a and made no comment on the issue 
during his interventions in the deliberations of the conference.
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The Egyptian proposal to reactivate the Djedda Agreement awakened al- 
Sallal's fears, and since the partial withdrawal of the Egyptian 
forces from Yemen in June he had became suspicious of Egyptian 
intentions. Even before he was in possession of all the facts, al- 
Sallal found it necessary to respond to the situation since his 
Foreign Minister was in Khartoum awaiting instructions. However, al- 
Sallal had no difficulty in making his cwn decisions. In view of the 
diminishing role of the UAR in YAR politics in the aftermath of the 
June war and the fact that the opposition leaders were still detained
in Cairo, al-Sallal could act without major political constraints.
/ / / / / / /  / / / / / / / / / /  / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /  / / /' / / / / / /  
Moreover, the suspension of the Republican Council since September
1966 had left the Cabinet as the only functioning authoritative
institution in the Republic, and since he was both President of the
Republic and Premier at the same time al-Sallal could take decisions
without constitutional constraints.
There is no information concerning the procedures al-Sallal followed 
in formulating his government’s response to the Egyptian initiative, 
but he clearly opted to temporarily maintain the long-established 
policy which rejected any attempt to question the legitimacy of the 
Republican regime. On 5 August, foreign minister Sallam made a 
statement in Khartoum expressing reservations on the UAR initiative.
He specifically objected to the idea embodied in the Djedda Agreement 
to the effect that a plebiscite be held to determine the future form 
of government for Yemen. Such a proposal, Sallam said, would be an 
unwarranted interference in Yemen's internal affairs, adding that the 
Yemeni people had by virtue of the September 1962 revolution already 
chosen a Republican regime.31 Although this stance surprised those 
observers who had believed the YAR government to be entirely 
submissive to the UAR.32 Sana'a did not contemplate an actual break
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with its ally. President Nasir, for his part, was anxious to 
emphasise his continued support of the YAR when he received Djuzaylan 
and Muhairmad Sallam on 8 August. There are conflicting accounts as to 
what precisely was discussed at that meeting. According to one 
source, President Nasir explained to the two Yemeni envoys the need to 
form a united Arab front against Israel, an objective which could only 
be achieved through a settlement of the UAR's differences with Saudi 
Arabia. But he assured the two Yemeni officials that this would in no 
way be at the expense of the Yemeni Republic. Furthermore, he pointed
out, serious talks about the implications of the UAR initiative should
/ / / / //, /y / / j. / j  / / / / / / / / / / /  / , / / / /  / / / / / /  / 
wait until the Saudis formally made their reply.33
It would seem however that the Egyptian assurances were not sufficient 
to calm the Yemeni leaders. In particular, al-Sallal remembered that 
the UAR had in the past made compromises detrimental to his government 
for the sake of a settlement of its conflict with Saudi Arabia over 
Yemen. In the second week of August, al-Sallal met both Djuzaylan and 
Sallam who briefed him on their respective missions. It was during 
this meeting, which was attended by Colonel Ali al-Sallal, the son and 
trustee of the president and the then Ambassador to Moscow, that the 
government response was formulated. On 13 August, the cabinet was 
convened to consider the report of the Vice-Premier Djuzaylan an his 
meetings with the UAR officials in Cairo and the report of the Foreign 
Minister Sallam on the Arab Foreign Minister's Conference in Khartoum. 
After a brief discussion which consisted mostly of enquiries fron 
cabinet members, President al-Sallal made a statement on the Egyptian 
initiative in which he said that:
"On behalf of the Yemeni people and government, I declare that
the YAR in no way accepts anything that infringes directly or
indirectly its independence and sovereignty. I further 
declare that the Yemen Arab Republic was not a party to the 
Djedda Agreement which was concluded between the two Arab 
states, the UAR and Saudi Arabia, and is, therefore, not bound 
by it. It certainly will neither approve of it nor recognise 
it. All that is said about a national plebiscite is 
considered open interference in our independence and a 
flagrant attack on our sovereignty as well as a violation of 
the bases of international law.1134
During August, the YAR leadership undertook measures to improve its 
defences. Contact was maintained with the UAR mainly through the 
latter's embassy in Sana'a which continued to insist on the importance 
the YAR-UAR alliance. In reply, the YAR government made it clear it 
appreciated the need for concerted Arab action to cope with the 
consequences of the June war and expressed support for the Arab summit 
to be held in Khartoum later in the month. In his visit to Cairo in 
the first week of August, Djuzaylan said that for the sake of Arab 
solidarity, the YAR would not object to the reconsideration of the 
Yemeni conflict at the proposed conference.35 However, the UAR 
ambassador in Sana'a was told the YAR would insist on two essential 
preconditions: first, the Republican regime should not be compromised
in any way; second, the members of the Hamid al-Din family should not 
be allowed back into Yemen.36
In his attempts to oppose the Egyptian initiative, al-Sallal sought as 
much internal support as possible. It is not known whether the 
popular reaction to the idea at that early stage was spontaneous or 
had been officially promoted. In any event, the overwhelming majority 
of Yemenis were against any attempt that would compromise the
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Republican regime. On 13 August, a deputation of shaykhs, merchants 
and intellectuals met al-Sallal to express their loyalty to the 
Republican regime and their readiness to defend it in every way 
possible.37 At the same time, al-Sallal’s government sought political 
support and military aid from other sources abroad to make up for the 
eventual Egyptian withdrawal. While attending the conference of Arab 
Finance, Economy and Oil Ministers in Baghdad (15 August, 1967), the 
YAR finance minister delivered a written message from al-Sallal to his 
Iraqi counterpart explaining the YAR views on the Egyptian initiative.
At a meeting with the YAR minister, President Abd al-Salam Arif gave a
/ / / / / / / / / / /  . / / / / /  / / / / / /  / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / 
somewhat ambiguous answer when he said that "Our efforts to end Arab
disputes, including the dispute over Yemen, do not in any way mean the
liquidation of the Yemeni revolution." 38
In another direction, al-Sallal sought military aid from the USSR, to 
be delivered direct instead of being channelled through the UAR as 
previously. Indeed, Djuzaylan's above-mentioned visit to Cairo was 
reportedly only a stopover, for in fact the Vice-Premier was on his 
way to the Soviet union to request military hardware for the YAR army.
Hie trip to Moscow did not ultimately take place but the Soviets 
responded positively to the YAR request.39 Sane sources believe the 
deal was calculated by al-Sallal to put pressure on Nasir not to go 
ahead with his intention to reactivate the Djedda agreement.40
Hew The Choice Vfas Made
Hie announcement on 31 August, 1967, of the Saudi-Egyptian accord on 
Yemen presented the Yemeni delegation with a typical crisis situation.
Firstly, the accord was directly related to the future of the
-124-
Republic, the supreme concern of the Yemeni regime. Secondly, it came 
as a surprise to the Yemeni delegation. Finally, the Yemeni 
delegation felt the time available for response was restricted.
The YAR's governing elite had expected that the matter of the Egyptian 
initiative was bound to be raised during the Khartoum surrmit, but they 
had not anticipated an agreement being arrived at without their prior 
knowledge, let alone their participation. Before the delegation left 
for Khartoum for the summit conference, the government had reflected
on the possibility of such an eventuality but had felt reassured by
/ / / / /  J. / / / / / / / / . /  7 J / . / / / / / / / . / / / / / . / / / / / / / / /  ;
the apparent Egyptian desire to remain in touch with Sana'a. It was
agreed, nevertheless, that should the Yemeni issue be discussed at the
conference in any way that infringed an the country's sovereignty or
threatened the Republican regime, the YAR delegation would withdraw
immediately.41 This was exactly what happened, for when the Nasir-
Faysal accord was announced in the morning of 31 August, President al-
Sallal refused to attend the conference. President Nasir met with al-
Sallal in an attempt to allay his fears but the meeting reportedly
turned into a very frank exchange of views. Nasir was provoked when
al-Sallal told him that the Yemeni Republicans expected Egyptian
military aid to continue until the Republic could defend itself.
Apparently, Nasir expressed impatience with the Yemeni Republicans
who, as he put it, were insisting on an indefinite Egyptian military
presence in Yemen instead of trying to be cane more self-reliant. The
Yemeni president was surprised by the change in tone but portrayed no
resentment and later resumed participation in the conference.42
Despite the resentment he privately felt at the treatment he 
personally had received fran his friend President Nasir and his 
outrage at what he regarded as the blatant disregard of the YAR's
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independence and integrity, al-Sallal was keen not to alienate the 
Egyptian president. He made no personal comment on the YAR official 
position towards the Saudi-Egyptian accord which was to be announced 
later on the same day. Following his meeting with Nasir, which no one 
else attended, al-Sallal met with members of his delegation. These 
included officially authorised decision-makers such as his deputy 
Abdallah Djuzaylan and the Foreign Minister, Muhammad Sallam, together 
with certain trusted colleagues such as the Minister for the Economy, 
Abd al-Ghani Ali, and the Head of National Security, Muhammad al-
Salami. No alternative action was considered, since the decision to
/ / y  / /  / / / /  / / / / / / / / / / / /  7 / / /  / / / J jL /J  ^ /categorically reject the Egyptian initiative which formed the basis 
for the proposed agreement had already been made. The only question 
they had to debate was one of procedure - whether to announce the 
YAR's position immediately or at a later stage. It was agreed that it 
was important to make the announcement at once since a silence would 
be misinterpreted as tacit approval.43 A press release was duly 
issued and rather unexpectedly was broadcast by Radio Algeria instead 
of the Egyptian media which usually carried news concerning the YAR. 
The statement did not explicitly reject the Khartoum Agreement, in 
deference to the conciliatory atmosphere which was deemed necessary 
for the success of the summit. Instead it repeated the position 
previously adopted towards the original Egyptian initiative. It 
announced that:
"The Yemeni people would reject any plan of mediation designed 
to encroach on their freedom and the gains of the revolution, 
hut the Yemeni people would welcome measures to strengthen
brotherly relations between the Arabs  Yemen was not a
party to the Djedda Agreement of 1965 between the UAR and the 
Saudi Kingdom and therefore we refuse to return to those
agreements. Recourse to these agreements would be considered 
unreasonable, especially as we already rejected those 
agreements. Any attempt to encroach on the independence and 
sovereignty of the Yemeni Republic will be considered as 
blatant interference in the country's internal affairs."44
The Implementation
In a sense, rejection by the YAR delegation of the Khartoum Agreement 
marked the beginning of the implementation process. It must be clear 
that the Yemeni delegation to the Khartoum sunmit did not express any 
objection to the Saudi-Egyptian disengagement fran Yemen as that was 
clearly a matter for the two Arab states to decide. But the Yemeni 
delegation objected to certain aspects of the Agreement which violated 
the standard legal norms regulating inter-state relations. The first 
concerned the contractual obligations entered into by the YAR and the 
UAR; the other was linked to the sovereignty and independence of the 
Republic, a founding member of the Arab League. The YAR leaders 
insisted on the upholding by the UAR of its obligations to help defend 
the Yemeni Republic, in implementation of the Mutual Pact signed 
between the two countries on 10 November, 1962 and the Co-ordination 
Agreement of April 1964. The terms of the Pact allowed for its 
termination only after each party had given one year's notice. The 
second, the Agreement, was to remain in force until unity between the 
two countries was achieved.45 In his meeting with Nasir on the day 
the Khartoum Agreement was concluded, al-Sallal explained that 
withdrawal of Egyptian troops at a time when the Republican army was 
not ready to take full responsibility for defence would endanger the 
Republic. He argued for limited Egyptian military aid until the YAR
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could rely on its own army. Nasir for his part made it clear he had 
not alternative but to canply with the terms of his agreement with 
King Faysal. He suggested that instead of pressing for a continuation 
of Egyptian aid, al-Sallal should take positive measures to increase 
the YAR's defence capabilities immediately upon returning fran 
Khartoum, and he premised to instruct the departing Egyptian forces to 
leave their weapons for the benefit of the Yemeni army.46
Another valid point raised by the YAR in their opposition of the
Khartoum Agreement was the illegality of the mandate given to the
'mC-/ LJ'J 4 /i/ A / / / . / /  J  / / /  / / V  / /./. / / /, /, / /, / 4 / / ./ Tripartite Arab Carmission to, among other things, help the Yemeni
people decide their future. This clearly cast aspersions an the
legitimacy of an established and internationally recognised regime.
The YAR delegation to the summit conference vigorously opposed any
such interference and Foreign Minister Sallam announced in Khartoum
that his government would not allow members of the Carmission to enter
Yemen in connection with this mission.47
The first practical measure to implement the rejection decision was 
taken iirmediately following the delegation's return from Khartoum. On 
2 September, 1967, the cabinet held a meeting in which the Khartoum 
resolutions were briefly examined. The Saudi-Egyptian accord on Yemen 
was discussed and, although sane ministers known for their pro- 
Egyptian views were receptive to the Agreement, the cabinet 
unanimously approved the position already adopted by al-Sallal. A new 
statement elaborating on that position was also approved. The 
statement was issued in the name of President al-Sallal and, unlike 
the statement at the surrmit, it addressed the Khartoum Agreement 
directly. In the statement, the president referred to the "recent 
UAR-Saudi joint statement" and declared that:
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1. On more than one occasion the Yemeni Government has declared 
its opposition to the Djedda Agreement.
2. The Yemeni Government and people consider the Djedda Agreement 
an interference in Yemen's internal affairs.
3. The Yemeni Government and people do not consider themselves 
bound by the above mentioned joint statement, which they 
consider a continuation of the interference in Yemen’s 
internal affairs.
/ / / / / / / / / / / /  / / / / / / / / / / / / /  / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /  /
4. The statement has been issued at a time when the Yemeni people 
stand ready to participate in all efforts leading to the
removal of the effects of the (Israeli) aggression  The
joint statement came as an attempt to belittle the effects of 
the aggression.
5. The Yemeni Government appealed to friendly countries to avoid 
involvement in this attempt.48
The month of September was a period used for digesting and reflecting 
on the Khartoum Agreement and preparing for its consequences. By 
rejecting the Agreement, al-Sallal knew he would have to bear the full 
brunt of the fight against the Republic without military support and 
against the wishes of almost all other Arab states. Already the 
Foreign Minister had solicited the view of the YAR’s close friends, 
including the Arab revolutionary regimes and the USSR. Except for 
Syria, all advised acceptance of the Saudi-Egyptian plan.49 As the 
issue pertained to the very existence of the Republic, the president 
undertook wide consultations which included not only the army and
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tribal leaders but also representatives of the various other segments 
of society. The immediate dilemma was whether to co-operate with the 
Tripartite Arab carmission as Nasir was urging or maintain the 
position already announced at the Khartoum conference and refuse to 
have anything to do with it. Bearing in mind the need to avoid 
antagonising Nasir, al-Sallal was hesitant but almost all of those 
consulted were adamantly against any dealings with the Carmission.50
Notwithstanding the Yemeni opposition, the Tripartite Carmission
carmenced its work by overseeing the implementation of the respective
/ J jL 4./ / / J /u7 7 i L / ^ 4 'J. / / /L// 4/ ^ / / / / < //undertakings of the UAR ana Saudi Arabia, a task which was merely a
formality given the political will that underlined the accord.
However, its attenpts to carry out its mandate with regard to helping
the Yemenis reach settlement of their internal conflict were hampered
by the negative approach adopted by the YAR's government. The
Carmission carmenced its operations by first meeting with the Yemeni
Republicans detained in Cairo with a view to ascertaining their views
on a possible national conference. Bor the same reason, the
carmission later met with the dissident Republicans in Beirut, as well
as the representatives of the Third Force.51
The Carmission also attempted to obtain al-Sallal1 s permission to 
visit Yemen and ascertain the views of the various political forces 
within the country in preparation for a national conference to be 
convened later on. Inevitably, al-Sallal was reluctant to co-operate 
with the Commission. After several unsuccessful attenpts, however, 
the Acting Foreign Minister of Iraq, who was a member of the 
Carmission, announced on 1 October, 1967 that al-Sallal had sent a 
telegram agreeing to receive the Carmission in Sana'a and co-operate 
with it in pursuance of "a just solution which will bring unity to
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Yemen and consolidate the achievements of the revolution11.52 It 
appears from the vague reference to the "achievements of the 
revolution" that al-Sallal1 s agreement to co-operate with the 
Commission was conditional on any future national reconciliation moves 
taking place within a Republican framework. Seme sources believed 
that al-Sallal gave way only under strong pressure fran the UAR.53 
According to official Yemeni sources, a debate was still going on 
within al-Sallal1 s government regarding conditional co-operation with 
the Commission, when members of the Carmission unexpectedly arrived in
Sana'a on 3 October on a chartered Egyptian plane, accompanied by the
/ / / / /  J  L  / / J^ / 2 I / / / / / / / /  / / / / / / / / / /  / / / / / / / / / / /  
Chief of Staff of the UAR armed forces, Muhammad Eawzi. Many Yemenis
were against the Khartoum Agreement and the arrival of the Carmission
in total disregard of their feelings was seen as provocative5 4 . While
members of the Carmission sheltered in the headquarters of the
Egyptian forces in Sana'a, thousands of Yemenis took to the streets of
the capital in protest.
During the violence which ensued, around thirty people were killed; 
unfortunately most of the victims were Egyptian servicemen. There are 
conflicting stories about al-Sallal's role in these demonstrations.
Seme suggested that the demonstrations were sanctioned by the 
president in an attempt to prove that the withdrawal of the Egyptian 
forces would result in chaos and turmoil in the country.55 Others 
blamed the Egyptians for rushing the Carmission into Sana'a knowing 
full well that the Yemeni people were hostile to it.56 In any event, 
immediately after its arrival in Sana'a al-Sallal reportedly informed 
the Carmission that for his part he wished to receive them hut the 
army and the police could not ensure their safety.57
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Feedback
The decision to reject the Khartoum Agreement had important 
consequences for both the internal and external environment. 
Domestically, the decision had clear implications for YAR 
capabilities, since under the terms of the agreement, the UAR had to 
terminate not only military aid but also political support in order to 
assume, with Saudi Arabia, a neutral position. During the 
implementation of the agreement most of the Egyptian forces, estimated 
at about 25,000, were recalled from Yemen and by the end of October 
the feftaining 10,060 troops wer4 being hastily withdrawn.58 7 This 
severely restricted the military capability of the YAR since the 
indigenous army was understaffed, poorly trained and ill-equipped, and 
it came at a time when the Royalists were massing on the unprecedented 
scale for an all-out offensive.59 Additionally, in the aftermath of 
the killings of the Egyptian soldiers in Sana'a on 3 October, the UAR 
decided to withdraw all its 1200 teachers and technical experts frcm 
Yemen, this badly affected the public services, especially in the 
educational field.60
Politically the decision itself did not harm existing relations 
between the YAR and the UAR, because the Yemeni leadership realised 
that President Nasir had been supportive of the Yemeni Republic and 
had been forced into the agreement. But Egypt's eagerness to Impose 
the Tripartite Carmission on the YAR certainly had negative 
consequences for Nasir's relations with al-Sallal's regime, and the 
subsequent killing of Egyptian soldiers during the events in Sana'a on 
3 October greatly offended Nasir. Sane believe that this led Nasir to 
speed up the withdrawal of Egyptian forces fran Yemen; others go so 
far as to suggest that the Egyptian president was so outraged that he
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encouraged the return of the Yemeni opposition leaders still detained 
in Cairo and, thereby, the overthrow of al-Sallal (certainly, al- 
Sallal suspected as much).61
The decision had other far-reaching consequences for the regime. 
While it improved the popular support for al-Sallal, it also resulted 
in important changes in the structure of the government. Many Yemenis 
who resented the regime's erstwhile sutmissiveness to the UAR welcomed 
al-Sallal1 s patriotic stand, and almost all Republicans supported the 
government's rejection of an accord which clearly jeopardised the
in various ways. Demonstrations were held in several provincial towns 
and indicated by their spontaneity that five years after the 
revolution the Yemeni people still opted for the Republican regime in 
defiance of hostile propaganda. Hcwever, these demonstrations 
revealed a divergence of views on hew best to achieve an effective 
resistance to the many challenges the Republic was to face as a result 
of the Khartoum Agreement. The only political party, al-Ittihad al- 
Sha'abi al-Thawri (the PRU), held a popular rally in Sana'a after 
which a number of resolutions were adopted. These expressed support 
for the Government's decision, advocated mass mobilisation to enhance 
the Republic's defence, and called the people "to be united in a 
single rank under our President Abdallah al-Sallal and support his 
reply to the Sudan agreement."62 Tribal leaders and representatives 
of Yemeni youth held separate rallies in Sana'a on 10 October in 
support of the government position. Unlike the PRU, however, these 
called in addition for the introduction of political reforms to 
strengthen the Republic.63 A statement issued on behalf of the Yemeni 
People's Democratic Union, the Yemeni Youth Democratic Union, the 
Yemeni Workers Federation, the Arab Nationalist Movement and the
Student Federation supported the government's position but also called 
for political reforms.64 Earlier the army had similarly declared its 
support for President al-Sallal1 s policy but demanded major reforms, 
including formation of a new government.65 All these pressures led to 
the formation on 12 October of a new cabinet which included sane 
supporters of the opposition and excluded elements kncwn for their 
pro-Egyptian views.
Aware of the fact that with the withdrawal of the Egyptian forces the 
Republic had become more vulnerable to the Royalists than ever before,
/ / /y / / /. / / / y / u / //,/ /y / ^ 4 /  / z,7 { / 7 7 V b V /and conscious of the public demand for political change, al-Sallal 
felt the time had come to widen the regime's support base by settling 
his differences with the opposition. On 19 October he appealed to the 
Republican leaders abroad to return to their country in order to work 
together in preserving the revolution and the Republic.66 Undoubtedly 
al-Sallal' s decision to reject the Khartoum Agreement was also 
decisive in Nasir's decision to release the jailed moderate 
Republicans. They were released on 26 October. They met with al- 
Sallal at Hudaydah and as a result a number of political reforms were 
agreed upon, with a view to forming a united front. A statement was 
issued on 30 October affirming that the Yemeni problem was to be 
solved by the Yemenis themselves, an explicit confirmation of the on 
going boycott of the Arab Tripartite Ccmmission.67 But most of the 
task of coping with the consequences of the Khartoum Agreement was 
left to al-Iryani and the moderate leadership who replaced al-Sallal1 s 
government in the aftermath of the November 1967 coup.
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CHAPTER VI
THE DECISION TO RECOGNISE THE FHTPTJg; REPUBLIC OF SOUTH YEMEN
(30 NOVEMBER, 1967)
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Among vital foreign policy issues, the reunification of the southern 
and northern parts of the country has been at the top of Yemen’s 
agenda ever since the south became independent in November 1967. A 
constant element in Yemen's foreign policy throughout the Mutawakkilat 
Imamate and into the period of the YAR, reunification represented a 
cannon aspiration for the Yemeni people. The reunification of the 
country in May 1990 nullified the division between the northern and 
southern parts of Yemen and affirmed the reality of a united Yemen.1 
As early as October 1962, the YAR had announced that the people of
South Yemen must be allowed to decide on the issue of merging with the
/ / / / / / / / / /  / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /  / / / / / / 
north and followed this by calls for decolonisation of these
territories and self-determination for the people. The YAR recognised
the South Yemeni people as partners working for the country's unity in
rejection of the Imam's dynastic claims to sovereignty.
Yet, on 30 November, 1967, the YAR government decided to recognise the 
newly independent FRSY. The decision meant recognition for the first 
time by the northern government of the existence of two separate 
entities in Yemen. Although this gesture had serious implications as 
far as Yemen's eventual unity was concerned, its immediate effect was 
to contribute to the legitimation of the PRSY, which was admitted to 
the Arab League on 12 December, 1967 and to the UN two days later. 
Furthermore, it enhanced the security of the YAR and consolidated the 
position of the Republicans who were in the throes of the Royalist 
siege of Sana'a during the winter of 1967/1968.
The following investigation will look at hew the decision to recognise 
the PRSY was arrived at in November 1967. The YAR leadership was so 
preoccupied at that time with the crucial battle with the Royalists 
that it was only able to give attention to the question of the
independence of the People's Republic of South Yemen when it became a 
really pressing issue (just a few weeks before it was actually 
declared).
The Operational Environment
Consequently, the two major environmental elements which impinged an 
the decisional setting at the end of 1967 were the Royalist siege of
Sana'a and the national aspiration for the reunification of north and
/ 'U* / /rrZ / / / / / /  / / I /. /,/ / / / / / / /./. / / / yy / / A / south. The carmencement of independence negotiations between the
National Front and the British Government in mid-November 1967
constituted the stimulus for the decision.
The Royalist siege of Sana'a which lasted seventy days (27 November, 
1967 to 8 February, 1968) was the most influential environmental 
factor. The Royalist offensive had in fact started with the capture 
of the northern town of Sadah on 17 September but it was not until 24 
November when the Royalists cut the road connecting Sana'a with the 
city of Ta'iz that, with the capital under siege, matters became 
really serious. In the early stages of the siege, many inside and 
outside Yemen believed the Republic would not survive now that the 
Egyptian forces had withdrawn. This impression was reinforced by the 
numerical superiority of the attacking Royalist forces over the 
defending Republican army.2 Although the Royalist offensive came as 
no surprise, the Republican government was still unprepared for it. 
During the month of November, the post-November 5 leadership had made 
serious attempts to defuse the tension by initiating contacts with the 
pro-Royalist tribes aimed at achieving national reconciliation within 
the Republican framework. These endeavours were opposed by Saudi
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Arabia which insisted that any reconciliation should cane through the 
Arab Tripartite Ccmnission and be contained within the framework of 
the Khartoum Agreement. Tension between Sana'a and Riyad was running 
high but while the controversy absorbed much of the Republican's 
energies, Saudi Arabia had been active in ensuring the flew of 
supplies to the Royalists for their biggest offensive to date against 
the YAR.
The new leadership in Sana'a was busy trying to obtain political and 
military support to replace the UAR aid which had been terminated as a
/ / / / / / /  / / / /  / / /  / /  / /  / / . / / / / / / ^  I J J  / / / / /, / / / / /result of the Khartoum Agreement. During the period 26 November to 10 
December, Premier Muhsin al-Ayni visited almost all the Arab countries 
in Africa seeking their support to convince Saudi Arabia to change its 
hostile attitude towards the moderate regime in Sana'a. Dr. Muhairmad 
al-Attar, the Minister of the Econany, visited Syria and Iraq at the 
same time in an attempt to obtain military and economic aid. The 
result of these contacts was disappointing. Most of the countries 
hesitated to provide help, probably due to the post-June 1967 regional 
politics or perhaps because of other pressures. At that time even 
Syria, Iraq and Algeria were reluctant to send assistance.3 President 
Nasir, who was tom between his support of the Republican cause and 
his commitment towards the Khartoum accord, subsequently sent vital 
supplies of amnunition to the YAR, concealed in fruit cases.4 
Initially, even the Soviets hesitated to continue the flew of military 
supplies, being naturally suspicious of the new regime which 
manifested a conservative character both in orientation and in the 
individual personalities of its leadership.5
An inevitable sense of isolation compounded the problems of the YAR 
leadership and led them to feel more vulnerable to the Royalist
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assault. Their anxiety over the survival of the Republic coloured 
their perception of the situation in the south and dcxninated the 
debate on the issue of recognition of an independent South Yemen.
Yemeni Unity
Along with the survival of the Republic, the liberation of the South 
Yemeni territories was, as already noted, the main objective of YAR 
foreign policy. The revolutionary government considered these
/ / / / / /  / y / / / / / / . / . / / / / / / /  / /v,/ /./ / / /, / / /. / / /
territories, which became British Protectorates following the latter's 
occupation of Aden in 1839, an integral part of "natural" Yemen. In 
its first statement on 27 September, 1962, the new regime identified 
the liberation of these territories as a primary objective of the 
Revolution.6 This policy assumed a greater urgency once the British 
government had adopted a hostile posture towards the Republican regime 
and put its weight behind the Imam's govemment-in-exile. Following 
the closure of the British Embassy in Ta'iz in February 1963, the YAR 
government began openly to encourage the nationalist forces in the 
South already working against the British occupation. The first 
military operation was launched on 14 October, 1963 by the National 
Liberation Front (NLF). In the following years the armed struggle was 
intensified as both the NLF and FLOSY (the Front for the Liberation of 
South Yemen) gained in strength and experience.7
In the summer of 1967, the liberation struggle in South Yemen had 
almost achieved its objectives. Until then, the British government, 
which in February 1966 had announced its plans to withdraw from South 
Yemen by 1968, was working to ensure that its client, the South 
Arabian Federation, would be in control by the time the British forces
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left. These plans were frustrated by the nationalist forces who 
intensified their military operations in the countryside and gradually 
increased their hold on the territories. As a result, in June 1967 
the British government began to pull sane of its troops out of the 
hinterland and concentrate them instead in Aden. When military 
operations were later intensified in Aden itself, the British 
government decided to withdraw them fran the country altogether. Most 
of the British forces, which had numbered 12,000 in early September, 
were withdrawn during that month; by early November there were only
3,000 troops left. At the same time, the South Arabian Federation was
//,/,//// /,/ //.// J L /////.// J J- / / / /  J / /. / /, / J crumbling in the wake of the spreading influence of nationalist
forces, particularly those of the NLF. In the first week of September
the National Liberation Front was in control of twelve of the sixteen
up-country federal states. On 5 September, the British High
Caimissioner in Aden admitted that the structure of the South Arabian
Federation had broken down and that he was ready to negotiate with the
nationalists.8
The YAR government viewed these developments with satisfaction. The 
capture of the hinterland and the seizure of the Emirate of Bayhan by 
the NLF in mid-September had not only quickened the British withdrawal 
but had also eventually denied the Royalists the opportunity of using 
the territories adjacent to the borders as a support base.9
However, the successes against the British and the South Arabian 
Federation were marked by the power struggle taking place between the 
two carpeting nationalist organisations, namely the National 
Liberation Front and the Front for the Liberation of South Yemen. In 
the competition for takeover from the collapsing federal government 
the NLF, by virtue of the support it had built up in the countryside,
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was able during the sunnier of 1967 to overthrow the rulers of the up- 
country emirates, while FLOSY maintained influence mainly in and 
around Aden. Political differences between the two groups had 
developed into a series of confrontations in January and June which 
were a source of deep concern for both the UAR and the YAR. Both 
countries had co-ordinated their policies towards South Yemen in such 
a way that the Sana’a government had been sponsoring the liberation 
movement there in a more comprehensive manner, leaving Cairo to 
effectively direct and supply the armed struggle against the British
forces.10 Although there was an apparent unease among the YAR leaders
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /  
over Egypt's lack of enthusiasm for Yemen's reunification, al-Sallal
had no problem in accepting President Nasir's increasing interest in
influencing the situation in South Yemen. In early September, when the
fighting between the two groups resumed on the outskirts of Aden,
President Nasir managed to bring the leaders of the NLF and FLOSY to
Cairo for negotiations under the auspices of the Arab League, with the
aim of resolving differences and forming a coalition government that
would assume authority after the British withdrawal.11 Because the
resulting agreement was rejected by the radical left in the NLF,
another round of negotiations was held in late October, again under
the auspices of the Arab League. A new agreement was announced on 1
November but this was ignored when the forces of the two groups became
engaged in what proved to be the final battle in a small tcwn outside
Aden. On 7 November the situation was settled after the South Arabian
Army intervened in favour of the NLF. This military victory was
followed on 11 November by a telegram fran the NLF leadership to the
British government in which the latter was asked to enter into
independence talks with the organisation as sole representative of the
South Yemeni people.12
The NLF's attempt to exclude FLOSY from the independence talks did not 
go dcwn well in Sana'a which had shifted its political support to 
FLOSY following the NLF's rejection of the November 1966 merger 
agreement. The new leadership in Sana'a did not intervene in the 
pcwer struggle between the two rival groups as it was fully occupied 
with its cwn mounting problems. However, relations between the YAR 
leaders and the NLF fell short of what was expected from two sides 
supposedly seeking unification. The NLF, much like FLOSY, called for 
the unification of the two parts of Yemen. But while FLOSY was 
unreservedly calling for an immediate merger with the north once the
to establish a state of its own. Reunification of Yemen, the NLF 
insisted, was possible only on "a sound and popular basis". As the 
prospects for independence became brighter, the NLF leadership made it 
clear it was aiming at establishing an independent state in the south 
and negotiate reunification with the north at a later stage.13 
During the negotiations the NLF rejected a proposal put forward by 
FLOSY for the establishment of a merely provisional executive body in 
South Yemen after the British withdrawal to handle the immediate unity 
negotiations with the North Yemen Republic.14
Before leaving for independence talks seme weeks later, Kahtan al- 
Sha'abi, the NLF leader, stated that his organisation was carmitted to 
the ultimate unity of Yemen, but it could only be brought about in the 
long term after due preparations and when stability in the north had 
been achieved.15 The implications of the independence of South Yemen 
and the achievement of reunification figured prominently in the debate 
among the decision-making elite on the issue of recognition.
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The NLF-British Independence Talks
By mid-November 1967 developments in the South had reached a point 
where the YAR decision-makers had to consider a formal response.
After the NLF had established supremacy, in the first week of 
November, attention focused on the independence negotiations.
Britain, which wanted to hand power to an effective government, was 
new willing to negotiate independence with the NLF. On 13 November, 
the British government agreed to the NLF proposals. Talks between a 
British delegation and an NLF team were held in Geneva from 21 to 29
/  7 7 7 7 7 Z 7 7 A  7 / y , /  7 7 7 7 7 ^ 7 7 7 7 -7 z /  ^  W  7 7 7 7 7November. At the end of these talks a memorandum was signed stating 
that Britain would relinquish its sovereignty over Aden and that South 
Yemen would become independent as of 30 November, 1967.16
Although the NLF had on occasions acknowledged YAR interests in the 
issue, there is no indication that Sana'a was consulted by the NLF 
leadership during the run-up to independence. Giving priority to the 
British withdrawal and fully preoccupied with its internal problems, 
the post-November leadership in Sana'a made no public response to the 
developments in the South. A year later, in early 1969 when relations 
between the two Yemeni Republics had greatly deteriorated, the YAR 
leadership complained that the NLF-British talks had confronted them 
with a situation which was contrary to YAR foreign-policy objectives 
in two respects. First, the idea of independence for the South was 
inconsistent with their long-cherished plan for the immediate 
reunification of North and South Yemen following the British 
withdrawal. Secondly, the exclusion of FLOSY from independence talks 
was unacceptable to the YAR leadership who considered the former fully 
entitled to be party to the political future of South Yemen having 
been a partner in the liberation struggle.17
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Perceptions of the Decision-Makers
The decision was taken by the moderate government, whose structure was 
not yet fully stabilised. The approach of independence for South 
Yemen coincided with the overthrow of President al-Sallal on 5 
November. Although a Republican council and a new cabinet were 
announced an the same day the coup was carried out, membership of the 
former was completed only on 22 November. On that date General al- 
Amri replaced Muhammad Nu'man, who had resigned a few days earlier 
from membership of the Council as a protest against the government's
/ / / / / / / / / / . / , /  / /./ z / / / /,/ / / / /./ /,/ / / / / / / / / y / / / /uncompromising attitude towards the national reconciliation proposed 
by the Khartoum Agreement.18
Officially, the ultimate decision-making unit, comprised of Premier 
al-Ayni, Foreign Minister Dr. Hasan Makki, the Occupied-South Affairs 
Minister Abdul Uthman and the three members of the presidential 
council, namely Kadi al-Iryani, Shaykh Muhammad Ali Uthman and 
Lieutenant-General Hassan al-Amri. In practice, however, al-Iryani,
Chairman of the Republican Council, became the principal decision­
maker as had been the case with his predecessor President al-Sallal, 
though for different reasons. Because of their frequent trips abroad 
to gather support for the new regime, both al-Ayni and Makki were 
absent for most of the policy-making. Lieutenant-General al-Amri was 
fully occupied in organising the defence of Sana'a as he was also the 
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces in addition to being a member 
of the Republican Council. Muhammad Ali Uthman no doubt had his views 
tut always left the decision-making to al-Iryani who was perhaps the 
one figure acceptable to all the main political forces within the 
post-November coalition.
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The individual roles played by the members of the decision-making 
elite in shaping inter-Yemeni relations were influenced by their views 
on Yemen's unity. Almost all of them were outside the government 
during the last and crucial stage of the developments in the South. 
Hcwever, it was widely believed that they resented the UAR's direct 
involvement in the liberation movement in the south. They were also 
reportedly opposed to Cairo's encouragement of the independent armed 
struggle movement there, fearing it might result in the establishment 
of a separate state.19
L^ uhsin al-Xyni /was/ probably tie YAR leader7 vio fiacl made the meet7 
consistent efforts in this area of north-south relations , especially 
during his brief tenure as foreign minister in the first Republican 
cabinet and again during Nu'man's 1965 cabinet. Al-Ayni1 s belief in 
Yemeni unity was partly rooted in the formative period of his
intellectual development. He was one of the famous group of forty
students sent by Imam Yahya to Lebanon in 1947 for their education. 
There he was influenced by the growing Arab nationalist agitation for 
the three "pillars" of Arab resurgence or Ba'athism, namely freedom, 
socialism, and Arab unity. The latter entailed integration of small 
entities to form larger entities as a first step towards comprehensive 
Arab unity. His belief in the unity of Yemen was strengthened by his 
brief political experience when he took refuge in Aden between 1958 
and 1960. There he joined the nationalist struggle from within the 
TUC in which he represented the Ba1 ath branch in both parts of
Yemen.20 His intellectual orientation as a Ba'athist, his belief in
Yemen's natural unity, and the relationship he formed with sane 
prominent members of the TUC, who later became the leaders of FLOSY, 
undoubtedly influenced his opposition to the establishment of an 
independent state in South Yemen exclusively controlled by the NLF.
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When it became clear in early November 1967 that the NLF was going to 
negotiate with the British government for independence, the YAR 
leaders including al-Ayni tried to shift attention to the issue of 
Yemen’s reunification. During the visit to Cairo of a YAR delegation 
headed by Premier al-Ayni on 10-12 October, the NLF leaders who were 
preparing for independence talks in Geneva, met the North Yemeni 
officials on their own initiative. At that meeting al-Ayni and his 
economic minister, Dr. al-Attar, urged the NLF leaders, who included 
al-Sha'abi, Adil Khalifah and Abd al-Fattah Ismail, to seize upon the
pending withdrawal of the British and work for the iirmediate
' / / ./£./ /.// Z / „ / / / / / / /  / / / / / / / / /  / / / / / / / / / . /  
reunification of the two parts of the country. According to al-Ayni
prevailing conditions in Yemen were ideally conducive to such a step.
He argued that:
"the two impediments, the Imamate and colonialism, are about 
to vanish. What then could obstruct unification? Sure there 
are problems; in the north they are manifested by the remnants 
of the Hamid al-Din family, in addition to pending issues with 
Saudi Arabia. In the South, there are the remnants of the 
Sultans and the stooges of the colonialist administration. A 
united Yemeni people should be able to face up to these 
problems.
Soon the Egyptians will leave and the Yemenis in the North 
will shoulder complete responsibility. In the South, the 
British will leave too and the Yemenis will shoulder the 
responsibility. In such a situation, the state, the 
institutions, the economy and foreign relations will be 
started anew. Why not start a new society together?
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This (independence eve) is the opportune hour to achieve 
unity. If we allow this chance to slip out of our hands, and 
two governments, separate institutions, and divergent foreign 
relations to be established, it will be very difficult to 
achieve unity afterwards. Separation will be perpetuated, and 
there will be interests, internal as well as external, that 
will prevent unity or hamper it at the least."21
Kadi al-Iryani viewed the situation fran a more pragmatic perspective. 
Like the other Republican leaders, he cherished the goal of restoring 
Yemen's7 unity and! shared with Muharamd All Utiman and 1^-Arnri, tie 
other two members of the Republican Council, resentment at the NLF's 
seemingly separatist tendencies. But during the debate which took 
place within the political circles in Sana'a in the second half of 
November, al-Iryani came out strongly in support of those who 
advocated recognition of an independent state in the South. He based 
his argument on the need to secure a reliable support base in South 
Yemen at a time when the Royalists were tightening their siege of 
Sana'a and supporters of the Yemeni Republic, including the Arab 
revolutionary regimes, were uncertain about the future of the YAR. In 
the event of the Royalists breaking into Sana'a, al-Iryani advised the 
Republicans to move to Ta'iz, the second capital of the YAR; there 
they would be able to reorganise themselves, benefiting fran the would 
be independent state of South Yemen which would serve as a support 
base for the North.22
In thinking along these lines, al-Iryani was clearly falling back on 
past experience. In the early 1950s al-Iryani had attributed the 
failure of the 1948 revolt mainly to the unreceptive attitude of the 
northern tribes who had helped Imam Yahya to put down the revolution.
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He advised that for any similar revolt to succeed, it should establish 
itself in the southern part of the country where the people were more 
receptive to change. Fran its southern base, the revolutionary 
government would be able to fight a protracted war against its enemies 
in Sana'a. Such a strategy would deplete the energy of the Royalists 
in Sana'a while at the same time giving the northern population time 
to get used to the idea of a more progressive regime.23
The YAR's Reaction To The NLF-British Independence Talks
/ / / ' / /  / / /  / /  / /  / /  / /  / /  / / /  / /  / /  / /  / / / / / / / / /  / / / / / / / ,
As previously mentioned, the new government assumed power on 5 
November, 1967, only three weeks before it had to take a final 
decision on the situation in the south. At that stage the new
leadership was completely overwhelmed by the pressing need to mobilise 
support for its policy of reconciliation while strengthening the
Republican defences in face of the attacking Royalists forces.
Most of the crucial pre-independence developments in South Yemen had 
taken place during the surrmer of 1967 while al-Iryani and his moderate 
colleagues were still detained in Cairo and could not respond to these 
events. However, by the time the last round of negotiations had taken 
place between the NLF and FDOSY in the last week of October 1967, al- 
Iryani and his colleagues were already preparing to return to Yemen 
with every indication that they were going to play an important role 
in the political future of the country. At that juncture and on their 
cwn initiative, members of the NLF delegation met with al-Iryani and
asked him to help persuade the YAR to support the aspirations of the
South so that, according to their argument, Britain would have no 
excuse to delay independence. When urged by al-Iryani to work for an
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immediate merger with the northern Republic instead, the NLF leaders 
said they preferred this issue to be decided later by the new state so 
that there could be no doubt as to the choice of the South Yemenis in 
the matter.24 Al-Iryani was not pleased to hear that but, like other 
Northern Yemeni leaders, was preoccupied with the situation back in 
the north and did not want to make any specific suggestions that might 
look like an attempt to impose certain views on the South Yemenis. 
Before leaving for Sana'a, he expressed the simple hope that the 
ongoing negotiations between the two rival South Yemeni groups would
succeed and that they would bear in mind the unity of Yemen in all
/ / .1 / . / / / / / / / / /  / / / / /././ l / / / / / / . / / / . /  / /u / /U* / / / their endeavours. He added that developments had given him the
impression that an independent South Yemen could in the near future
prove a valuable "support base" for the revolution in Yemen as a
whole.25
The impending independence of the South had become a pressing issue 
for Sana'a only a few days before the event had taken place. Due to 
their preoccupation with the increasing political and military 
pressures, the new leaders in Sana'a could not give their full 
attention to that issue. Even when it became quite clear, after the 
NLF and the British government agreed in mid-November to begin 
independence talks in Geneva, the YAR leadership did not respond 
quickly. The issue was never considered by the cabinet or the 
Republican Council in their meetings. Instead, members of the 
decision-making elite exchanged views on the subject in informal 
settings. There was a feeling that the developments in the South were 
beyond Sana'a's control and everyone in the leadership was aware that 
the NLF was determined to establish its cwn independent government 
there. This fact was brought heme to al-Iryani and al-Ayni by the NLF 
leaders themselves during their talks with the latter in Cairo in late
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October and mid-November respectively. Nevertheless, in the second 
half of the month, al-Iryani undertook wide consultations with members 
of the governing elite and leaders of public opinion with the 
intention of ascertaining their views on what the proper response to 
the imminent establishment of an independent NLF government in South 
Yemen should be. All agreed that, because of the YAR preoccupation in 
defending itself against the Royalist offensive, there was very little 
Sana’a could do to change the situation. However, with regard to the 
issue of recognition of an independent government, there was 
considerable difference of opinion. Proponents of recognition, mostly 
^intellectuals^ ielilved t£iat failure to recognise £he ISoutfi vrould he 
interpreted by the British as an indication of the YAR's intention to 
annex the South and would make them delay their withdrawal. The 
prospect of the British staying in Aden, or a possible arrangement 
between London and Riyad, was fraught with very serious Implications. 
After all, they argued, it was Sana'a which had called for self- 
determination for South Yemen. The opponents of recognition, on the 
other hand, were convinced that to confirm the legitimacy of the NLF 
government would be to give up forever the North's long-standing claim 
of sovereignty over the southern territories. Among those who held 
this view were the tribal shaykhs, the more conservative elements, 
sane Ba'athists and the supporters of FLOSY inside the government.26
Hew The Choice Was Made
The Royalist siege of Sana'a not only had a bearing on the decision 
that was finally agreed but also on the method by which that decision 
was eventually made. During the last week of November 1967 when the 
siege began to affect life in the capital, the government machinery 
was virtually paralysed. The Royalist forces were already shelling 
Sana'a fran the north, west and south. Buildings, housing and state 
agencies were especially targeted and later President al-Iryani's
house was shelled. Due mainly to these extraordinary circumstances,
/ / / / / . / / / / . / / / / / „ /  / .A / / / / / / / / /  J  / / / / / / / / / / / . /  , the cabinet could neither meet in regular sessions nor use its
headquarters. In most cases the ministers concerned were assembled at
the invitation of the Premier or his deputy in the house of a member
of the cabinet. Al-Iryani made a point of consulting the individuals
concerned whenever possible. Anyone who had an interest in the issue
had to convey their point of view to al-Iryani either directly by
seeking a meeting or indirectly through a member of the government.
Al-Iryani managed somehow to consult almost all members of the
governing elite, which included the other two members of the
Republican Council, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the
Minister for the Affairs of the Occupied South, in addition to Shaykh
Abdallah ifcn al-Ahmar and seme other tribal shaykhs and senior army
officers.27
It was also as a result of the Sana'a siege that when the issue of 
recognition became most pressing, both Premier al-Ayni and Foreign 
Minister Dr. Makki were abroad searching for economic and military aid 
and political support. Muhsin al-Ayni began by visiting Cairo on 26 
November, and at the time the decision was being considered he was 
paying a visit to Tunisia. The Foreign Minister Dr. Makki was on an
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official visit to the USSR. Under the circumstances, Kadi al-Iryani 
had practically taken command of the government in their absence.
In his consultations al-Iryani could not discern a universally 
acceptable course of action. He concluded that the YAR had one of 
three options:
a. use force to prevent the NLF from establishing an independent 
state;
,/ / / /-./ / ./. /,! / / /./. / /./ / /. / /, / / , / / / / /  / /.J. / / /./ /b. confine itself to making its point by denying recognition to the
would-be state;
c. grant recognition to that state once it was proclaimed.
The first option seemed unrealistic to al-Iryani because, under the 
circumstances, the YAR did not have the military capability. In 
addition, al-Iryani felt that even if annexation by force were 
possible, it would damage the prospects of a lasting unity between the 
two parts of Yemen. The second alternative was similarly ruled out 
because in his view such a negative stance was totally inappropriate 
with regard to such a vital issue. More Importantly, the NLF would 
have viewed non-recognition as a serious challenge to its legitimacy 
and this could have lead to hostilities.
With so little tame and so few options al-Iryani settled for the third 
alternative, the one which would, apart fran anything else, meet 
immediate security needs and preserve prospects for future 
reunification of the two parts of Yemen. Recognition of the southern 
Republic would after all only be an acknowledgement of a de facto
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situation, but al-Iryani knew that it would earn Sana*a the gratitude 
of the NLF and oblige it to provide vital help if the battle for 
Sana'a did not go the Republican's way. Moreover, the NLF would find 
it difficult later on to withdraw fran its cannitment to the eventual 
reunification of Yemen.28
In line with his declared policy on decision-making, al-Iryani let the 
other members of the decisional unit knew of his preferences but 
refrained fran pressing his point of view. Until about the 27th of
November,there was no clear-cut position within the decision-making
/ 7, / / / /. / / / 7 / y  /. 7 /. 7 I..L/ / J  Jy ^  7 7elite. While General al-Amri was unenthusiastic, Muharrmad All Uthman,
the other member of the Republican Council, was against recognition.29
At that time the military was fully preoccupied with the defence of
Sana'a and less interested in political issues. It was known that the
MAN had overwhelming support within the army at that time and would,
if needed, cane out in support of recognition. In any event, al-
Iryani consulted the senior officers but was told the army trusted him
and would leave the matter to his own discretion.30
During the last week of November as the independence talks in Geneva 
between the NLF and the British delegation were being finalised, it 
became imperative for al-Iryani to reach a decision. At last he 
placed his political weight decisively behind recognition, arguing 
that failure to do so on the part of the YAR would provide an excuse 
to those states which were basically unreceptive to the NLF to delay 
recognition themselves - a situation faced by Kuwait after it obtained 
independence in 1961. Furthermore, al-Iryani stressed the Importance 
of the time factor, arguing that since independence of the south was 
inevitable, it would be wise to be the first to recognise the new 
state, especially as sane countries had already indicated their
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readiness to acknowledge the new Republic as soon as it became
independent.31 It appears that this argument was not accepted 
unanimously, but there were no strong objections either. Members of 
the governing elite who had objected to recognition opted for silence 
for the sake of solidarity in the face of the Royalist onslaught. 
Thus the YAR became the first country to recognise the PRSY. Formal 
recognition was preceded by a telegram sent by Chairman al-Iryani to 
Kahtan al-Sha1 abi, the president of the newly independent People's 
Republic of South Yemen, in the early morning of 30 November, 1967 in
which he congratulated the people of the South on achieving
4 / / / I / / / / / J A / i / V - /  4 4*/ / / /independence and wished the government there the best of luck.32
Implgnentaticn
The unilateral nature of al-Iryani's role reflected the peculiar 
characteristics of the decision-making process in Yemen during that 
stage of the war. The Chairman of the Republican Council not only 
dominated the policy-making process but because of the disruptive 
conditions of the war was also able to effect the implementation 
himself. While the consultations were being finalised on 28 
September, al-Iryani personally ordered both the Information Ministry 
and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs not to release any statements on 
the subject of the YAR's attitude to the political future of the 
South. They should, instead, confine themselves to welcoming the 
imminent withdrawal of British forces and the independence of South 
Yemen.33 Subsequently, on 29 November, 1967, on the eve of the PRSY's 
independence, in its commentary Radio Sana'a hailed "the victory of 
the 14th October revolution which was staged by the people of the 
South  Independence was also a splendid victory for the 26th
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September revolution which had shewn the revolutionary path to the 
people of the South." In the same news bulletin, it was announced 
that the Civil Service Authority, on the recarmendation of the 
Chairman of the Republican Council, had declared Thursday 30 November 
an official holiday on the occasion of the independence of the 
South.34
It was not out of keeping with the way foreign policy is conducted in 
third^world countries that al-Iryani sent the congratulatory telegram 
to the president of the newly independent South Yemen without the
Republican Council and the Cabinet were informed later in the day when 
the two councils held a joint emergency meeting to consider the 
events. At the meeting presided over by al-Iryani, it was decided to 
abolish the Ministry for Occupied South Yemen Affairs and replace it 
with the Ministry for Yemeni Unity Affairs which was to "strengthen 
fraternal understanding between brothers in the North and South."35 
On the same day, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, acting on personal 
instructions frcm al-Iryani, issued the following statement:
"The Government of the Yemen Arab Republic, in line with its 
policy which is based on respect for the wishes of the people 
of the South and their right to self-determination, has 
decided to recognise their new regime. It considers 
independence and the withdrawal of the forces of occupation a 
step that will enable the Yemeni people in the North and in 
the South to achieve unity. It also considers that this 
decision will open the door to discussions with the new 
regime, on all camion issues in accordance with the interests 
of all Yemeni people."36
Feedback
In the final analysis, the decision was a strategic one in the sense 
that it was an irrevocable act pertaining to a high-policy goal. The 
decision was conclusive and described as representing the then 
inimitable position of the YAR towards the situation in South Yemen.
On the motivational level, however, the decision was taken in response 
to what the YAR decision-makers considered an urgent, but far fran 
permanent, state of affairs.
/ / / / / '  / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /  / / / / / / / /  / / / /  / /  / /  / / / / / / /  
The decision had immediate implications for both the internal and
external environment. The military capability and political position
of the Yemeni Republic was strengthened by the good relations between
the NLF government in Aden and the Sana'a government, brought about by
the latter's recognition of the PRSY. In the military context this
was demonstrated by the fact that during late 1967 and the first half
of 1968 PRSY troops and YAR forces were able to launch joint
operations against enemy forces (i.e. the ex-rulers of the south and
the Royalists) across the eastern borders.37 In addition, during the
second week of November 1967, the NLF in Aden sent the YAR army a
limited but much needed shipment of ammunition.3 8 Politically, the
creation of another Yemeni state strengthened the position of the YAR
at a time when, following the withdrawal of UAR forces, it had been
left to face the military and political pressures of the anti-
Republican forces largely on its own. During the crucial period of
the siege of Sana'a, the leaders of South Yemen affirmed their
solidarity with their brothers in the North and in early February 1968
Kahtan al-Sha'bi even threatened to intervene directly in support of
the YAR.39 Although actions by the NLF fell short of fulfilling the
YAR's hopes of actual unification, they encouraged belief in a viable
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and very necessary inter-Yemeni alliance. However, cn 1 August 1968, 
only days before the bloody events which marked the beginning of the 
rift between the two Yemeni Republics, al-Iryani was still calling for 
iirmediate unity which, in his view, was made more vital by the fact 
that the two Yemeni Republics were facing the same enemy.40
By recognising the PRSY, the North Yemeni leaders had been forced to 
abandon the principle of the indivisibility of Yemen - a basic foreign 
policy principle consistently upheld since the North became 
independent in 1918. Dr. Abd al-Karim al-Iryani described the
/ y  /./.// / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / , / / / / / , /  / ./y / /
decision as "the most important event in the nation’s history, 
surpassing in its significance even the British occupation of Aden 
and/or the latter’s agreement with Turkey in 1914 on the delineation 
of the borders which were to separate the [Yemeni] south fran the 
north."41 The division of Yemen into two states had acquired 
international legitimacy by the admission of the PRSY firstly to the 
membership of the Arab League on 12 December, 1967 and then to the 
United Nations on 14 December, 1967 - with no opposition or
reservations on the part of the YAR.42 Both Yemeni Republics 
continued to insist that the existence of two governments in Yemen was 
only temporary and for this reason no diplomatic relations between the 
YAR and the PRSY were established. Instead co-ordination ccrrmittees 
were established in Aden and Sana'a. Hcwever, apart from these 
manifestations of unity, the two Republics pursued their own 
interests. According to YAR observers, the NLF leaders made it quite 
clear days after independence that any dealing between the two Yemeni 
Republics had to be conducted on that basis. In fact, members of the 
official delegation who arrived in Aden on 7 December to convey the 
YAR leadership's congratulations on independence were surprised by the 
formal way they were received by the NLF government and the formal
manner In which talks between the two sides were organised. They were 
allegedly also stunned when, contrary to the spirit of the visit and 
the prevailing cordial atmosphere, the PRSY Interior Minister 
Muhammad Ali Haytham, expressed his government's displeasure at the 
alleged presence of anti-NLF groups in the YAR.43 These were taken by 
the YAR leaders as an early indication of unfriendly intentions on the 
part of the NLF government. A year later, in February 1969, when the 
differences between the two Yemeni governments had cane out into the 
open, the YAR leaders began to admit that their decision to recognise
the PRSY had been based on a misconception. They maintained that the
V  7 7 7 7 ^  J iL 7 7 4 7 7 7 /j7 7,_7 i-7 7^  L LJ L-L 7 7 7 7 7*/decision had been made on the understanding that the NLF government
would take steps tcwards reunification almost immediately. No steps
had been taken; in fact the PERSY had begun to consolidate separation.
As Kadi al-Iryani explained in his speech delivered in the same month:
"when independence came [to the south], we in the North 
pondered whether to recognise a second state on the soil of 
the same country or alternatively to delay such a step. As 
you knew, our delay would have led to the delay of the British 
withdrawal fran our country. In addition we believed our 
brothers who, in their charters, were affirming that the first 
thing they would do [upon independence] was to announce unity 
of the natural Yemen. For this and the need to deny the 
British any opportunity to delay their withdrawal, we 
recognised the new Government [in Aden]."44
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NOTES CN CHAPTER VI
Following the first clashes between the two Yemeni republics 
across cannon borders in September-October, 1972, an agreement was 
signed in Tripoli (Libya) in March, 1973 which laid down the basic 
principles for eventual reunification. The "Tripoli Charter" was 
not immediately implemented, but recurrent hostilities, especially 
the 1979 cross-borders fighting, enhanced the conviction that only 
with reunification would intra-Yemeni problems be solved. On 22 
May, 1990, the two Yemeni republics were eventually reunited and 
became "The Republic of Yemen".
Dr. Makki, the then YAR Foreign Minister mentioned that during the 
initial stage of the siege all states including the UAR and the 
USSR believed the fall of the capital to the Royalists was
inevitable. Such an impression led sane members of the Egyptian 
embassy in Sana'a to circulate notes to other embassies stating 
that with its troops already withdrawn, the UAR was not
responsible for their safety and are thus advised to leave the 
city. See Makki's account in Hisar Sana'a: Shahadat lil Tarikh 
(The Sana 'a Siege: Testimonies for History) canpiled by the Yemeni 
Centre for Studies and Researches (Sana'a) Dar al-Fikr lil Tiba'ah 
wal-Tawzi'i wal-Nashr, Damascus, 1989, pp.227-228.
Fran an interview with Hassan Makki on the Sana'a siege. In Hisar 
Sana'a: Shahadat lil Tarikh, op. cit., p.231.
op. cit., p. 227; Colonel Hussin al-Daf'i, the then Deputy
Canmander-in-Chief of the armed forces mentioned that ammunition 
sent by Nasir numbered 5 million shells, op. cit., p.291.
5. Fran the statement by Ali Lutf al-Thawr, op. cit., pp.63-64.
6. As mentioned in the first policy statement, the Revolution's first 
objective was 'eradication of the absolute individual rule (in the 
north) and elimination of foreign influence (in the south).' See 
the YAR first policy statement in Nusus Yamaniyyah, canpiled by 
Ali al-Ulufi, op. cit., p.23.
For an account of the revolution of the armed National Movement in 
South Yemen see Ahmad al-Misri, Al-Nadjm al-Ahmar Fawk al-Yaman,
7 J J /7 Ll/ 7 L 7 7 ^VrV7 7T 7 /./,/ 7 7 /,/ / / / . / / / / / / ,Tadjrfbat al-Thawrah fil Yaman al-Dimukrati, Beirut, Muassasat al- 
Abhath al-Arabiyyah, third edition, 1988, pp. 123-179.
8. Muhamnad al-Hibshi, Al-Yaman al-Djanubi Siasiyyan wa Iktisadiyyan 
wa Idjtima'iyyan Munthu 1937 Wahatta Kiyam Djumhuriyyat al-Yaman 
al-Djanubiyyah al-Sha ’abiyyah (Southern Yemen, Politically, 
Economically and Socially Since 1937 Until the Establishment of 
the People's Republic of South Yemen), Beirut, Dar al-Tali'ah lil 
Tiba'ah wal Nashr, 1968, p.584.
9. See Al-Hayat, 27 September, 1967.
10. Yemeni sources agreed that the Egyptians took the prime 
responsibility of arming and training the guerilla movements in 
the south and established a liaison office for that purpose in the 
city of Ta'iz, close to the borders with the south. They added 
that the Egyptians conducted their operations in this respect 
mostly independently of the Yemeni authorities (see Muharrmad al- 
Aswadi, op. cit., p. 106-107). Two YAR foreign ministers, al-Ayni 
and M. Yakub, told the writer that they had on occasions to draw
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the attention of the UAR government to the necessity of using the 
name "occupied South Yemen" instead of the term "occupied South 
Arabia" used constantly by Cairo.
11. The Ecananist, 4 November 1967, Ahmad al-Misri, Al-Nadjm al-Ahmar 
Fawk al-Yaman op. cit., p.282.
12. ibid., p.302.
13. Abd al-Karim al-Iryani, Tatawwur al-Awda ...,. op. cit., p.96.
 ^7 Ali Salirn al-Bid, the7 first t)e£efice iimister 6f th6 PRSY and
current Deputy-Chairman of the Presidential Council of the 
Republic of Yemen, told the writer that reunification of Yemen was 
indeed not at that stage among the political priorities of the 
NLF.
14. Ahmad, al-Misri, Al-Nadjm al-Ahmar Fawk al-Yaman, op. cit., p.293.
15. Akhir Sa'at, 22 November, 1967; seme believe part of the then 
apparent lack of enthusiasm from within the NLF leadership for 
immediate unification with the north was due to the assumption of 
power in Sana'a by the conservative Republicans on 5 November, 
1967. A unification under these circumstances would, this 
argument went, retard the progressive developments in South Yemen.
16. Fred Halliday, Arabia Without Sultans, op. cit., p.221.
17. See the YAR statement on the differences with the PRSY in Al- 
Thawrah, 14 February, 1969.
18. SWB ME/2629/A/4; text of Nu'man's resignation in Al-Hayat, 21 
November, 1967.
19. See Muhammad al-Aswadi, Harakat al-Ahrar al-Yamaniyyin wal Bahth 
An al-Hakikah, Cairo, 1987, pp.165-166.
20. Helen Lackner, op. cit., p.32; see also Files of al-Ahram's Centre 
for Strategic Studies.
21. From Muhsin al-Ayni1 s replies to the writer's enquiries, dated 
7 7 70ctobe^ 1988. / / / / / / / ' / / / / / / / / / / / ' / / / ' / /
22. Personal interviews.
23. From al-Iryani' s correspondence with Muhammad Nu'man, in Min Wara 
al-Aswar, op. cit., pp.32-38.
24. Kadi al-Iryani, in his replies to a questionnaire sent by the YCSR 
on Yemen's unity (unpublished 1988), blamed lack of co-ordination 
between al-Sallal' s government and the NLF in the few months which 
preceded the independence of the PRSY for the situation faced by 
the post-November government in this respect.
25. Akhir Sa’at, 26 October, 1967.
26. Personal interviews.
27. Fran the writer's interview with Dr. Hassan Makki, London, 1988.
28. Fran Kadi al-Iryani's unpublished replies to the YCSR's enquiries, 
op. cit.
29. Fran al-Ayni's replies to the writer's inquiries.
30. Fran the writer's interview with Colonel Muhairmad al-Iryani, 
London, November, 1988.
31. Personal interviews. No information was available regarding the 
states to which al-Iryani was referring, but al-Ahram the Egyptian
recognise the South Yemeni state once independence was announced.
32. SWB, ME/2638/A/3.
33. Personal interviews.
34. SWB, ME/2636/A/1-3 supplemented by personal interviews.
35. ibid.
36. Fran files of the YAR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
37. Fred Halliday, Revolution and Foreign Policy: The Case of South 
Yemen, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p.111.
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38. Contrary to Western reports of the arrival to the YAR of a few 
hundred NLF fighters to fight on the side of the republican army 
against the Royalist forces during the Sana'a siege, North Yemeni 
officials affirm that only followers from the FLOSY army, Djaysh 
al-Tahrir, took part in the fighting. (See Makki's interview with 
the Egyptian magazine al-MUsawwar, 15 December, 1967). However, 
the PRSY Government, according to Shaykh Sinan Abu Luhum, sent 
25,000 rifle bullets. (See The Weekly, 26 September, 1990, 19
April, 1990).
40. Al-Thawrah, 2 August 1968.
41. Abd al-Karim al-Iryani, Tatawwur al-Awla, op. cit., p.97.
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CHAPTER VII
THE DECISION TO RESUME DIPDCMATIC RELATIONS 
7 7 WITH THE REPURUC OF GERMANY 7 7
(JULY 1969)
The defeat of the Royalists' final offensive in mid 1968 was followed 
by the suppression of the radical Republicans. There ensued a period 
of tranquillity in Yemen lasting exactly one year which made it 
possible for the post-November leadership of the YAR to effect certain 
changes in the country's foreign policy, starting with resumption of 
relations with West Germany. It took nearly six months of
negotiation, both direct and indirect, between the YAR and the ERG, 
before a decision was finally taken in May 1969 to restore the broken 
diplomatic links between the two countries. It was well worth the 
effort, as far as the YAR was concerned, because Bonn was prepared to
relations.
Unlike the other cases covered by this study, this decision came as a 
result of a pre-planned strategy and not as a response to external 
stimuli. The feedback effects were manifested by the enhancement of 
the economic capabilities of the YAR as well as the regime's political 
credibility. As a result of the decision, the international 
environment had also become relatively more favourable towards YAR 
foreign policy objectives.
Operational Environment
As the decision to resume broken relations with West Germany was 
mainly a response to internal needs, two of the three environmental 
factors which directly, but differently, influenced the decisional 
setting were internal, namely political stability and the economic 
crisis. The third was related to one of the main objectives of the 
country's foreign policy, namely the achievement of balanced relations
with East and West. On the other hand, the readiness of West Germany 
to provide aid quid pro quo for recognition constituted the stimulus 
for the decision.
Internal Political Stability
The Royalist encirclement which threatened Sana'a in the winter of 
1967/68 had relaxed by September of the latter year. A subsequent 
offensive, at the beginning of October, which was organised and led by
collapsed by the end of the month. This proved to be the last serious 
military effort by the Royalists and in the following months the 
Republican forces took the initiative and carried out a series of 
mopping-up operations in the northern territories. Consequently, the 
Royalist hold on these territories was greatly reduced and by May 1969 
the Republican forces were in control of up to two thirds of the 
country and most of the population.1 As an indirect result of these 
Republican victories many tribes deserted the Royalists and declared 
their allegiance to the Republican government instead. On 25 July 
1969, the last of the Hamid al-Din caimanders in Yemen, Amir Abdallah 
ibn Husayn, was assassinated in the main northern city of Sadah by 
it's cwn citizens, an event which effectively marked the end of the 
Royalist counter revolution in Yemen.2
During the same period, and especially during January 1969, the 
government, in accordance with its policy of reconciliation, 
encouraged the return to Sana'a not only of Royalists but of dissident 
Republicans who shared the government's belief that the war should be 
settled by reconciliation with the Royalist side. This policy
inevitably triggered fierce opposition fran the radical Republican 
forces, mainly followers of MAN who controlled the most effective 
units in the army: the shock troops and the parachute regiments in
addition to the Popular Resistance Forces (PRF) (Kuwat al-Muka.wamah 
al-Sha ’abiyyah). During 1968, this opposition fran the left became an 
open challenge to the government. However, in two crucial 
confrontations the government asserted its authority and eliminated 
the left-wing pressure on the decision-making centre. On one 
occasion, in March 1968, government troops were able to foil an
attempt by the PRF in Hudaydah to seize an arms shipment. On another
/  7 7 / v 7^ 7! 7 7 7 /y /. /  /  /V / , /  / .J  /  / * / ■ , /  7 7 7occasion fierce battles were fought in Sana’a itself between followers
of the MAN and troops associated with the Ba'ath and loyal to the
government. In these battles, which took place over three days (23-25
August, 1968), the government again prevailed but at seme material and
political cost.3 In January 1969, government troops killed the leader
of the opposition forces within the army, Major Abd al-Rakib Abd al-
Wahhab, who had returned back fran Algeria where he had been in exile
for his part in the August fighting. Capitalising on these incidents,
the government took a number of measures to ensure the suppression of
further opposition from the left for some time to come.4
These dual achievements, i.e. military victory over the Royalists and 
the suppression of the left, removed any formidable political 
constraints and enabled the post-November government to put its 
moderate policies into practice.
The Eccncmic Crisis
A combination of political and environmental factors led to a serious 
deterioration in the economic situation during the latter half of the 
1960s. The drought which began to hit the country in 1966 worsened 
during 1967 and in 1968 it crippled the agriculture which at that 
time was contributing 80% of the Gross Domestic Income.5 Matters were 
made worse by the increasing cost of the war which, since the 
withdrawal of the UAR forces in late 1967, the Government was having 
to meet from its own meagre resources. As will be seen later, the 
Ktir^ hmi ^Govertan^ it: whidi was horned7 on September ^  / 1969 was left: to 
tackle this difficult situation.
What concerned the YAR leadership in late 1968 was the lamentable lack 
of vital foreign aid which the government needed to embark on its 
pnograirme of economic development. Since the defeat of the Royalists 
in October, Kadi al-Iryani the Chairman of the Republican Council and 
Premier al-Amri had both been proclaiming a new era of peace and 
economic development, but they were painfully aware that the foreign 
aid, on which the country had always depended in the past for the 
implementation of development plans, was no longer easy to get. Since 
the YAR severed relations with West Germany in 1965 and with the USA 
in 1967, Western aid had been suspended. In 1968 only Algeria and 
Romania were providing limited aid to the YAR in the form of commodity 
credits while the bulk of Soviet aid came in the form of military 
supplies.6
The resumption of Western aid was clearly dependent upon the 
resumption of diplomatic relations and since the YAR had initiated the 
break in the first place it was logical that it had to take the
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initiative in bringing about their restoration. Immediately after 
they came to power in November 1967, the moderate leaders called for 
the re-establishment of relations with the USA, West Germany and other 
Western countries. Mainly in deference to Saudi Arabia with which 
they had conmon economic interests, none of those countries responded 
at that stage.7 In early May 1969, al-Iryani made it clear that the 
YAR wanted an immediate resumption of cultural and economic relations 
with West Germany and the USA. Diplomatic relations, he said, could 
follow later when the time was right.8
of diplomatic relations became a bargaining matter when the ERG made 
their resumption a condition of economic aid in any quantity. During 
the pre-decision negotiations with the FRG, the direct relevance of 
this factor became evident when the resumption of diplomatic relations 
was linked to the amount of West German aid. Later, in a radio 
interview on 7 February, 1970, Ahmad Barakat who succeeded Djaghman as 
foreign minister in the Kurshmi cabinet attempted to rationalise the 
decision by stating that the restoration of relations with West 
Germany was motivated by the need for economic aid.9
Hie '*Balanoed Approach" Policy
One of the basic principles of YAR foreign policy had been to remain 
resolutely "non-aligned" and not to be drawn into the ongoing power 
struggle between the superpowers, the USA and the USSR, or their 
respective blocs. Ideally, this meant the establishment of balanced 
relations with both blocs; but the hostile attitude of the West 
towards the Yemeni revolution and the positive attitude of the
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socialist states meant that balance was far fran easy to achieve. 
Socialist countries had been among the first twenty countries to 
recognise the YAR in the first two weeks of its inception, and close 
relations between the Yemeni Republic and members of the socialist 
bloc had continued uninterrupted ever since. In mid-1969 the USSR, 
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and China had embassies in Sana'a, while 
the GDR and Romania had consulates. Hcwever, only three Western 
countries (the ERG, USA and Italy) had ever recognised the YAR, and 
Italy alone had maintained uninterrupted relations with Sana'a
throughout the war period. Italy was therefore the only Western
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /  / / / / / / / / /  / / / /  / /  
country with an embassy in Sana'a which looked after the interests of
the USA, ERG and the UK within Yemen.10
Subsequent non-alignment was made even more difficult during the 
Royalist offensive in late 1967 and 1968 as the YAR had became almost 
completely dependent on military supplies fran the Soviet Union and, 
to a much lesser extent, China. Although this was a measure of 
survival on the part of the YAR, Saudi Arabia used it as a pretext to 
justify its continued hostility to the Republican regime in Sana'a.
In December 1967 and January 1968 Saudi Arabia expressed concern about 
the allegedly inevitable Ccmmunist penetration into the Arabian 
Peninsula through Moscow's aid to the Yemeni Republic.11 An American 
source believed that the Saudis' cool reception of repeated overtures 
from the YAR during 1969 was explained by the apparent close relations 
between Sana'a and Moscow.12
Estrangement from the West deprived the YAR not only of much needed 
economic aid but also technical assistance. Prior to the breakdown in 
relations between Sana'a and the two Western countries, the YAR had 
received aid from the USA and ERG to an estimated value of $42 million
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and EM20 million respectively. This was less than the aid received 
fran the USSR and China whose aid to the YAR was valued at $100 
million and $46 million respectively.13 During the last three years 
of the 1960s the flew of foreign aid to the YAR virtually ceased as a 
result of the regional and international realignment talcing place in 
the Middle East. While most Western countries were still refusing to 
re-establish relations with Sana'a, by the beginning of 1969 the USSR 
was engaged in scaling-dcwn its relations with the YAR and instead 
cultivating its relations with the new and more reliable ally in the
south, namely the PRSY.
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /  / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /  / / / / / / / / / /  /
The need to achieve balanced relations with both East and West was 
uppermost in the minds of the YAR leaders and constituted part of the 
operational environment at the time the decision to re-establish 
diplomatic relations with the ERG was made. In January 1970, al- 
Iryani alluded to the bearing this imperative had on the decision when 
he said that YAR foreign policy over the previous months had 
implemented one of its basic elements, namely non-alignment and 
positive neutrality.14
The Mutual Overtures
During 1968, the efforts made by the ERG to resume relations with Arab 
countries, in exchange for economic aid, constituted the stimulus for 
negotiations. The framework for a mutually beneficial arrangement 
between the YAR and West Germany was already in place and in fact 
dated back to the first three years of the revolution. It was after 
the GDR had recognised the YAR on 5 October, 1962 that the ERG, in a 
bid not to be outdone by Berlin and to forestall any reciprocal
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recognition by Sana'a, uncharacteristically broke with its Western 
allies and became the first Western state to recognise the YAR on 23 
October, 1962.15 By doing so, it was made difficult for the YAR to 
respond to the GDR's gesture without being ready to sacrifice its 
relations with Bonn, especially as the ERG was already providing 
ecananic aid to Yemen. At that time, West Germany was fully carmitted 
to denying international recognition to its rival state and had 
actually severed relations with governments which failed to canply 
with its policy. This policy had its roots in the policy expressed in 
1957 by the FRG Foreign Minister Walter Hallstein, when he said that 
governments which recognised the GDR were in effect recognising the 
post-war division of Germany and must, therefore, be considered to be 
committing "an unfriendly act" against West Germany.16 In the 
circumstances, because of its economic needs and the need to secure 
the recognition of as many Western governments as possible, the YAR 
was aware that its interest lay in maintaining good relations with 
Bonn.
In the first three years of its existence the YAR had benefited fran 
the competition between the two German states, with each trying to 
increase its influence in Yemen as well as in the rest of the Arab 
world at the expense of the other. Although denied full diplomatic 
recognition, the GDR was at first satisfied with consular 
representation in the YAR.17 However, as relations between Sana'a and 
Bonn began to deteriorate following reports of the FRG's intention to 
recognise Israel in 1965, the GDR seized on the situation to 
ingratiate itself with the Arab world, including Yemen. In mid-April 
1965 it was no coincidence that Paul Shulz, the Deputy Prime Minister 
of East Germany, made an official visit to Sana'a just as the West 
German experts were leaving Yemen in the aftermath of the violent
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anti-FRG demonstration in Ta'iz a month earlier.18 On 14 May, 1965, 
Premier Ahmad Nu'man formally announced the severance of diplomatic 
relations with the IPG in response to the latter's recognition of 
Israel.19 The GDR wasted no time in granting the YAR two loans, the 
first of $5 million in April 1965 and the second of $2.7 million in 
June 1967.20
In 1969, when relations were restored between the YAR and West 
Germany, it was on a Yemeni initiative. According to official Yemeni 
sources, the YAR governing elite was aware at that time that the PRG 
oirfferln^  e6c6otid.6 aid loo Arab countries 'in exchange7 for the 
resumption of diplomatic relations and they decided to benefit fran 
the opportunity.21
Perceptions af the Decision-Makers
The decision was taken amid conditions of internal political tension 
which was reflected in the instability of the government. Following 
the ejection of the left from the post-November government in the 
aftermath of the 1968 upheavals, General al-Amri formed two cabinets 
dominated by the conservatives, the first on 14 September, 1968 and 
the second on 3 April, 1969. But al-Amri's influence and his role in 
formulating state policies were undermined by opposition from within 
the army, as well as differences with al-Iryani over issues which 
included the prospect of reconciliation with Saudi Arabia.22 Al-Amri 
tendered his resignation on 8 July, 1969, one week before the decision 
vis-a-vis the PPG was announced, although by that time it had already 
been adopted. These developments inevitably strengthened al-Iryani's 
position at the centre of the decision-making system. Most
specifically, the mounting tension within the regime increased the 
need for his skill in keeping the peace between the various Republican 
factions at a time when the return of the dissident Republicans had 
consolidated the dominance of the conservatives over the decision­
making process.2 3
Notwithstanding these cabinet changes, the membership of the decision­
making elite remained almost the same and comprised of al-Iryani, 
Muhammad Ali Uthman, al-Amri, and a number of others who had no formal 
decision-making authority, namely Shaykh Abdullah ibn Husayn al-Abmar
arid Ambassador Muhammad Ahmad Nu man. The latter was the son of Ahmad 
Nu'man; he had taken part in the Free Yemeni Movement alongside his 
father and played an active part within the circle of the moderate 
Republicans in the pre-1967 era. He was among the dissident 
Republicans who had returned to Yemen at the beginning of 1969 and had 
quickly assumed a very important role in the formulation of the 
country's foreign policy as an advisor to the Republican Council (al- 
Madjlis al-Djumhuri).
Al-Iryani's view of West Germany's readiness to provide economic aid 
was naturally affected by his awareness of Yemen's economic needs. 
Ever since the Royalist threat had waned in mid-1968, he had 
concentrated his energies on the resumption of relations with the West 
and reconciliation with Saudi Arabia, believing that in this direction 
lay the only path to a peaceful settlement of the war and the 
achievement of economic prosperity which had constituted the raison 
d'etre of the September revolution.24 Al-Iryani had always been moved 
by the harsh economic conditions prevailing in Yemen and saw the 
improvement of these conditions as one of the main tasks of the 
revolution and the principal mission of the regime. He constantly
drew the attention of those Yemenis who called for a revolutionary 
anti-West policy to the bleak realities of life for the Yemeni people. 
As a country having neither the capability nor the motivation to take 
an active part in either the regional or the international pcwer 
struggle, the YAR should seek balanced relations with the big powers. 
Attempts, he said, should instead be made to convince the two 
superpowers, the USSR and the USA, of Yemen's determinedly non-aligned 
position. This way, the YAR would secure its independence and obtain 
badly needed economic assistance.25
/Eca^matism Wa4 among al-Iryani's personal7^ attributes/ / in late 1968 
when the West German government made it clear that it was ready to 
exchange economic aid for the resumption of diplomatic relations, he 
concluded it was unrealistic and unfair that the Yemenis should 
maintain the stance taken up by the Arabs against the ERG in 1965, 
while other Arab states with much healthier economies had practically 
abandoned that policy. In fact, at a press conference on 18 March, 
1969, al-Iryani complained that while the YAR had continued faithfully 
to observe the agreed policy in the name of Arab solidarity, other 
Arab countries were receiving German economic and cultural aid. He 
observed that, apart from being unfair to Yemen, the policy itself was 
also damaging to the Arab cause which it was intended to serve. In a 
press interview on 17 July, his reply to Arab criticism (mainly 
Syrian) of the decision encapsulated his point of view. He commented 
on the much vaunted Arab unanimity over the boycott of West Germany by 
saying:
"In fact, there is no Arab unanimity. Several Arab states did 
not sever relations with West Germany from the start. The 
fraternal Jordanian government, which is directly concerned
with the issue for which the boycott decision was taken, has 
resumed relations with West Germany. The boycott by the 
states which has so far put the decision into effect has been 
nominal. These states withdrew their Ambassadors but kept 
embassy officials, counsellors, attaches, secretaries and so 
forth in place. Above all economic relations with West 
Germany were maintained and West Germany continued to offer 
loans, projects and aid to these states. Only Yemen applied a 
boycott that was firm, final and almost total. We can say, 
then, that our attitude is not a departure fran Arab unanimity
As to the claim that the Yemeni decision was harmful to the 
Palestinian cause al-Iryani said:
"Everything helpful to an Arab country is helpful to every 
other Arab country and finally to Arab issue number one - the 
Palestinian issue... If recognition of Israel by West Germany 
was the reason for a decision to boycott West Germany - 
although not all Arab states applied the decision - logic 
tells us that we should boycott all States which recognise
Israel, including the major powers in the West and East....
Finally I would like to say that the boycott policy does not 
serve the Palestine question. The contrary is true. Instead 
of leaving the field open for Israel alone, it will be better 
for us if we are challengers who work for our cwn interests 
and against those of Israel."26
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The Decisional Process
The strategic decision taken on 19 May, 1969 to resume diplomatic 
relations with the FRG was preceded by a tactical decision, made three 
months earlier. Even before the May decision was made, relations in 
other non-political areas were resumed. This made it difficult to 
distinguish between the various stages of the decision-making process. 
In the following investigation, implementation refers to actions taken 
after the formal announcement was made on 15 July, 1969.
The Pre-Declslcnal activities / / / / / / / / / / / / ' / / / ' / " •
Most of the procedures and activities which preceded the decision 
concentrated on encouraging universal support for the move. This 
seems to suggest that there was no consensus inside the decision­
making elite, in addition the issue was considered to be a highly 
sensitive one. Although no written sources were available to the 
researcher, talks and interviews with the decision-makers themselves 
indicated that fran the procedural point of view, the pre-decisional 
process was divided into two stages. Fran November 1968 when the idea 
first surfaced, until February 1969, consultations on the issue were 
mainly confined to the members of the Republican Council, Premier al- 
Amri, Shaykh ibn al-Ahmar and Foreign Minister Yahya Djaghman. In the 
second stage, which began in earnest in April, the consultations 
involved persons outside the decisional core.
Apparently it. was al-Iryani who originally told the other Council 
members of the West Germans' readiness to negotiate a reconciliation. 
With regard to much needed foreign aid fran any source (a resolution 
was already embodied in the government's manifesto) no objection was
raised. The immediate recognition by both the Yemeni and West German 
sides of the mutual advantages made it difficult to ascertain, in the 
absence of documents, which party took the initiative. For the 
Yemenis, the issue was not the resumption of diplomatic relations with 
Bonn per se but the extent of aid the country would receive in 
exchange for resuming relations with the FRG. To explore the 
possibilities, Yemeni and West German diplomats had a series of 
informal meetings in Rome, Geneva and then later in Sana’a and Bonn.27 
West German officials also began to mate open contact with the Yemeni 
authorities as early as January 1969. This process apparently began
German delegation consisting of representatives of the Foreign 
Ministry and the Ministry of the Economy. On 17 January, Yahya 
Djaghman, the YAR's Foreign Minister, welcomed "the desire expressed 
by West Germany" to resume aid to the YAR in the field of 
agriculture.28 On 12 March there followed a meeting between the 
Under-Secretary of the YAR's Foreign Ministry, and Dr. Landau, head of 
the FRG Interests Section at the Italian Embassy in Sana'a, where the 
former was informed that West Germany agreed to resume technical aid 
in the area of communications in accordance with the 1961 agreement 
between the two countries. Later, on 17 June, Dr. Landau informed the 
Foreign Minister that his government had decided to send a hundred 
tons of wheat to Yemen as a gift. West Germany was then asked to 
provide a workshop to maintain telecommunications equipment, three 
experts in electricity and experts in the postal field.2 9
There was nothing sinister in the mutually beneficial resumption of 
bilateral relations, but al-Iryani, like other members of the 
decision-making elite, realised it would be seen as an indication of 
the regime's foreign policy reorientation. The leadership was aware
of the bitter opposition of certain leftist-oriented groups to the re­
establishment of relations with the West, especially at a time when 
the political rifts of August 1968 were not totally healed. Because 
of the sensitive nature of the issue, President al-Iryani began 
consultations with representatives of the various segments of public 
opinion. These contacts were intensified after the furore associated 
with the establishment of the National Council (al-Madjlis al-Watanl) 
was settled in March 1969. In these consultations, the position of 
the intellectuals who represented the various political groups was far 
fran coherent. While sane expressed support for the Government's 
policy p(it£ing tiie cc)untry^ s need for practical foreign aicl laelore 
anything else, others opposed it as another fateful step in the 
direction of the West. Among these detractors were certain of the 
Ba'athists, followers of the newly formed Revolutionary Democratic 
Party (al-Hizb al-Dimukrati al-Thawri) and supporters of the pre-1967 
regime.30
The most powerful pressure groups, the tribal shaykhs and the army, 
were also involved in the consultations. The influential shaykhs, 
including ibn al-Ahmar, were generally supportive of the government 
since this particular issue did not directly involve their interests, 
but, at the other extreme, the army was the group most interested in 
the issue. A group of leftist officers in the High Command told al- 
Iryani personally that they were definitely against the proposed move. 
They claimed that the resumption of relations with West Germany would 
alienate the Soviet Union, the major supplier of military hardware, 
and thus weaken the army. Sane of them threatened violent action if 
the government went ahead with its plans.31 Although this fierce 
opposition caused sane concern to the members of the Republican 
Council it was clear this group had little support within the army,
certainly not among the middle-ranking and the junior officers. By 
then the Government had taken effective steps to ensure the loyalty of 
the army, especially in the aftermath of the August 1968 events which 
were seen as a challenge to the authority of the political leadership. 
Among these measures was General al-Amri1 s creation of new units, like 
al-’As if ah, under the command of loyal officers. These arrangements 
proved effective in this case, as the majority of the officers decided 
to support the Government. There is no precise information as to
whether it was al-Iryani1 s intervention that silenced the leftist 
officers' opposition, but certain sources have suggested that he
■ / Ay / /y / / i l j  Zc/ / / / / / / , /  s. /.//./,/ / /./ /somehow encouraged the loyal officers to speak their minds against
and override, their leftist colleagues.32
There was additional pressure on the government fran external sources. 
The Soviet Union was understandably not pleased with the seemingly 
pro-West orientation of the YAR government and viewed the resumption 
of Sana'a's relations with the FRG with suspicion. The Soviets did 
not express any open opposition to the resumption of relations with 
the FRG, but actively urged a similar posture towards the GDR. 
Encouraged by this support fran the USSR, the GDR began pressing once 
more for recognition by the YAR. On 29 February, 1969, it made a 
formal request for full recognition, saying in its petition that such 
an action was unlikely to jeopardise relations with Bonn, since the 
latter had recently established relations with certain other states 
which recognised Berlin.33 Later, on 17 June, the GDR made another 
request to the YAR urging that it too should follow the example of 
other Arab countries which had recently recognised the GDR.34 
Although no formal response came fran Sana'a, the GDR and USSR kept 
pressing for full recognition even after the resumption of YAR-FRG 
relations were announced. It was reported that, in their bid to force
recognition of the GDR, the Soviets had hinted that spare parts for 
Russian-made weapons would in future only be available fran the GDR.35
How The Choice Was Made
Although al-Iryani and other members of the decision-making elite had, 
in the case of this decision, had enough time for deliberation, their 
options were narrowed by the absence of alternatives. The only offer 
on the table was the West German proposal which, as framed by the FRG 
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relations with Bonn (severed since 1965) in exchange for Bonn's 
resumption of economic and technical aid, in addition to an initial 
credit of EM 15,000,000 million to cover the costs of several 
developmental projects.36 Although East Germany spread a rumour of a 
competitive offer of aid in exchange for full recognition by the YAR 
of the GDR, no offer was officially made. Republican Council members 
agreed that they should accept the FRG offer, seeing no reason why it 
should have an adverse effect on the YAR's relations with the 
socialist countries. With regards to any East German offer, the 
prevailing opinion in the government was that the GDR aid project 
would, in the light of past experience, probably be of little use.37
It was then clear that no better alternative was available, however 
the YAR decision-makers seem to have sought to maximise the benefits 
by dragging things out and asking for improvement in the West German 
offer. This was confirmed by al-Iryani who stated afterwards that the 
government had decided "sane time ago" to resume relations with Bonn 
but had delayed announcement of the decision "until talks were 
completed."38 A Western source believed that the YAR government had
finally seized upon West Germany's severance of relations with the 
FRSY two weeks earlier to restore its own relations with the FRG.39 
On 2 July, 1969, the FRG announced the freezing of relations with the 
FRSY as a reaction to the latter1 s recognition of the GDR a few days 
earlier.40 In the circumstances, observers believed that West Germany 
must have included the EM 10 million it had previously allocated to 
South Yemen in the package of economic aid it offered to the North.41
The exact date on which the government adopted the decision to resume 
relations with the ERG is yet to be ascertained, but Yemeni sources 
believe the a6tion io6k place iii laie May oi at tiie b^ginhi^g o£ dhne 
1969. Although the emphasis was on economic aspects, al-Iryani and 
other members of the decision-making elite linked the decision to the 
overall orientation of the country's foreign policy and thus 
deliberations on the final choice were kept within this inner circle. 
According to an official, the decision was taken by the Republican 
Council on the basis of a consensus and was handed dcwn to the 
government. Instead of discussing the issue, the cabinet simply 
endorsed the decision without inviting any further deliberation. 
During the meeting in question and according to the same source, when 
General al-Amri, the Premier, noticed that the issue was next on the 
agenda for consideration he told cabinet members that there was no 
need for further discussion because the decision had already been 
taken. As a result a study on the issue, prepared at the request of 
the cabinet by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not considered.42
ImpIemRntatim
It took nearly two months for the decision to be made public. The 
delay may have been on the German side, although the Yemeni 
Information Minister Husayn al-Magbali announced on 18 June that the 
YAR would not lay down any conditions for the resumption of relations 
with the FRG.43 Later, the Foreign Office in Bonn announced that the 
final agreement was only hammered out between June 29 and July 3 
during the visit to Sana'a of Herr Walter Gehlhoff, a senior Foreign 
Office official. On 15 July, a formal announcement was made 
7 simultaneously inSana'a amcl Bonn wtiich stated^ thai / 7 / / / / / / /
"The Government of the YAR and the Government of the Federal 
Republic of Germany have agreed to restore diplomatic 
relations. This decision will ccme into force as of today and 
the ambassadors will be exchanged as soon as possible. The 
two governments have also decided to co-operate closely in the 
economic and technical fields. The two governments are 
convinced that resumption of diplomatic relations and their 
mutual co-operation will enhance the friendly relations 
between their people."44
Unusually for such a formal announcement, the statement went on to 
refer in seme detail to the various aspects of the proposed German 
aid, and there emerged a disparity regarding the total value of aid 
promised. According to the statement, Bonn was offering help by 
resuming those development projects which had been suspended in 1965, 
together with an initial credit of EM 15 million.4 5 But in his 
attempt to justify the decision in a press interview on 9 July, al- 
Iryani mentioned that the total value of aid was £15 million, over
three times as much and the equivalent of YR 165 million.46 This 
suggested a problem in communication between the Republican Council 
Chairman and his aides, if not between his office and the other 
ministries concerned.
The first step in the implementation of the agreement was carried out 
on 16 July when the FRG Embassy in Sana'a was reopened.47 Two weeks 
later, on 27 July, a West German ship arrived at Hudaydah carrying 
foodstuff, constituting the first instalment of the premised aid.48
During a visit to Bonn by a Yemeni delegation, which included Ahamd
V  A /*/ L J  / 7 J  / /  l L / . /  //. /^  / / /  I l /Barakat, the new Foreign Minister, and Yahya Djaghman, al-Iryani's
Personal Representative in the new cabinet, an agreement was signed on
28 November, 1969, according to the terms of which the YAR would
receive a long-term credit of EM 25 million. Part of that amount (EM
10 million) would be a carmercial loan and the rest would finance
projects to be carried out by West German firms.49 Soon afterwards,
on 2 and 3 January, 1970, two shipments consisting of ten thousand
tons of wheat flour arrived at Hudaydah as another instalment of the
aid premised under the agreement.
Feedback
West German aid undoubtedly strengthened the national capability of 
the YAR as the projects it funded contributed to the modernisation of 
the country's economic infrastructure. More specifically it financed 
the improvement of al-Rahabah airport and the asphalting of the 
Sana'a-Ta'iz highway - two vital development projects. Even more 
importantly, the positive impact of the FRG aid and the negligible 
political price the YAR paid in exchange confirmed the rationality of
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their new "balanced" approach to foreign relations and specifically 
encouraged them to think that this policy might soon bring more aid 
fran the West.50 The political implications of the decision were 
later alluded to by Kadi al-Iryani in January 1970 when he assessed 
the performance to date of YAR foreign policy. He said that: "As a
result of this independent policy, we achieved several things. We 
maintained friendship with our (socialist) friends while winning new 
friendships which would greatly benefit Yemen.1,51 During the second
half of 1969, the new, more favourable, climate encouraged the leaders 
of the YAR to feel that the time was right to make efforts to repeat 
the7 success of ttieir rapprocfiaient with -the F&G by' approaching both 
the USA and Britain with the purpose of establishing relations. 
Muhammad Nu'man, the roving Ambassador, visited London in the second 
week of November 1969 in an attempt to convince the British government 
to recognise the Yemeni Republic.
In the international context the benefits which resulted fran the 
decision to resume diplanatic relations with the FRG far outweighed 
the negative aspects, the foremost being the reaction of the USSR and 
other socialist states. They suspected that the YAR was replacing its 
socialist friends with new "Western" friends, especially since Sana'a 
continued to ignore the GDR's request for recognition. Until the YAR 
recognised the GDR on 12 December, 1972, Moscow continued to press the 
issue forcefully.52
In the regional context, the decision had only a short-term effect on 
the YAR's relations with sane Arab states. Aware of the prevailing 
Arab sensitivity to the resumption of relations with the FRG, the YAR 
government explained its motives to certain Arab governments, 
including Tunisia, Algeria, Iraq, Sudan and Syria, before the decision
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was made and justified it to the remainder afterwards.53 Yemen was 
only the second Arab state after Jordan to resume relations with the 
FRG and the move provoked sane criticism, mainly fran the left-wing 
press. Among the Arab governments only three shewed actual 
displeasure - the UAR, Syria and the FRSY. Syria and the FRSY had 
special ties with the socialist bloc and were clearly resentful of the 
YAR decision. At that time the UAR was urging the Arab states to 
establish relations with the GDR as a reaction to Bonn’s support of 
Israel and was disappointed with the Sana'a decision. However, while 
the South Yemeni Republic was too preoccupied with its own interned
/ / / / / / // /// / // ///<,. / / ///./ / yyj ////./ /./ j / / /problems to register any protest, both Cairo and Damascus let it be 
known that they privately censured the Yemeni decision. The UAR did 
not make any criticism publicly and expressed its displeasure in a 
discrete manner54 but, on 16 July, the Syrian Charge d'affaires in 
Sana'a conveyed Syria's opposition personally to the Head of the 
Political Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in rather 
harsh terms, implying that the Yemeni Republic was reneging on its 
"revolutionary" policy and adopting a pro-Saudi and pro-Western 
posture.55
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CHAPTER VIII
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Except perhaps for the decision to request the UAR's military 
assistance, this decision, made at the very end of the period, was the 
most important of all those made by the YAR during the 1960s, 
including the others covered by this study. The significance of the 
decision to accept their conciliation agreement concluded with Saudi 
Arabia in Djedda during March 1970, lies in the impact it had on the 
internal and external environment. The most important consequence for 
the Republican regime was the termination of hostile activities by the 
Saudi-backed Royalist elements and the recognition of the YAR by Saudi 
Arabia on 23 July, 1970.
Following crippling military reversals, in early 1969 the military 
organisation of the Saudi-backed Royalists, who had been challenging 
the Republican government for nearly six years, finally seemed to have 
disintegrated, and Saudi Arabia at last became convinced of the 
necessity of caning to terms with the Yemeni Republic. However, a 
further year passed before the terms of reconciliation were agreed and 
it was not until March 1970 that the Reconciliation Agreement was 
presented at the Djedda conference. The decision-making process took 
several months, fran March to July 1970, with the problems of 
implementation taking up most of this period.
The Operational Environment
There were a number of environmental factors which impinged on the 
decisional setting, three of which were particularly relevant. They 
were the changing position of Saudi Arabia, the West' s refusal to 
establish relations with the YAR, and the crisis in the danestic 
economy. The fact that the Royalists counter-revolution had been
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related to the Saudi position vis-a-vis the YAR, made these three 
components inter-related. It was the invitation to the YAR to 
participate in the Djedda Islamic conference that constituted the 
decision stimulus.
Hie Saudi Position
The prospects for reconciliation between the YAR and Saudi Arabia 
which appeared premising in the first half of 1969 were seriously
/ / / /  /.u/ / y / y ///.//./ / y y .// /-1 / y / / / y / / / / / / / / / 7 7 7threatened when, in late October of that year, the Royalists launched 
a surprise military offensive aimed at regaining the northern city of 
Sadah. On their own, the Royalists would have been totally unable to 
mount such a challenge to the Republican government; events of the 
previous year had shewn how dependent they had been on Saudi support, 
and when Saudi Arabia, for its own reasons, had terminated its aid to 
them following the collapse of the siege of Sana'a in mid-1968, the 
Royalists had been unable even to hold on to the territories they were 
controlling in the northern part of the country. In the following few 
months, the Republican forces had rapidly increased their hold on 
these territories; on 6 September, 1969 they had captured Sadah and a 
month later they captured Waylah and Kitaf, the last Royalist 
strongholds.1
Although initially Saudi Arabia did not admit that it had resumed 
military aid to the Royalists, the YAR leaders were convinced that the 
Kingdom was behind the renewed hostilities. This led to renewed 
tension between the two countries throughout the second half of 1969.
Kadi al-Iryani tried to challenge King Faysal politically by making an 
unsuccessful attempt to raise the issue for debate at the Fifth Arab
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Summit Conference in Rabat in December, 1969. This attempt was 
unsuccessful because the Arab leaders gave priority to the more 
pressing issues pertaining to the continued confrontation with 
Israel.2 There was even a danger of direct military confrontation on 
the occasions when the battle for Sadah spilled over the border, with 
Yemeni planes hitting Royalist positions on the Saudi side and Saudi 
aircraft retaliating.3
There are different interpretations of this sudden change of the Saudi 
policy towards Yemen. Sane suggest that the Saudi resumption of aid
"4-a 7 aj / / / . / . / / / / / / , / / / / / /  / / /v / / / y i / . / / / /  /to the Royalists was merely a response to their underlying concern 
over the Republican capture of Sadah, a stronghold so close to their 
borders, while others believe the Saudis might have felt that a 
Royalist revival was still possible.4 However, others believe that 
the Saudis merely wanted to convey a message to the Republicans to the 
effect that they could not stabilise their regime before a canpranise 
of sane sort had been negotiated with Riyad and the Yemeni Royalists. 
More specifically, it was suggested that should Sadah fall into 
Royalists hands, which indeed happened in mid-February 1970, the 
Republicans would adopt a more conciliatory approach.5
The YAR's relations with the PRSY had also becane a pertinent factor 
in the renewed entente between Sana'a and Riyad. King Faysal, to whan 
the NLF were nothing but canmunists, had, during 1968, provoked a 
number of internal uprisings in the northern areas of South Yemen with 
the purpose of destabilising the regime in Aden. By November 1969, 
the situation had escalated into open conflict, with the Saudi and 
South Yemeni forces battling for control of al-Wadia'h, a point along 
their cannon borders. Despite the rift with Aden which had occurred 
earlier in the year, the YAR took the side of South Yemen and al-
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Iryani worked with the South Yemeni President, Salim Rubi'a, to put 
the al-Wadia'h issue before the Rabat summit.6 This infuriated the 
Saudis, who were seeking to win the YAR over to their side, and the 
announcement on December 9 by Prince Sultan, the Saudi Defence 
Minister, of an aerial raid by YAR planes on Saudi territories was 
linked to Riyad's anger. Nevertheless, the intra-Yemeni solidarity 
strengthened the reconciliation between Sana'a and Riyad. A Western 
source suggested that it was the realisation that it would be 
difficult to sustain open conflict with the YAR while attempting to 
overthrew the South Yemeni regime which led Saudi Arabia to cane to 
"termfe With the7 Reptblitafi tegirrie it Sana ra .7 ^  /  ^  ^/  ^/  ^/ / / ; / ;
The need to establish good neighbourly relations with Saudi Arabia was 
cited by the YAR leadership as the principal motivation for the 
Government's decision to accept the Djedda Accord. Indeed, upon his 
return fran the conference it was justified by al-Ayni on those very 
grounds.
Relations With The West
Another external factor which influenced the decision on the Djedda 
reconciliation was the YAR's interest in establishing relations with 
the West. For over a year, the YAR government had been seeking to 
establish relations with the principal Western states, for mainly 
econanic reasons. As mentioned previously, these attempts were 
frustrated by the insistence of the latter that the Yemeni Republicans 
should first settle their differences with Saudi Arabia. However, 
several factors led these Western states to look more favourably on 
the establishment of relations with Sana'a. The resumption in July
1969 of YAR-West German relations and the promulgation in the 
following month of legislation encouraging foreign investment in Yemen 
had improved the West's image of the YAR.8 In addition, the decision 
by Great Britain during 1968 to withdraw from the Gulf by 1971, 
together with the simultaneous increase of Soviet and Chinese aid to 
the PRSY (and through it to radical groups in the area) had led the 
Western governments to urge a Saudi compromise with the moderate 
regime in Sana'a. According to official Yemeni sources, both the USA 
and Italy were instrumental in convincing Saudi Arabia of the need to 
come to terms with the Yemeni Republic, and acted as intermediaries in
dialogue of March 1970.9
The Economic and Financial Crisis
Another environmental factor was the state of the economy. The 
economic situation, as explained in the previous chapter, had become 
increasingly strained during 1969 as the financial crisis became ever 
more acute. In 1969, the riyal was worth less than 30 per cent of its 
1964 value; by 1970, the value of exports amounted to only 7 per cent 
compared with imports, and government revenues covered only 56 per 
cent of current expenditure.10
The problem was rooted in the economic stagnation of the preceding 
three years and was constantly exacerbated by increasing government 
expenditure necessitated by the continuing war. Immediately upon 
coming to power an 2 September, 1969, al-Kurshmi's government adopted 
stringent austerity measures to cope with the situation, including the 
reduction of government expenditure by 60 per cent, temporary
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suspension of the issue of currency, and introduction of certain new 
taxes. However, these measures were never implemented because of 
strong opposition fran the armed forces and tribal armies.11
The rising cost of the war made it difficult for the government to 
secure even essential funds for running its daily activities and the 
public services were substantially reduced.12 The inability of the 
al-Kurshmi cabinet to implement its policy while satisfying the 
demands of the army of the tribes led to its resignation on 2 
February, 1970. Consequently, the YAR leadership became even more
settlement of the war.13 In such depressing circumstances, they were 
aware that the options available to the YAR were severely limited 
since continuation of the war was becaning financially unsustainable.
The Invitation To The Djedda Conference
In early March 1970, the YAR Foreign ministry received an invitation 
to participate in the Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference due to 
take place in Djedda on 23 March. All Muslim states were invited to 
the Djedda Conference and all accepted the invitation except the FRSY 
and Syria.14 The invitation was sent by the provisional secretariat 
consisting of Morocco, Senegal and Somalia, but was widely interpreted 
as a sign of Saudi desire to talk to the Yemeni Republicans.15 It 
seemed that the YAR leaders were expecting the invitation since they 
had prior knowledge of the Saudi intention to open a dialogue and they 
were receptive to it. Although they set conditions for taking part in 
the conference, the fact that the YAR attended the conference contrary 
to its previous objections supports this assumption.16 The conference
itself was an implementation of a decision adopted by the Islamic 
summit held in Rabat in September 1969 as a response to the burning of 
the al-Aksa mosque in Jerusalem that summer.
By that time, King Faysal appeared ready to open direct, though not 
official, dialogue with the Yemeni Republicans. This reconciliatory 
approach was conditioned by the King's increasing fears of mounting 
threats during 1968 and 1969 frcm disturbing developments in South 
Yemen and the Gulf as well as internal upheavals at hone. For nearly 
seven years, the Saudi monarch has consistently maintained that the 
war iri North Yemen was lie tween {■he legitimate government of tie Imam 
and the Republican usurpers. He refused to talk to the Republicans 
because, as he put it, the conflict was an internal Yemeni matter and 
insisted that the Republicans should talk to their Royalist countrymen 
instead. King Faysal maintained this position even during the time 
when he was engaged in indirect contact with al-Iryani. No details 
are available on the nature of these contacts, which Yemeni sources 
believe to have taken place during 1969 and the first two months of 
1970. It seems, hcwever, that the king was insisting on a Yemeni 
government in which the Republicans and the Royalists were equally 
represented. A change in the king's position was conveyed at a 
meeting held in Beirut in the first week of February 1970 between 
leading Royalists and Republican personalities. During the meeting, 
the Royalists disclosed that King Faysal was new ready to cane to 
terms with the Republican government and would support a settlement 
within a Republican framework. Among suggestions for ways of 
furthering the dialogue was the proposal that a ceasefire be called 
while negotiations took place. But nothing came frcm this due to 
Republican outrage at the capture of Sadah by Royalist forces in mid- 
February, shortly after the Beirut talks had ended. Clearly the
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Royalist offer reflected a change in King Faysal's attitude, and this 
was made even more apparent by participation in the Beirut talks of 
Shaykh Kimal Adham, his brother-in-law.17 Thus the invitation to the 
Djedda Islamic Conference came as no surprise to the YAR decision­
makers.
Perceptions of the Decision-Makers
As with other decisions in this study, members of the Republican
decision-making process. In practice, however, the decision evolved 
within the ultimate decision-making elite comprising, in addition to 
al-Iryani, the two other members of the Republican Council, Muhammad 
Ali Uthman and Hassan al-Amri, Premier al-Ayni as well as Shaykh 
Abdallah itn Husayn al-Ahmar. As chairman of the Consultative 
Assembly, Shaykh al-Ahmar was not a member of the formally authorised 
decision-making unit but he played an important part in all stages of 
the decisional process.
Perhaps it was no accident that the same men who, as leaders of the 
November 1967 government, initiated the reconciliation policy in the 
first place, subsequently became responsible for its implementation. 
Muhsin al-Ayni's tenure as prime minister lasted less than two months, 
frcm 5 November to 22 December, 1967 when he resigned the office to be 
appointed personal representative of al-Iryani and the country's 
permanent representative at the UN. He later went on to be the YAR's 
ambassador in Moscow. Meanwhile, al-Iryani had by force of his 
personality and his political skill become a driving force for the 
cohesion of the Republic. The confidence invested in him by his
-211-
colleagues was confirmed in November 1969 when the National Council 
refused to accept his decision not to stand for re-election for the 
chairmanship of the Republican Council. The political crisis which 
resulted frcm the resignation of al-Amri's cabinet early in July 
demonstrated the difficulty of finding leaders acceptable to all 
political factions and consolidated al-Iryani's position as a 
universally unobjectionable leader.18
Al-Iryani1 s contribution to the consolidation of the Republic was 
temporarily hampered in October 1969 by the resumption of Royalist 
military operations, which clearly marked the renewal of the Saudis' 
hostile posture towards the YAR. The ensuing tension between Riyad 
and Sana'a was in contrast to the atmosphere which had prevailed over 
the previous twelve months. During that time the situation was, frcm 
the YAR leaders point of view, reassuring; not only were the Royalists 
rapidly disintegrating but Saudi Arabia was also giving every 
indication that it was ready to reconsider its policy towards North 
Yemen. The Saudi decision in February 1969 to allcw for the first 
time Yemenis holding Republican passports to make their pilgrimage to 
Mecca was just one of these indications.19 For a while the YAR 
leaders might have felt that there was no need to make concessions to 
the Royalists any more, especially since emotions were running high 
against the government' s policy of encouraging the return of ex- 
Royalists. Even contacts being made with the implicit blessing of the 
Republican Council between Republican and Royalist personalities in 
Beirut at the time were threatened by inter-Republican disagreement on 
the issue. In July 1969, Lieutenant-General al-Amri rejected a 
proposal for formal but secret talks between the two sides in Athens, 
saying that such talks should be conducted openly.20 The resumption 
of the Royalist offensive alerted the YAR leaders to the fact that the
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military defeat of the Royalists would not in itself end the war. 
Negotiations would have to take place in which both the interests of 
the Saudis and their Royalists allies would be acccranodated.
Among the members of the governing elite, al-Iryani held the 
consistent view on the need for accanmodation with the Royalist side, 
meaning Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni Royalists. Although he was 
convinced of the antagonistic Saudi attitude to the Yemeni Republic, 
he believed that a permanent state of hostility between the two 
countries was not necessarily inevitable. He believed that if it had 
not been for al-Baydani's provocative gestures towards Saudi Arabia 
and his public threats in the early days of the Revolution, the Saudis 
might have resigned themselves to the de facto situation and 
recognised the YAR in the early days of its inception.21
Al-Iryani's re conciliatory views towards Saudi Arabia and his advocacy 
of the Djedda deal were coloured by an awareness of the need to 
placate King Faysal and allay the king's fears of the Republican 
regime. This in turn was based on his astute perception of the Saudi 
King. The Yemeni president perceived the Saudi monarch as a stubborn 
and proud bedouin chief who would not concede without face-saving 
devices, even when he was on the wrong side. Al-Iryani's assessment 
of Faysal1 s character was formed frcm his meetings with the Saudi 
leader on several occasions. The latter's hostility to any 
establishment of Republican rule in Yemen had been known to al-Iryani 
ever since he exchanged views with the then Crown Prince Faysal in 
1961.2 2 Although King Faysal' s attitude towards the Yemeni Republic 
appeared to alter in 1969, particularly in light of the resumption of 
the YAR-FRG relations in July 1969, he could not change his position 
easily, especially since he felt moral obligations to the defeated
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Yemeni Royalists. This was confirmed when, during the First Islamic 
Summit Conference held in Rabat in September 1969, King Faysal 
rejected an attempt made by the Amir of Kuwait to initiate a dialogue 
between the two. The king said he would never recognise the YAR and 
refused even to shake hands with the Yemeni President.23 The King's 
intransigence did not discourage al-Iryani who was intent on diluting 
the king's suspicion of the Yemeni Republic so that a constructive 
dialogue could begin between the two sisterly countries. In December 
1969 he took the initiative during the Rabat Arab summit and appealed 
to King Faysal to spell out his misgivings of the Yemeni Republic 
which lay at the root of the Kingdom's continued hostility. Again the 
King refused to back dcwn claiming that he had no quarrel with the 
YAR, adding that in order to settle the war in Yemen, the Republicans 
had to cane to terms with their Royalist "brothers". In October 1969 
he made a direct appeal to King Faysal to put an end to the Kingdom's 
interference in Yemen, affirming that the Yemeni revolution was a 
revolution for the Yemeni people who desired peace for themselves as 
well as for others.24
Kadi al-Iryani wholeheartedly welcomed the reconciliation proposals 
communicated to him by his prime minister on 25-26 March, 1970 and 
supported the return of the Royalists to Sana'a in the face of fierce 
opposition from many Republicans. This attitude towards the return of 
the Royalists was in keeping with his long-held beliefs. Like other 
early reformers of the Free Yemeni movement, al-Iryani had always 
advocated the sort of political change that would replace the Imam's 
divisive policies with those which would achieve greater national 
unity. The establishment of the Republic was certainly a radical 
change, from the tyrannical rule of the Imam to constitutional rule 
based on the will of the people. But national unity, long sought by
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the older generation of the Free Yemeni Movement, was thought to have 
been eclipsed by the civil war which had divided the Yemenis into 
Republicans and Royalists. Al-Iryani was one of the three moderate 
leaders who had initiated a policy of national reconciliation early in 
1963 and had never deviated frcm it. This policy, which took shape 
during the Khamir Popular Conference of 1965 and constituted the core 
of the post-November government, was based on two principles: to 
uphold the Republican regime and at the same time to restore national 
unity by the incorporation of the "misled elements" (followers of the 
deposed Imam) to the legitimate fold of the Republican regime.25
Al-Iryani made his views on the return of the Royalists known to the 
Republican Council and Cabinet when they met in joint session on March 
27 to consider the progress of the Djedda talks. He told the meeting 
that the Royalists return and the inclusion of sane of them in the 
government was one element in the proposed reconciliation which he 
personally would have no difficulty in accepting.26 When the senior 
Royalist figures arrived in Sana'a on May 23, al-Iryani delivered a 
welcoming speech in which he suggested that the differences between 
Republicans, like himself, and the Royalists, like Ahmad al-Shami, a 
leading Royalist of moderate leanings, were really only over whether 
the government should be Republican or Imamic. He said that while in 
prison for their part in the 1948 revolt, both he and al-Shami had 
held the same views and
"wished for [the sort of] progress for the Yemeni people as 
has been achieved today under the Republic.... where the 
Yemeni people govern themselves, uphold their sovereignty 
against any foreign intervention, develop their society, live 
freely... and, beyond and above all, preserve benevolent
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religious values... These were ideas shared by both of us (at 
the time)... We differed on the means of achievement hut new 
we share the same values and hold similar views."27
Like al-Iryani, Premier al-Ayni had been an advocate of reconciliation 
since the idea first took shape in the Khamir Conference resolutions, 
the resolutions upon which the Nu'man government's policies were 
based. As a radical nationalist, al-Ayni was inclined not to accept a 
caiprcmise with the anti-Republican forces. As a pragmatist, however, 
he saw no other way of settling the war. He was confident the 
Republic could withstand any Royalist military assaults but he also 
knew the YAR lacked the capability to achieve an outright victory 
against the Saudis and their Royalists clients. In his policy 
statement, which he put before the National Council on 16 April, 1970, 
he admitted that continuation of the war could achieve no decisive 
victory and could only bring more misery to the country. He said that 
acceptance of the Djedda accord was the only way to establish fruitful 
relations with Saudi Arabia and to enable the Yemenis to forgo their 
past differences and work together for a more prosperous future. 
Above all, the agreement aimed at putting an end to the conflict 
which, in his words had "devastated our country, destroyed our dignity 
and made us dependent on others, always receiving but giving nothing 
in return." He added, "I would have deceived you if I said we could 
accomplish anything while we are confronted with war, anarchy, and 
destruction."28 Al-Ayni repeated the same pragmatic views when, upon 
his return from Djedda, he explained the government's decision to the 
officer corps. Responding to the astonishment expressed by seme of 
the audience of the government's consent to the return of the 
Royalists, he made it clear he saw no other way of settling the war,
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saying to the resentful officers "had you succeeded in overcaning the 
Royalists we would not have needed this deal."29
The Decisional Process
The invitation to the Djedda Conference offered the YAR decision­
makers an opportunity to further the country's foreign policy 
objectives of which they were acutely conscious. In no way did the 
invitation constitute a surprise to the Yemeni leadership. In 
essence, the decision to accept the invitation was a carefully 
calculated tactical move which aimed at facilitating a direct dialogue 
with Saudi Arabia. Although the predecisional activities covered the 
month of March, 1970, the formal consideration of the issue and the 
subsequent decision took only two days. However, it took a further 
month before a decision on the implementation was adopted on 26 April.
The Pre-Decisional Stage
A joint meeting of the Republican Council and the Cabinet was convened 
on 16 March to consider the official response. Al-Iryani's contacts 
with King Faysal were not disclosed but the possibility of holding 
talks with the Saudis and the Royalists was exhaustively discussed. 
It was decided that participation would by itself be advantageous to 
the Republic for it would simultaneously emphasise its commitment to 
the Islamic cause and enhance the regime's image in the Islamic world. 
If the looked-for talks did materialise, so much the better.30 The 
premier did not participate in the meeting because he was out of the 
capital, tut he was obviously consulted beforehand for he had
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announced the Government's intention to take part in the conference on 
11 March, five days before the government formally took the decision. 
On 20 March, the high policy elite, including Shaykh Abdallah ibn- 
Husayn al-Ahmar, held a meeting to discuss the issue. No information 
is available as to what was discussed in that meeting but the 
subsequent talks in Djedda suggest that the meeting was crucial to 
final agreement on the issue.
The Djedda dialogue was successful because the Saudis had decided to 
change their Yemeni policy. Until 1969, they had supported the 
Royalists in their bid to restore the Imamate to Yemen, but when the 
Royalists failed in this task and regional politics forced a change in 
the Saudi foreign policy, King Faysal began to consider them a 
liability.31 By the time the Djedda Conference took place, the king 
had already decided to cane to terms with the Yemeni Republic and 
encouraged the Royalists to negotiate with the Republican delegation. 
Faced with the prospect of being left with no support, the Royalist 
leaders held a meeting where it was agreed that those who wished to 
take the Saudi advice could do so and the others could go their cwn 
way. On 20 March, when he realised that most of his supporters would 
take the former option, al-Badr issued a statement urging Yemenis of 
all persuasions to meet in a national conference in order to decide on 
their future government.32 Later, when the agreement between the 
Republican and Royalist sides had crystallised, al-Badr gave his 
permission to the Royalists to consider the proposals and arrive at 
their cwn decision, undertaking to be bound by the will of the 
majority of the Yemeni. people.3 3 Shortly afterwards he left for 
Britain, implicitly admitting that his campaign for the restoration of 
the Imamate to Yemen was finally over.
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The Saudi desire to reach a modus vivendi with the Yemeni Republic was 
reflected during the Djedda talks in several ways, the most important 
of which was their acceptance of the Republicans' basic demands. In a 
series of informal talks between the YAR delegation and Saudi 
officials, which were facilitated by the good offices of a number of 
Arab foreign ministers participating in the conference, it became 
clear the Kingdom was not insisting on its old views. No Saudi
objection was raised to either of the fundamental Republican 
conditions - no compromise on the Republican regime and banishment of 
the Hamid al-Din family. The only controversial issue was the Saudi 
suggestion of a national reconciliation conference. King Faysal was 
anxious not to look as if he had abandoned the Royalists for the 
Kingdom's cwn interests and thus he insisted that any Saudi-YAR 
rapprochement must be preceded by a settlement arrived at by direct 
negotiation between the Republicans and the Royalists. A national 
reconciliation conference was proposed as a way to formalise the 
Royalist return to Yemen within the existing Republican structure.34 
The YAR's Premier rejected this idea on the grounds that it would only 
give the Royalists a formal status vis-a-vis the government.
Al-Ayni suggested that simple ongoing talks were more practical and 
would yield more positive results.35 Not wishing to cause disruption 
of the talks by pressing the issue, it would seem that the Saudis 
decided to leave the matter to the Republicans. No written agreement 
was concluded when the talks ended on 28 March, but the accord between 
the two parties did not refer to the conference issue. The accord 
covered the following:
* a strict ceasefire
* discontinuation of hostile propaganda
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* cessation of Saudi aid to the Royalists
* return to Yemen of the Royalists, except the Hamid al-Din 
family.36
How The Choice Was Made
Despite the fact that reconciliation with the Royalist side had long 
been an objective for the post-November leadership, there were Yemenis 
who opposed such a policy; so al-Iryani was keen on secrecy. Details 
of the ongoing talks in Djedda among the high-policy elite were 
ccmnunicated to the cabinet only at a later stage. On 26 March, while 
negotiations were proceeding in Djedda, al-Iryani summoned the 
Republican Council and the Cabinet to keep them abreast of the 
situation, but only the general outlines of the accord were 
disclosed.37
Full details of the proposed accord were disclosed by al-Ayni upon his 
return frcm Djedda on 29 March. The decision evolved during the next 
two days into face-to-face contact between members of the ultimate 
decision-making unit. On 30 March, al-Iryani met with all members of 
the delegation to discuss the outcome of the Premier's mission to 
Djedda, and on the same day al-Ayni and Shaykh Abdullah al-Ahmar met 
with General al-Amri for the same purpose. The following day, al-Ayni 
briefed a joint session of the Republican Council and Cabinet on his 
delegation's participation in the Djedda Conference, as well as the 
contacts undertaken with the Saudis, but in response the two councils 
were only required to approve and legitimise the choice that had 
already been made by the decision-making elite. In all probability, 
it was al-Iryani who actually made the decision to accept the Djedda
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deal. While Premier al-Ayni was in Djedda conducting the talks,
Muhammad Ali Uthman and General al-Amri, the other members of the 
decision-making elite were out of the capital. Al-Amri had sane 
reservations about the Djedda accord and withdrew to Ta'iz but was 
eventually reconciled to the extent that he headed the YAR's first 
official delegation to Saudi Arabia on July 1970.38 Muhammad Ali 
Uthman was fully supportive of the accord and his absence was 
explained by seme sources as being due to his strained relations with 
the prime minister.39
These consultations were followed by a joint meeting of the Republican 
Council and Cabinet on 31 March with a view to consider the Premier's 
report on his mission to Djedda. Although most of the cabinet members 
did not knew the full details of the proposed deal, no one raised any 
serious question.40 This was partly because they already knew the 
main features of that deal but mainly because they all shared the same 
view on the basic demands for any peaceful settlement of the war. 
Ever since the first peace talks in Erkuwit in 1964, the Republicans 
had insisted on two basic demands as a precondition to any peaceful 
settlement - maintenance of the Republican regime and exclusion of the 
Hamid al-Din family. As the proposed deal appeared to have met both 
these demands, the two councils had promptly decided to accept it. 
The Information and Yemeni Unity Affairs Minister, Abdallah Humran, 
announced that the two councils had agreed to the prime minister's 
report and had thanked al-Ayni and members of the delegation "for the 
service they rendered to the sons of Yemen so that they could return 
to their country and take part in its development and also for ending 
the war and friction which cost the Yemenis so much."41
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Implementation
Ten days after the decision was agreed, the first practical step in 
the implementation of the Djedda accord was taken. In mid-April, 
there was a ceasefire. Saudi Arabia ordered the Royalist forces to 
terminate military operations and also asked the Royalist caimanders 
to withdraw frcm the al-Djawf region.42
The stipulation in the Djedda accord that the Royalists should be 
allowed to return to their hemes was unnecessary simply because ever 
since November 1967 the government in Sana'a had constantly worked for 
the return of the Royalists (with the exception, of course, of the 
Hamid al-Din family). Many Royalists had in fact already returned and 
by the time the Djedda talks started, the rest were divided among 
themselves as to their best course. Those who enjoyed special status 
and were politically carmitted to the Royalist cause, like Hashim ifcn 
Hashim the long serving Information Minister in the Imam's cabinet, 
held back, trying to obtain as many concessions frcm the Republicans 
as possible before accepting Republican rule. Many tribesmen whose 
stake in the war was purely financial decided there was no point in 
holding out, especially after it became evident that the Saudis were 
about to stop payments. Their shaykhs had several meetings in Djedda 
with Premier al-Ayni who urged them to go back to Yemen while at the 
same time refusing the Saudi pressure to negotiate with thou as 
equals.43 Many eventually returned on their cwn.
Last-minute difficulties against implementation were raised by sane 
ex-Royalists, mainly tribal shaykhs, who insisted on holding a 
national reconciliation conference, an idea that had already been 
rejected by the YAR government. There are two explanations for this:
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either these shaykhs were not aware of the less than firm carmitment 
of King Faysal to the idea or the Saudi King himself might have been 
trying to push the idea behind the scenes as far as possible. These 
shaykhs gathered in Raydah, about 100 miles north of Sana'a over a 
period of a few days demanding that a conference be held. Initially 
the government ignored them but eventually al-Ayni agreed to meet with 
them at al-Rawdah on the outskirts of the capital. Sanehcw these 
elements were reconciled and gave their allegiance to the Republic 
without any preconditions. On 11 May, 1970 the YAR premier announced 
that most of them had dispersed and sane had returned to Sana'a to 
declare their allegiance to the Republic.44
In the case of this decision, implementation was a particularly 
difficult stage of the decisional process. Not only was there 
dissension over the proposed reconciliation conference issue, but a 
difficult problem was posed by the refusal of many Republicans to 
accept Royalists back into the government; most Republicans believed 
this would enable the Royalists to undermine the Republic and might 
distort its revolutionary character. The return in the first half of 
1969 of leading Royalists had already provoked strong opposition, 
mainly fran the intellectuals and various political groups, and Kadi 
al-Iryani had no illusion as to the reaction concerning the 
government's decision to include leading Royalists in the Republic's 
institutions. Both he and al-Ayni did their best to prepare the 
Republicans psychologically for this eventuality. Initially, on 30 
March, al-Ayni said that no specific agreement had been arrived at in 
Djedda with regard to this matter and that he merely urged the 
Royalists he met to return to their country.45 However, in the 
following days, a ccmmitment regarding the Royalists was disclosed in 
his report to the joint meeting of the Republican Council and Cabinet.
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It took one month of intensive campaigning by the YAR leaders to 
convince opponents to the Djedda accord of the propriety of the 
government's action. This effort amounted to a rationalisation of the 
decision after it had already been taken. However, due to the 
significance of the issue, al-Ayni had undertaken pre-decisional 
consultations with the various political pressure groups. According 
to him, before leaving for Djedda he had consulted the Nasirites, the 
Ba1 athists and the communists. All showed an understanding of the 
imperatives for the potential accord but insisted they could not 
support it publicly and might even express opposition.46 
Nevertheless, the opposition to the government's position was not 
effective enough to warrant a change of policy. There had been no 
opposition frcm within the two real centres of pcwer - the tribes and 
the army - and the intellectuals lacked unity and organisation. More 
importantly, al-lryani had joined forces with al-Ayni and their 
combined influence enabled the deal to be progressed. Sane suggested 
that al-lryani had foreseen opposition to the eventual reconciliation 
package and persuaded al-Ayni to head the government because of the 
latter' s appeal to the young officers and intellectuals who were most 
deeply opposed to reconciliation with the other side.47 Both 
Republican leaders took it upon themselves to rationalise the 
decision, and each appealed to a different Republican segment. While 
al-lryani was respected by the conservatives, al-Ayni was acceptable 
to the radicals. But since the conservatives were basically 
supportive of reconciliation, the real burden fell on al-Ayni.
For obvious reasons, the government was most concerned with the 
position of the military. In January 1970, possibly due to the 
beginnings of opposition with the army to a possible accord, the 
government removed the principal figures in the High Canmand kncwn to
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be radicals and replaced than with loyal officers. Subsequently the 
new canmand was gratifyingly receptive to the government's policy. No 
sooner had al-Ayni returned frcm Djedda, than Colonel Muhammad al- 
lryani (Deputy Ccrnmander-in-Chief of the armed forces and relative of 
Kadi al-lryani) and Colonel Husayn al-Maswari (the new Chief of Staff) 
sent, on April 1, a note congratulating the delegation on their 
success.48 A few days later, al-Ayni held a meeting with the senior 
officers at the High Canmand headquarters to explain the Djedda accord 
and the reasons behind the government's acceptance of it. This was 
follcwed by a similar meeting with junior officers for the same 
purpose. Questions were asked during these two meetings, but no 
objections to the government's decision were raised.49
Al-Ayni also held a meeting at the National Council headquarters where 
he explained the Djedda accord to civil servants from various parts of 
the country. Overall, he is said to have spoken to 700 officers, 
military cadets, civil servants and leaders of public opinion.
Although there was a certain amount of internal political pressure, 
there were no legislative constraints on the government's policy. The 
National Council's authority over the executive was enhanced by new 
powers accorded to it by a recent Republican decree, but it did not 
discuss the matter when this issue was referred to it. The National 
Council which was dominated by conservative shaykhs, had always 
supported the government. Most of its shaykhly members had 
enthusiastically supported the government's policy of reconciliation 
with the Royalists.50 The Council had rushed to support the 
reconciliation deal reached at Djedda even before the government 
presented its report on the issue. Upon hearing the report on the 
Djedda talks which Shaykh ibn al-Ahmar presented on 7 April, in which
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he had been a participant, the Council announced its approval of all 
the steps taken. Shaykh Abdallah ibn Husayn al-Ahmar was an old ally 
of Kadi al-lryani and had been associated with the moderate 
Republicans ever since the first intra-Republican discord surfaced in 
1963.51 For his part, al-Ayni reported to the Council on 14 April;
three days later, on 17 April, the chairman of the Council sent a 
letter to the chairman of the Republican Council in which he conveyed 
the their support for the government and further authorised it and the 
Republican Council to take whatever steps were necessary to reach a 
final agreement with Saudi Arabia over settlement of the war.52
According to an official Yemeni source, King Faysal stipulated during 
the Djedda talks that the establishment of relations between the 
Kingdom and the YAR was contingent upon the successful reconciliation 
of Republicans and Royalists within a period of three months. If the 
king had in fact made such a stipulation, Kadi al-lryani would have 
had this target date in mind when, at the end of April, he decided to 
tackle the problem. He called for an emergency joint meeting of the 
Republican Council and Cabinet. This meeting, which was also attended 
by Shaykh ibn al-Ahmar, was held on 25 April, 1970. At the 
conclusion, the Information and Yemeni Unity Affairs Minister made a 
statement in which he said that:
"the two councils, in their joint session, have considered the 
steps which should be taken to enhance the bases of peace in 
the light of the understanding reached during the 
participation of the Yemeni delegation, headed by the Premier 
and Foreign Minister Muhsin al-Ayni, in the Islamic Foreign 
Minister's Conference. The two Councils have approved the
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incorporation of sane brothers, who would return fran Saudi 
Arabia, in the Government.1,53
The decision did not specify either the number of posts or the nature 
of the portfolios to be allocated to the Royalists. In mid-May 
Colonel Yahya al-Mutawakkil, a Republican officer who had family 
contacts on the Royalist side, was sent to Djedda where he arranged 
the final details for the Royalist's entry into Government. On 23 
May, thirty senior Royalists arrived in Sana'a and on the same day 
three Republican decrees were issued. The first appointed Ahmad al- 
Shami to membership of the Republican Council along with Ahmad 
Muhammad Nu'man who had been living in Beirut ever since his release 
fran Cairo in October 1967. By the second decree, four Royalists were 
appointed to the Cabinet as ministers for state, public works, justice 
and Awkaf (Islamic endowments). The third decree provided for the 
appointment of twelve others to membership of the al-Madjlis al-Watani 
(the parliament), including Shaykh Ali al-Ghadir who was appointed 
vice-chairman of the Council.54 Three days later it was announced 
that all confiscated estates and properties belonging to the 
Royalists, except those belonging to the Hamid al-Din family, were to 
be returned to their former cwners.5 5
Of equal significance in the same decree was the appointment of three 
Royalists as governors of Sadah, al-Dawf and al-Mahabshah, all near 
the Saudi border. Seme sources suggest that this was a condition of 
the Djedda accord. An American authority on Yemen gathered the 
stipulation was that areas which had been under nominal control of the 
Royalists were to be administered by Royalist personnel. Indeed, this 
decentralisation of authority was, according to the same source, at 
the core of the understanding.56
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Even after the YAR government had carried out its part of the Djedda 
accord, Saudi Arabia hesitated for two months before it granted 
recognition to the Yemeni Republic. Sane Republican leaders believed 
that King Faysal was still sceptical of the Republicans' ability to 
implement the agreement in the face of internal opposition and 
preferred not to rush recognition. Others told the writer the Saudis 
were merely sticking to the three-month deadline stipulated at 
Djedda.57 On 21 July, 1970, a large delegation led by General al-Amri 
began a six-day visit to Saudi Arabia. During the visit, on 23 July, 
Saudi Arabia formally announced its recognition of the YAR, explaining 
that recognition was accorded, as the official statement puts it, 
because the Republican side had followed the steps agreed upon in 
Djedda, in March 1970.58 On July 26, at the conclusion of the visit, 
a joint communique was issued which stated that:
"as far as future bilateral relations were concerned the two 
sides have agreed to exchange diplomatic representation at 
ambassadorial level. Economic, cultural and commercial 
relations at various levels will also be exchanged. Bilateral 
agreements in all these fields will also be concluded. 
Furthermore, the two sides affirmed their resolve to co­
operate in a fruitful and constructive manner aiming at 
achieving the interests of the two sisterly countries."59
However, a period of adjustment lasting nearly one year was to pass 
before any real co-operation was initiated between Sana'a and Riyad. 
Furthermore, it took two years before the Kingdom sent its first 
resident ambassador to Sana'a, in May 1972.
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Feedback
The fact that reconciliation with Saudi Arabia also ended the 
Republican-Royalist war meant that most environmental ccrnponents were 
affected by the decision. Full examination of these effects would 
clearly be beyond the scope of this study. The following section will 
therefore be limited to effects which became apparent during the first 
year.
The behaviour of Saudi Arabia towards the YAR throughout the war 
became a vital element in the latter's decisional format. The 
reconciliation decision added to the significance of that element in 
several ways. It generally enabled the Kingdom to approach the YAR 
decision-makers directly and, through seme of them, penetrate the 
decision-making system of the Republic. As early as 1971, Saudi 
Arabia began paying regular subsidies to the three important forces in 
the Republic's structure. This constituted annual budget support for 
central government, payment of the armed forces personnel and direct 
subsidies to the tribes.60 The kingdom reportedly exerted immediate 
and direct pressure on al-Ayni1 s government to collaborate with 
Riyad's persistent endeavours to destabilise the NLF government in 
Aden.61 The YAR's own relations with the PRSY were adversely affected 
by the decision, as the latter perceived a threat to its security in 
the northern government's reconciliation with Saudi Arabia. 
Immediately after the decision was announced, the PRSY began to shew 
signs of unease. This prompted al-lryani in mid-June to send a letter 
to the PRSY president, in which he drew attention to certain 
insinuations critical of the reconciliation and reportedly warned 
against any escalation of such tendencies.62 Earlier, on 6 May, 
Premier al-Ayni had sent a letter to his Southern counterpart
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explaining the situation and assuring him that no harm should cane 
fran the YAR-Saudi reconciliation.6 3
YAR relations with other Arab states were only slightly affected by 
the decision. The radical Arab regimes in Syria, the UAR, Iraq and 
Algeria appreciated the reasons behind the YAR action and none 
objected to it.64 The Arab conservative regimes welcomed the 
prospects of Saudi-YAR co-operation and on 15 August Jordan went so 
far as to reinstate its recognition of the YAR. However, the Arabs in 
the Gulf perceived a threat fran the radical South Yemeni regime and, 
much as did Saudi Arabia, expected the YAR to take positive action to 
pronote a change in Aden towards a regime of more moderate 
complexion.6 5
The eventual acceptance of Royalists by the Republican government and 
the end of more than seven years of fighting were perceived by the YAR 
leaders as a vindication of their moderate policies, both domestic and 
foreign. This perception was enhanced by recognition of the YAR by 
Britain and France within a week of the Saudi recognition; Iran and 
Turkey added their recognition shortly afterwards.66 Although no 
immediate economic aid flowed from the West, the stage was obviously 
set for future co-operation. Equally gratifying to the Yemeni leaders 
was the fact that the scope of their country's relations had become 
broader. They concluded that their non-alignment policy had at last 
paid off.67
With respect to the international environment, the decision generally 
had a favourable impact. Contrary to Western reports, the USSR had 
consistently urged a peaceful settlement to the war and shewed no 
reservations towards the national reconciliation. Nevertheless, al-
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Ayni took no chances and assured the socialist countries through their 
Sana'a embassies that the government decision was motivated solely by 
the need for infusions of aid.68 Al-Ayni1 s argument was apparently 
accepted but YAR-USSR relations, which were already stagnant, remained 
so for the first few years of the 1970s.69
Two major internal environment components were particularly receptive 
to the feedback effect: the political structure and the economic
capability. Incorporation of ex-Royalists into the state's structure 
had only a mild and short-term effect on the composition of these 
institutions. At the beginning of 1971 when Ahmad al-Shami was 
appointed an Ambassador to the United Kingdom, ex-Royalists in the 
National Council were not elected to the newly established Madjlis al- 
Shura (the Consultative Assembly), while their colleagues in the 
cabinet at that time were out by 1975.70 A more important effect of 
the decision was reflected in consolidation of the post-November 
leadership's political capability. The national unity brought about 
by reconciliation improved the credibility of the regime whilst 
simultaneously enhancing its conservative character. A Western source 
observed that the Permanent Constitution promulgated in December 1970 
embodied the thinking of the older generation of the Free Yemenis who 
dominated the regime.71 However, there were still many Republicans 
who remained suspicious of this reconciliation. This was shewn by 
students protest strikes which took place in several tewns. Sane 
radical officers were transferred fran posts on suspicion that they 
might interfere with the arrangements.72
Contrary to expectations, the YAR's economic capability was not 
greatly enhanced as a result of reconciliation, at least not 
immediately. Several countries provided technical assistance, but
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little was offered in a way of direct financial support. The YAR 
leaders had hoped that the Saudi recognition would be followed closely 
by economic aid, and in fact economic aid had actually been promised 
during al-Amri' s visit to the Kingdom in July 1970. However, Saudi 
financial support did not materialise until a year later, in mid-1971. 
Meanwhile, the financial crisis had partially receded due to a $6 
million loan obtained from a Dutch Bank, guaranteed by the Saudi 
government. But during the first half of 1971 the situation 
deteriorated again and there was no knowing when relief would come.73
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The Findings
This investigation into the four major decisions has identified the 
procedures followed by the policy-makers in the decision-making 
process. These procedures have been included in the decisional
process of the investigation but are distinguished here to facilitate 
categorisation. Decisional procedures differ fran one case to 
another, and the procedures considered here are those which were shewn 
to be of most relevance. Although the pattern was not all followed in 
all the decisions examined here, they could be considered in toto as 
representing the procedures adopted by the YAR decision-makers during 
the war period. These are: the search for alternatives,
consultations, perceptions of policy options, the pattern of choice, 
and implementation.1
The Search For Alternatives
Despite the fact that the decisional situation properties in the 
Khartoum (August 1967) and Djedda (1970) Agreements were quite 
different from each other, the YAR decision-makers responded to them 
in a similar manner. Neither al-Sallal nor al-lryani attempted to 
search for alternative policies to cope with the new situation. 
Instead, both maintained existing policies. In this context al- 
lryani, who had ample time to gather information and consider 
alternatives to the Djedda proposals, responded to the situation much 
like al-Sallal who was under real stress during the day the Khartoum 
Agreement was announced. Both resorted to what might have looked like 
"defensive avoidance strategy". Hcwever, far fran being so, the 
maintenance of existing policies was based on the assumption that the
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policy had been carefully developed over time and, in addition, 
represented a consensus policy. Al-Sallal explained his rejection of 
the reactivation of the Saudi-Egyptian agreement of August 1965 on 
Yemen (the Djedda Agreement) by the fact that the accord had already 
been rejected by both the Government and people of Yemen. On the 
other hand, acceptance of the Djedda proposals of March 1970 was 
explained by al-lryani by the fact that they met long-established 
Republican terms for political settlement of the war.
These instances point to the possibility that even in situations of 
stress, decision-makers could, in certain cases, make their choices on 
a rational basis. Such a conclusion would confirm Verba's assumption 
that clarity of goals would suppress the irrational idiosyncratic 
influences on the decision-making. It might also question the 
validity of the widely held proposition which contends that, because 
of the primacy of individuals in the decision-making process within 
third world countries, decisions in these polities usually reflect 
less rational qualities.
Despite the fact that, in the cases of the PRSY and ERG, al-lryani 
and his colleagues in the YAR leadership would have preferred a wide 
choice, their options were still perceived as limited. The 
limitations were related not to constraints in the external 
environment but rather emanated fran another fundamental factor, 
namely the lack of capacity to achieve the desired objectives.
-242-
Consultations
In two of the four cases examined in this study, the YAR leadership 
perceived the need to also consult other states before taking 
decisions, to explain the need to them after they were adopted. The 
YAR leadership was careful to inform other states of the YAR's 
intention to resume relations with the FRG in 1969, much as did their 
predecessors who in the summer of 1967 undertook to solicit the views 
of other states over the Khartoum Agreement. It is significant, 
hcwever, that while non-Arab states were consulted and/or informed 
about the YAR policy in only two decisions, pertaining to the Khartoum 
Agreement and the intention to resume relations with the FRG, Arab 
states were consulted on virtually all four decisions. While frequent 
contacts with non-Arab governments stemmed fran the need for political 
support and/or military assistance, the more consistent consultation 
with Arab governments suggest an awareness of the possible impact of 
Arab reaction to the YAR domestic politics. In the FRG case, the 
eagerness of the YAR leadership to consult other Arab states before it 
took the decision shewed how keen it was to avoid possible Arab 
criticism and consequent public fury.
Consultation with domestic interests became an established procedure 
and, as we saw from this investigation, fairly wide-ranging 
consultations were held before each of the four decisions was taken. 
These consultations, hcwever, aimed mainly at ascertaining the views 
of the military and the tribal shaykhs, and secure their support. 
Whilst highlighting the vital nature of the issues involved, these 
consultations reflected the need by the regime for both internal and 
external support. At a local level, regular consultations with 
representatives of the influential groups and the lack of enthusiasm
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for mass political organisations brought out the dilenma confronted by 
many third world states regarding public participation in the 
formulation of state policies. It was a matter of being tom between 
the need for public support of the government's decisions and 
apprehension of too much public involvement in the process.
Perceptions of Foreign Policy Options
In weighing their policy options, the YAR leaders generally based 
their calculations on the perceived lack of capabilities to influence 
the predominantly hostile environment. In the PRSY case, the 
decision-makers perceived their options to be narrowed by lack of 
military capabilities sufficient to resist the Royalist forces which 
began to tighten their siege of the capital by the end of November 
1967 whilst simultaneously projecting a forceful position with regard 
to the anticipated independence of South Yemen. Al-lryani's citation 
of the NLF commitment to Yemen's unity as the reason for recognising 
the PRSY was one way of concealing the regime's inability to pursue 
active policies on both vital issues at the same time.
The decision concerning resumption of relations with the FRG (1969) 
revealed a pattern followed by the YAR in exploiting the opportunities 
latent in their external environment. Lacking the material capacity 
to influence the West regarding provision of much needed economic aid 
to the Yemeni Republic, the YAR leaders took advantage of the FRG's 
need to stem the accelerating rate of recognition of the GDR during 
1969 and offered re-establishment of severed relations with Bonn in 
exchange for economic aid. The FRG Government's eagerness to re­
establish relations with the Yemeni Republic was reflected in the
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frequent visits during the first months of 1969 to Sana'a by West 
German non-political missions, which enhanced the YAR leadership's 
perception of the value of their political leverage vis-a-vis the FRG.
This case supports the theory advanced by sane students of comparative 
politics to the effect that even small and resource-poor states like 
Yemen possess certain capacities to influence the international system 
to their advantage. A recent study concluded that a small state may 
influence a larger state if it possesses a desired "resource", be it a 
valued commodity or strategic location. The small state may threaten 
to align itself with the other side if satisfaction is not obtained.2 
Given vision and a tendency for taking bold initiatives by their 
leadership, such states could overcome constraints manifested in their 
limited material capacity and pursue a more active foreign policy.
At the same time, the Yemeni case highlights the limitations of 
theories which link the foreign policy actions of small states solely 
with their material capacity. It should be noted, hcwever, that the 
prior willingness of the FRG to trade off resumption of relations for 
economic aid and the communication of this willingness to Sana' a 
eliminated the need for the YAR leadership to survey the environment 
for such an opportunity. Inability of the small and poor states to 
respond to foreign policy problems and opportunities is usually 
attributed to incomplete information emanating from the lack of 
sufficient human and material bases for foreign policy negotiation.3
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She Choice Pattern
In all the cases examined here, decisions were made by the formal 
decisional forum, the Cabinet in the Khartoum case and jointly by the 
Republican Council and the Cabinet in the other three cases. They 
were arrived at by consensus, although the way consensus was achieved 
differed between cases. In the decision on reconciliation (1970) and 
the decision on resumption of relations with the FRG (1969), the 
shared belief among members of the decisional unit rather than the 
external threat was the decisive factor in achieving consensus. In 
both cases, members of the ultimate decisional unit - members of the 
Republican Council and the prime minister - shared the same basic 
values defined in terms of reconciliation with the Royalists and 
openness in foreign policy. These constituted agreed policies which 
enabled the formal decision-making forum, the Republican Council and 
the Cabinet, to take prompt and unanimous decisions on each of the 
above-mentioned issues.
Conversely, there was no consensus within the government in the case 
of the Khartoum decision. Hcwever, there was national consensus in 
opposition to the Agreement, which led the Cabinet members receptive 
to the accord to conceal their opposition and concur in the unanimous 
decision adopted by the Cabinet rejecting the Saudi-Egyptian accord. 
The consensus within the Government was ensured by al-Sallal when, on 
12 October, he formed a new Cabinet comprising only individuals 
supportive of the government's policy in this respect.
While the war only indirectly affected the way the decisions were 
adopted, it became the major determinant of the pattern by which the 
choice was made in the case of the PRSY decision (1967). Views within
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both the Republican Council and the Cabinet which were opposed to 
recognition of the irrminent declaration of an independent South Yemeni 
state were put aside amidst the feeling regarding the need for 
solidarity against the Royalists, who at that time were tightening 
their siege of Sana'a.
Implementation
One of the characteristics of YAR decision-making during the period 
covered by this study was the salience of external environmental
factors to the implementation of decisions. Lack of sufficient 
military and political capabilities to coerce other actors and lack of 
material enticements to persuade them to co-operate affected the way
decisions were implemented. The difficulties encountered by the YAR
decision-makers in achieving a full and speedy implementation to the 
two decisions on Reconciliation and the Khartoum accord reflected the 
limitations within the external environment. In the case of the
reconciliation with Saudi Arabia, the YAR leadership were frustrated 
by the delay of King Faysal's recognition of the YAR in implementation 
of the Djedda deal; it had to resort to persuasion which culminated in 
the Kingdom's recognition nearly four months after the accord was 
reached between the two states.
In the case of the Khartoum Agreement (1967), al-Sallal fs hesitation 
to deny entry to Yemen of the Arab Tripartite Ccnimission during the 
summer of 1967 in implementation of his decision to reject the Saudi- 
Egyptian accord underlined the YAR's limited capacities to carry out 
its decisions.
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The Environments
The study has identified the various YAR foreign policy inputs and the 
interaction among these components within the decision-making system 
in selected cases during the war period. More specifically, it has 
pointed to the influences on this polity, the individuals responsible 
for converting these influences into decisions, and the process 
followed in the formulation and implementation of these decisions.
The External Influences
The political and military polarisation which prevailed during the 
1960s an both systemic (international) and sub-systemic (regional) 
levels was the most important of the external influences which 
impinged on YAR foreign policy-making. During the first five years of 
the Yemeni revolution, fran 1962-1967, the Saudi-Egyptian involvement 
which came mainly within their politico-ideological rivalry 
constituted the most important of these external influences. Until 
June 1967, the Saudi-Egyptian conflict and Egypt's direct intervention 
in YAR policies influenced both the direction and content of YAR 
foreign policy. In the last three years of the 1960s the Arab 
pressures on the Yemeni Republic continued, not only in the form of 
the Saudis persistent attempts to force a political change in Sana'a 
but also in the intensification of the Saudi conflict with the PRSY.
With regard to influences from the non-Arab environment, the rivalry 
between the two superpowers was the most relevant. The strong Soviet 
support of the Yemeni revolution was in accordance with their strategy 
of undermining the West's influence in the Arabian Peninsula. This 
triggered a response fran the principal Western countries. In the
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pre-1968 period, both Western and Soviet interests in the Yemen 
conflict was reflected in active, albeit indirect, involvement of 
both, with the West aiding the Royalists and the Soviets supporting 
the Republicans. The Egyptian withdrawal from Yemen in the aftermath 
of the June 1967 war contributed to the decline of American and Soviet 
interest in Yemeni affairs, thus making the international environment 
relatively less relevant to YAR foreign policy, although the Soviet 
role continued to be vital to Sana'a throughout 1968.
The Internal Influences
Concern for the security of the Republic, which was triggered by the 
Royalist counter-revolution, became the most relevant factor in 
determining YAR foreign policy-making during the 1960s. This sense of 
insecurity was compounded during the active fighting (1962-1968) by 
the Republicans' continuing perception of their insufficient capacity 
to ensure the survival of the regime. As a consequence, the pre-1969 
foreign policy activities were restricted mainly to relations with 
countries which provided political and material support, including the 
UAR and the Soviet Union. Due attention was given to other important 
values, i.e. economic development and national reconciliation, only 
when the Royalist threat had subsided in late 1968. When that time 
came, YAR foreign policy activities were re-orientated towards 
relations with Saudi Arabia and the principal Western states which 
were perceived to possess the capabilities to help bring about the 
desired goals. Another major influence was the orientation of the 
pre- and post-1967 governing elite. The UAR intervention in Yemen was 
urged by almost all Republicans (but most strongly by the radicals) 
including President al-Sallal, who sought to increase the YAR
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capabilities of achieving its goals (including security) by aligning 
the YAR with the UAR and forging closer relations with the Soviet 
Union and Arab revolutionary governments. Conversely, the moderates 
who assumed pcwer on 15 November, 1967 undertook to disassociate the 
YAR fron intra-Arab bickering. A policy of reconciliation and 
openness was pursued during the last three years of the 1960s as a 
means of insulating the Republic against the negative effects of the 
Arab and international environment while at the same time benefiting 
fron all possible opportunities for the achievement of the regime's 
main objectives.
The Decision-Makers
While the official forum had changed with the changing constitutional 
arrangements, both President al-Sallal and Chairman al-Iryani had 
decisive roles in the formulation of YAR foreign policy. A 
combination of constitutional and political instability and the need 
for rapid decisions under the pressures of war conditions strengthened 
the primacy of the head of state in policy-making. Members of the 
ultimate decision-making unit, who after November 1967 included 
members of the Republican Council and the prime ministers, played an 
important role in the process of state, but al-Iryani continued to 
have the decisive say. His position within the group was due to the 
need for his political skill, his revolutionary credentials and his 
status as a religious judge (Kadi). In this respect, the situation is 
typical of that described by Sidney Verba in his study of leadership 
within a small group. He concluded that a person will assume a 
leading role if he is perceived to be effective in serving the cause 
and goals of the group and possesses certain characteristics among
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which is a respectable social status.4 Public participation in the 
formulation of foreign policy was urged by the head of state, who 
involved representatives of public opinion in the pre-decisional 
consultations. The military and the tribes had generally insisted on 
playing a role in the policy-making. But even in cases where these 
two groups reflected lack of interest, the head of state ensured that 
he consulted sane of their representatives.
The Pattern Of Policy Making
Observation of YAR decision-making during the war reveals a pattern 
quite different fron the suggestion advanced by J. Robinson and R. 
Snyder to the effect that interaction among members of a decision­
making unit is usually mediated by an elaborate canmunication 
network.5 In considering their political options, the YAR decision­
makers depended on face-to-face canmunication with no bureaucratic 
elements involved. The sensitive nature of foreign policy issues and 
the resultant allocation of foreign policy to top government were the 
main factors which determined the procedures followed in the process. 
Such influence was discemable in the fact that decisions in the four 
cases covered in this study were formulated within the ultimate 
decisional unit (the Republican Council and the Cabinet in the post- 
1967 era) in a strictly secret manner. Pre-decisional consultation 
among individuals outside the decision-making unit covered only the 
broad outlines of possible policy, but the formulation of the specific 
decision was the function of members of the ultimate decision-making 
unit (in the post-1967 era) and were reflected in the consensus which 
characterised the choice-selection process.
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Fran the foregoing conclusions, it has becane clear that the war 
situation was the most important determinant of YAR foreign policy­
making during the 1960s. Such a conclusion inevitably raises the 
question of the relevance of this study. One might specifically ask 
the following question: If many aspects of the YAR foreign policy­
making at that period were linked to the war situation, how relevant 
is this study to the understanding of the process in general?
In answering this question, attention must be drawn to the fact that 
although the situational context changed after the end of the war in 
1970, most of the other variables persisted and until recently changed 
very little. The scarcity of national resources and the resultant 
need for external support continue to form permanent elements in YAR 
foreign policy-making. In addition, several components of the 
decision-making system are linked to the degree of socio-political 
modernisation and are slew to change. A manifestation of this 
predicament is the snail-like institutional development which resulted 
in the continuation of the dcmination of personalities over the 
decision-making process. Another interrelated phenomenon is the slew 
pace of social and political mobility which resulted in the 
continuation of many of the 1960s leadership in power to this date. 
On the other hand, because of the linkages of intra-Arab politics, the 
YAR will continue to be attached to the Arab environment where most of 
the systemic constraints and opportunities originate. A prominent 
Yemeni politician has even suggested that the Yemeni leaders in the 
pre and post-revolutionary era followed a consistent pattern in their 
endeavour to insulate the country against foreign domination by 
balancing the influence of aspiring powers6 . These are considerations 
which constitute an element of continuity in YAR foreign policy­
making, regardless of the nature of the situation, and therefore make
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this study relevant. In any event, the study could not claim to be 
either exhaustive or unchallengeable. Its main objective has been to 
provide sane insight into the YAR's foreign policy-making during an 
extraordinary period of the country's history. It would have achieved 
a major objective if it could stimulate further inquiries into this 
unexplored field in the affairs of this little-studied Middle Eastern 
polity.
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C O R R I G E N D U M
LINE NO. EXISTING FORMULATION NEW FORMULATION
12
10
17
26
last
line
21-22
20
A new sentence is to be added 
after the first sentence.
The sentence beginning with
the words ' Except for 1
is to be changed.
A word to be inserted after 
the words "During the 1
The word 'and' to be changed.
The words 'any reciprocal 
recognition by Sana'a' is to 
be changed.
The sentence beginning with
the word 'Although ' is
to be changed.
The words 'recognition by the 
YAR' are to be changed.
The new sentence to be added is as 
follows: 'Saudi Arabia had consistently 
refused to talk to the Yemeni Republic 
even after the moderate leadership took 
over in Sana'a on November, 1967.
Replacement is as follows: 'Except 
for Major-General Abdullah Djuzaylay, 
Deputy Premier and Deputy Commander-in- 
Chief of the armed forces and Brigadier 
Abd al-Latif Daifellah, who enjoyed 
sane loyalties in the army, none of 
the other cabinet members enjoyed an 
independent power base.'
The new word is 'Cairo'
The new word is 'for*
Replacement is as follows: 'a likely 
establishment of diplomatic relations 
between Sana'a and Berlin".
The new sentence is as follows: .
'Although denied diplomatic relations 
with the YAR, the GDR was at first 
satisifed with non-diplomatic represenl 
ation in Sana'a."
The new formulation is as follows:
' establishment of relations with the 
YAR.'
21 The word 'recognition' is to
be deleted.
29 The words 'for full recognition' The new words are 'the issue',
is to be replaced.
The words 'recogntion of the 
GDR' are to be replaced.
Replacement is to read as follows: 
'establishment of full diplomatic 
relations between Sana'a and Berlin.
21 The words 'for recogntion'are
to be deleted.
22 The word 'recogntsed' is to be
replaced.
note 
No.15
last
line
The word 'recognise' is to be 
replaced.
The words 'by his colleagues' 
are to be deleted
Replacement is as follows: 'prcmote 
its relations with'.
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The word 'two' is to be 
replaced.
The word 'covered' is to 
be replaced.
The word 'Arabs' is to be 
replaced.
New words are to be added.
The word 'made' is to be 
replaced.
The sentence beginning with
the word 'They '
to be changed.
Replacement as follows: 'Saudi monarch
and the Yemeni president.'
Replacement is as follows: 'provided for
is to read 'regimes'
The word 'only' is to follow the word 
'not* and 'also' after the wor 'eminated
Replacement is by the words 'announced 
only'.
To be replaced by the following. 'They 
were made by few persons comprising 
the decision-making unit and were 
usually arrived at by consensus. The 
way consensus was achieved differed 
from a Case to another
250 18 A new word is to be inserted The new word to be added is 'decisions'. 
after the word 'state'
